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Foreword
Bill Cooke provides the most thorough examination to date of the potential 
benefits and costs of labor-management cooperation and factors that influence 
these potential benefits and costs. Recognizing that both labor and manage 
ment must derive greater net benefit from cooperation than either party can 
derive from strictly confrontational relationships, he critically examines why 
some joint efforts succeed and others fail.
It is fundamentally clear from his analysis that labor-management coopera 
tion requires high levels of mutual respect and trust. It is along these lines 
that Cooke tackles the overriding problem of how to sustain trust, commit 
ment, and enthusiasm for cooperation. Most writers on this subject conclude 
that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to sustain these programs in the long 
term. Unlike most writers, however, Cooke offers a set of specific recom 
mendations to avoid this pitfall and sustain the benefits to both labor and 
management on a continuing basis. These recommendations, which include 
establishing labor©s claim to its stake in business decisions and performance 
gains, are worthy of careful consideration.
Cooke provides a critical and balanced view of labor-management coopera 
tion. As such, the evidence and opinions provided are important reading for 
both union and business leaders. Unions and employers who have either already 
embarked on cooperative strategies or who are considering entering into 
cooperative relationships should read this book. Although it is doubtful that 
this book will be widely read by antiunion executives and managers, I wish 
it could be required reading for them. Perhaps they would learn that workplace 
efficiency and workplace democracy are not only compatible, they are essen 
tial to American competitiveness in a global marketplace.
Douglas Fraser
Former President of the UAW
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Trying To Make It Work In America
As we enter the 1990s, there can be little doubt that global and 
domestic nonunion competition have severely challenged traditional 
collective bargaining relationships in American industry. The market 
forces brought to bear on industry in the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s have led to important strategic choices by employers and unions, 
some adversarial and some cooperative. These choices may depict, on 
one hand, what some observers have called nothing less than the "trans 
formation of American industrial relations" (Kochan, Katz, and McKer- 
sie 1986), or what others, on the other hand, view as "nothing new under 
the sun" (Dunlop 1986). Whether one views ongoing changes as "noth 
ing new" or "a transformation," there are currently unprecedented 
widespread efforts at joint union-management activities designed to 
improve labor-management relations and company performance. Do 
these innovative joint activities, however, hallmark a shift away from 
historically adversarial relationships between unions and employers? 
Are industry and union leaders truly pioneering new and lasting part 
nerships, or are they merely going in circles, buying time and destined 
to return to a long tradition of adversarial relationships?
This study examines that fundamental question, although any defini 
tive answer at this time would be premature. The purpose of the study is 
to explore issues regarding the decision to cooperate, the success of 
cooperative efforts, and the problems that undermine these efforts. The 
analyses presented are based on a variety of secondary data sources, as 
well as data from nationwide surveys of plant managers, their local 
union leader counterparts, and executives of companies parent to the 
plants sampled.
This first chapter reviews the existing literature and sets the stage for
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the analyses that follow. Chapter 2 develops a general theoretical frame 
work, which broadly guides the subsequent analyses. Chapter 3 de 
scribes companywide labor relations strategies that have recently 
emerged and examines why some parties have embarked on cooperative 
relations and why just as many have not. In addition, the objectives and 
structure of joint programs, as reported by a sample of plant managers 
and local union leaders, are described. Chapter 4 examines how effec 
tive these joint efforts have been and identifies factors that appear to 
enhance or diminish their effectiveness. Chapter 5 addresses the under 
lying problems arising in the joint decisionmaking process that under 
mine the potential success and longevity of cooperative efforts. Finally, 
how the parties can go about resolving, avoiding, or minimizing the 
costly effects of these key problems is addressed in chapter 6. In that 
final chapter, implications for the union movement are also assessed.
I have chosen to avoid reporting many of the statistical details of my 
analyses. My purpose in doing so is to reach out to a wide audience of 
local and national union leaders, plant managers and company execu 
tives, and various policy makers wrestling with the issues at hand in 
practical ways. Although this wider audience needs and seeks informa 
tion and analyses that go beyond the wealth of reported case studies, 
reports, and testimonials, their interests are not in studying more aca 
demic methodological details and nuances of statistical modeling. 
Where I report the results of various statistical estimations, I have 
nevertheless adhered strictly to the results and hypothesized cause- 
effect relations. For readers especially interested in statistical details of 
the analyses, selected tables reporting the measurement and estimation 
of pertinent equations are provided in appendices to chapters 3 and 4. 
Nearly all the statistical estimations used in this study, furthermore, have 
been published recently or are in press in academic journals and hence 
available to the interested reader.
Review and Synthesis of the Literature
The literature on cooperation has grown rapidly in recent years, 
addressing both American and foreign experiences. Nearly all this
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literature is founded on single company and union case studies, reports, 
and testimonials. Recognizing that a detailed review of the literature is 
far beyond the intended scope of this study and that my specific purpose 
is to examine American industry experiences, I restrict my review to 
first providing a note on the limited early American experiments and, 
second, to a general synthesis of the reported potential benefits, costs, 
and problems associated with American cooperative activities. The 
review is further restricted to cooperative efforts between union repre 
sentatives and plant management that (a) are outside traditional contract 
negotiations and contract administration; (b) contain formalized mecha 
nisms for input from union representatives and/or the employees they 
represent into management decisions; and (c) are intended to improve 
company performance at the plant, either through direct efforts aimed at 
improving productivity, quality, efficiency, etc., and/or through indirect 
efforts aimed at improving employee well-being, job satisfaction, and/ 
or the labor-management relations climate.
Excluded, then, are cooperative problemsolving activities that might 
normally occur during the negotiation and the day-to-day administration 
of contracts. Although joint programs in health and safety, substance 
abuse, apprenticeship training, and many others can be seen as contrib 
uting to company performance and employee welfare, they are excluded 
from the present analysis. Their specific foci and restricted activities fall 
at the periphery of the present investigation and warrant separate analy 
ses. Also excluded are joint activities undertaken outside the plant or 
company, such as involvement in industry or communitywide joint 
activities or instances where the parties seek in concert to obtain trade 
protection from foreign competitors.
Except for labor-management committees, most joint activities are 
structured to elicit shop-floor participation. These programs, moreover, 
are very similar in structure and activity, regardless of program title. 
They revolve around team or group activities in which hourly and 
salaried employees put their heads together on a fairly regular basis. 
Their charge is to identify problems and opportunities for improvements 
in the workplace and, in turn, to develop plans for resolving problems or 
making improvements. Quality of Work Life (QWL) or Employee
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Involvement (El) programs do not differ substantially from quality 
circles, work teams, or employee involvement associated with gainshar- 
ing arrangements. The programs all appear to tackle issues surrounding 
productivity, product quality, efficiency, etc., and employee concerns 
about the work environment, the climate of labor-management rela 
tions, and overall job security. Most of these programs also have steering 
committees involving union officials, most restrict activities to subjects 
not governed by the labor contract, most are voluntary, and most provide 
training for team members.
These structural similarities do not imply that there are no differences 
among the team-based programs. The differences, however, have less to 
do with structure and purpose and more to do with: (a) the intensity of 
activity (e.g., the proportion of employees engaged in the activity, 
frequency of group meetings, the amount of team member training, and 
the extent of other joint programs); (b) the degree of emphasis placed on 
selected performance-related factors (quality, productivity, absen 
teeism, etc.); (c) the amount of autonomy and decisionmaking authority 
granted to teams; (d) the degree of union leader input (both in the design 
and facilitation of programs); and (e) whether or not there are financial 
incentives, either tied directly (i.e. gainsharing) or indirectly (i.e. profit 
sharing and stock ownership) to employee participation.
In spite of an extensive literature addressing cooperation, there are 
only a few surveys that begin to document the extent to which cooper 
ative activities have been undertaken. My 1986 nationwide survey of 
350 relatively large unionized manufacturing plants (described in chap 
ter 3) indicates that roughly 50 percent have established formalized joint 
programs of the kind described above. A 1983 Conference Board survey 
of approximately 400 large companies shows that 56 percent of union 
ized business units have established programs wherein "employees meet 
in small groups to discuss production and quality" (Kochan, McKersie, 
Chalykoff 1986). A 1983-1984 survey of approximately 350 unionized 
firms in Wisconsin shows that roughly 60 percent have established 
either shop-floor teams or joint committees (Voos 1987). A 1987 nation 
wide survey of approximately 150 unionized business units shows that 
about 50 percent have established "employee participation initiatives"
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(Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1988). Although these various surveys 
are not fully comparable due to differences in sampling, response rates, 
and definitions of cooperative activities, they do encompass the most 
extensive efforts to date at documentation of cooperative efforts. Taken 
together, these surveys indicate that roughly half of unionized private 
sector establishments have embarked on cooperative efforts of the 
nature to be examined by this investigation.
The fact that cooperation between unions and employers is occurring 
is (in Dunlop©s words) nothing new under the sun. Cooperative efforts to 
improve productivity and production standards were undertaken in the 
1920s and afterwards, especially in the railroad, textile, and garment 
industries (Slichter 1941; Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Jacoby 
1983). Pressured by the War Labor Board during WWII, unions and 
employers established thousands of joint productivity committees (de 
Schweinitz 1949). Throughout the post-WWII period, there also were a 
number of highly publicized but fairly isolated cooperative efforts 
undertaken; for example, by the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council, Rushton Coal Mine and the 
United Mine Workers, and Harmon International and the United Auto 
Workers (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Cammann, Lawler, 
Ledford, and Seashore 1985). History shows, however, that case after 
case of these uncommon cooperative committee and team efforts were 
short-lived.
Even though American union-management cooperative efforts de 
signed to improve company performance and labor-management rela 
tions are nothing new, the fact that these efforts are currently widespread 
is unprecedented. Were these efforts to become central and lasting 
institutional arrangements of successful collective bargaining rela 
tionships, then in the words of Kochan et al., American industrial 
relations would be transformed. For cooperative efforts to become 
lasting forms of partnership, however, it must ultimately be demon 
strated that the gains to cooperation are greater than the costs and that 
the net gains at least match those derivable from more traditional or 
highly adversarial relationships.
There is a rich descriptive literature that identifies a wide range of
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these potential benefits and costs to management, employees, and union 
leaders. The literature also identifies several general or recurring 
problems (e.g., insufficient trust and commitment) that appear to in 
crease specific costs associated with cooperation. Except for discussing 
these general problems, the literature is largely silent, nonetheless, with 
respect to identifying salient factors that affect potential benefits and 
costs, and, consequently, affect the success of cooperative efforts. One 
of the primary purposes of the present study is to begin filling that void.
Potential Benefits and Costs of Cooperation
Potential benefits and costs associated with cooperation must be 
examined through the eyes of managers, bargaining unit employees, and 
union leaders. In synthesizing the literature, therefore, I attempt to 
distinguish potential benefits and costs as they may be realized by these 
three parties to cooperative activities. Because most of these potential 
benefits and costs are fairly self-explanatory, I avoid any lengthy discus 
sion but provide interested readers with citations of reports in which 
richer descriptions and analyses can be found. The potential benefits 
and costs, as the reader will surely recognize, are sometimes extrinsic or 
pecuniary and sometimes intrinsic or nonpecuniary, some depict more 
tangible outcomes than others, and some outcomes are potential benefits 
to one or more parties but are potential costs to another.
Potential Benefits and Costs to Management
Potential Benefits: The potential benefits to management from plant- 
level cooperation reflect various dimensions of the labor costs and 
nonlabor cost components of production. Labor costs are potentially 
reduced by making the production process more efficient, increasing 
output per unit of labor, and reducing the cost of labor per unit of product 
produced. Increased product demand can be derived by improving 
product quality, giving greater attention to customer satisfaction, and 
dealing more effectively with customers. By searching out ways of 
eliminating unnecessary overhead expenditures, minimizing waste and 
rework, reducing materials costs and materials handling and inventory
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costs, enhancing the utilization of capital equipment, and dealing more 
effectively with suppliers, nonlabor costs are potentially reduced. Also 
by minimizing unnecessary labor-management conflicts and problems 
and by resolving these more quickly and satisfactorily, associated lost 
productive time and inefficiencies are minimized. Last, cooperative 
efforts can potentially increase worker commitment to and identity with 
company goals, which lead to more aggressive efforts by employees and 
union leaders at being competitive and at improving workplace 
practices.
Drawing on the literature, the following potential benefits have been 
identified from a wide range and mix of cooperative efforts.
1. Increased Productivity and Efficiency
See Voos (1987); Schuster (1984, ch.6); Cohen-Rosenthal and 
Burton (1987, pp. 32-33); Rosenberg and Rosenstein (1980); 
Contino (1986); Boyle (1986); Douty (1975); Pearlstein (1988).
2.Improved Quality of Product and Service
See Camens (1986); Voos (1987); Boyle (1986); Katz, Kochan, 
and Gobeille (1983); Katz, Kochan, and Weber (1985); Smith 
(1986a).
3.Improved Customer Relations and Service 
See Mclntosh (1988).
4.Reduced Waste and Rework
See Boylston (1986); Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille (1983); Cam- 
ens (1986).
5.Reduced Overhead, Materials Costs, and Material Handling 
Costs
See Dulworth (1985); Lazes and Costanza (1984).
6.Enhanced Supplier Service
See Roadley (1988); Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1988). 
7.Improved Communications
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See Driscoll (1980); Boyle (1986); Siegel and Weinberg (1982); 
U.S. Department of Labor (1982 and 1983); Smith (1988).
8.Improved Relationships Between Supervisors and Employees
See Fuller (1981); Boyle (1986); Burck (1981,a); Kochan, Katz 
and Mower (1984, pp. 134-138).
9. Reduced Grievances and Disciplinary Action
See Guest (1979); Watts (1982); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1982); Smith (1988b).
10. Stronger Identity and Commitment to Company Goals
See Boyle (1986); Goodman (1980); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1982); Walton (1985); Verma and McKersie (1987); Schuster 
(1989).
11. Reduced Absenteeism, Tardiness, and TUrnover
See Guest (1979); Goodman (1980); Cammann, Lawler, Led- 
ford, and Seashore (1984, p. 110); Goodman and Lawler (1979); 
Siegel and Weinberg (1982).
12.Increased Organizational Flexibility and Adaptability
See Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, p. 31); U.S. Department 
of Labor (1982 and 1983); Lawler and Drexler (1978).
Potential Costs: Organizational shifts from traditional and generally 
adversarial collective bargaining relationships and autocratic manage 
rial practices (which left little room for employee or union leader 
participation in management decisions), demand substantial change in 
an organization©s culture, values, and shared ideologies. These organi 
zational shifts sometimes require sizable resources for reorientation and 
training of managers, supervisors, rank-and-file, and union represen 
tatives. The costs of change are not only financial but include non- 
pecuniary costs to many managers and supervisors in the form of 
perceived loss of authority, power, and status. Because of improvements 
in productivity and efficiency, furthermore, the perceived threat of job 
loss (attributable to shifting authority to employees) among managers
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and supervisors is heightened. In response to these potential costs, 
managers and supervisors are less inclined than otherwise to genuinely 
embrace cooperation, which necessarily reduces some of the potential 
company benefits identified above. There is also testimony that commit 
tee and team-based meetings are often marked by wasted or generally 
unproductive time, limiting management©s ability to react quickly or 
complete production schedules in a timely fashion. In addition, when 
important disputes arise, the parties sometimes make unwise compro 
mises in the name of bolstering cooperation. In summary, the literature 
has addressed the following potential costs of cooperation to 
management.
1. Added Costs for Reorientation and Training of Managers, Employ 
ees, and Union Representatives
See Tick, McKersie, and Greenblaugh (1982); Lawler and Drexler 
(1978); Siegel and Weinberg (1982); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1982); Lee (1987).
2. Perceived Loss of Authority and Status
See Lawler and Drexler (1978); Guest (1979); Schlesinger and 
Walton (1977); Rosow (1979); Jacoby (1983); Siegel and Weinberg 
(1982); Rosow (1986).
3.Displacement or Loss of Employment for Middle-Managers and 
Supervisors
See Schlesinger and Walton (1977); Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 
13).
4. Wasted Time Spent in Meetings 
See Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1988).
Potential Benefits and Costs to Employees
Potential Benefits: Unless joint activities yield financial rewards (e.g., 
in the form of gainsharing) and greater employment security, the potential 
benefits to bargaining unit employees are largely intrinsic, as derived 
from more harmonious working relations and higher quality of work-
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lives. The literature highlights how employees derive these potential 
benefits by experiencing greater participation or involvement in their 
work, having more say in how work gets accomplished, and improving 
work conditions and environments. Assuming employees prefer more 
harmonious over less harmonious working relations, employees poten 
tially benefit from fewer grievance disputes and quicker problem resolu 
tion. Last, cooperative relationships often provide employees enhanced 
dignity, self-esteem, and pride in their work. In summary, the literature 
identifies and addresses the following potential benefits to employees:
1. Increased Intrinsic Rewards from the Participation or Involvement 
Process
See Guest (1979); Goodman (1980); Work in America Institute, 
Inc. (1982, ch. 3); Parker (1985, ch. 2).
2. Greater Say in How Work Gets Accomplished
See Kochan, Katz and Mower (1984, ch. 4). 
3.Improved Working Conditions
See U.S. Department of Labor (1983); Ruttenberg (1988).
4. Enhanced Financial Rewards From Gainsharing and Other Incen 
tive Arrangements
See Schuster (1989, 1984, ch. 6); Cummings and Molloy (1977, 
ch. 21,22); Dulworth (1985); Pearlstein (1988); Ross and Ross 
(1986).
5.Improved Supervisor-Employee Relationships
See Burck (1981,a); Fuller (1981); Boyle (1986); Kochan, Katz, 
and Mower (1984, pp. 134-138).
6. Reduced Grievances and Quicker Resolution of Problems
See Burck (198la); Kochan, Katz, and Mower (1984, pp. 
134-138); Smith (1988b).
7.Heightened Dignity, Self-Esteem, and Pride in Work
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See U.S. Department of Labor (1983); Work in America Institute, 
Inc. (1982, ch. 3); Mclntosh (1988).
Potential Costs: In some cases management may be perceived as 
promoting cooperative activities as a guise for having employees simply 
work harder as opposed to working smarter, which leads to greater 
fatigue and stress. By helping invent ways to increase productivity and 
efficiency, some employees fear displacement or loss of employment for 
themselves or co-workers. Some employees, furthermore, apparently 
fear having to relinquish their secret work practices, which would 
eliminate personal advantages in completing tasks more efficiently than 
others or in receiving pay incentives. More skilled or senior employees 
dislike sharing unwanted tasks, which is frequently required by team 
efforts. There is, finally, anecdotal evidence that some employees shun 
unwanted peer pressure to be more or less involved in cooperative 
activities. In summary, the literature identifies the following potential 
costs of cooperation to employees:
1. Working Harder, Not Necessarily Smarter 
See Oswald (1986); Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 14).
2. Displacement or Loss of Employment From Increased Productiv 
ity and Efficiency
See Zager (1977); Schuster (1984, ch. 6); Simmons and Mares 
(1985, ch. 14); Work in America Institute, Inc. (1982, ch. 3) 
Camens (1986); Banks and Metzgar (1989).
3.Unwanted Peer Pressure to be Involved or Not Involved 
See Spector (1986).
Potential Benefits and Costs to Unions
In weighing the potential benefits and costs of joint programs, union 
leaders estimate the value of joint programs in satisfying the needs and 
promoting the interests of (a) their members, (b) the union as an 
institution, and (c) themselves as leaders. The potential benefits and 
costs to employees described above, therefore, are weighed by union
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leaders. The potential benefits and costs outlined below, on the other 
hand, are pertinent to the union as a viable institution and to the leaders 
who, it can be assumed, prefer to benefit rather than be hurt politically 
by engaging in and supporting joint activities.
Potential Benefits: By satisfying member interests that would not 
otherwise be possible to satisfy except through cooperation, union 
leaders potentially receive recognition from members. The key here is, 
of course, that members reap benefits from cooperation and that they 
recognize these benefits were gotten via union leader involvement in 
establishing or modifying cooperative activities and could not have been 
gotten via traditional collective bargaining. This recognition, however, 
is sometimes thwarted by managers failing to share recognition with 
union leaders for benefits obtained. Cooperation also potentially pro 
vides union leaders with greater knowledge of and input into manage 
ment decisionmaking, which, in turn, allows the union leadership to 
make better informed decisions affecting the membership and the union 
as an institution. Cooperation, that is, potentially gives union leaders 
greater access to pertinent company information, earlier notification of 
pending organizational changes, and opportunities to persuade manage 
ment to modify their decisions.
Cooperation, in addition, potentially leads to improved communica 
tion, which (everything else the same) can lead to more harmonious 
interpersonal relations and trust between managers and union leaders. 
As an outgrowth of reduced grievances and disciplinary action, cooper 
ation reduces the conflicts and costs associated with day-to-day contract 
administration. Finally, some unions have found that the organizational 
structures surrounding joint committee and team-based activities pro 
vide avenues for more regular input by members in union activities and 
policy making. In summary, the literature identifies the following poten 
tial benefits to union leaders:
1. Recognition from Members for Improvements
See Burck (1981,a and 1981,b); Cammann, Lawler, Ledford, and 
Seashore (1984, pp. 11, 21-22); Greenberg and Glaser (1980); 
Dyer, Lipsky, and Kochan (1977).
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2. Greater Participation and Input in Management Decisions
See Fraser (1986); Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, p.20); 
Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 14); Work in America Institute, 
Inc. (1982, ch. 4).
3. Improved Communications Between Union Leaders and Managers 
See Driscoll (1980); Smith (1988b).
4. Reduced Day-to-Day Contract Administration Problems
See Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, pp. 16-17); Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower (1984, pp. 134-146); Watts (1982).
5.Greater Membership Input into Regular Union Activities and 
Policies
See Burck (198la); Kochan, Katz, and Mower (1984, pp. 
138-146); Bieber (1984, p. 34).
Potential Costs: The adjustment from traditional adversarial roles to 
roles that embrace cooperation is just as trying and difficult (if not more 
so) for union leaders as it is for managers. One potential cost to union 
leaders is being coopted or being perceived as coopted by manage 
ment doing management©s bidding, that is, instead of protecting the 
interests of the union as an institution or its members more directly. It has 
also been reported that employers potentially use cooperative programs 
to undermine or bypass the union or its leadership in various ways: by 
appealing directly to employees for employer-initiated changes, using 
team-based efforts to alter collective bargaining agreements (e.g., with 
respect to scheduling, assignments, bidding, and job classifications); by 
usurping grievance procedures and union authority in resolving griev 
ances; and by weakening the union at the bargaining table (either by 
creating or uncovering divisions in bargaining unit preferences over 
negotiable issues).
The choice to embrace cooperation and choices about the form and 
extent of joint activities are fraught with political conflict over proper 
leadership roles. Here, dissension among leaders and the rank-and-file 
leads to increased uncertainty of reelection. Evidence also suggests that
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there can be a loss of member loyalty or commitment to the union (and, 
hence, loss of union influence) as employees begin to accept and identify 
more closely with company goals. In summary, the literature identifies 
the following potential costs:
1. Perceived Cooptation by Management
See Goodman (1980, p. 490); Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, 
pp. 17-18); U.S. Department of Labor (1982, 1983); Work in 
America Institute, Inc. (1982, ch. 4); Hoyer and Huszczo (1988); 
Strauss (1980).
2.Undermining Traditional Roles of Unions and Collective 
Bargaining
See IAM Research Report (1984, pp. 16-21); UBC Bulletin (1984, 
pp. 41-42).
3.Heightened Political Conflict Over Leadership Role
See Hammer and Stern (1986); Strauss (1980); Levine and Strauss 
(1989).
4.Increased Uncertainty of Reelection
See Hoyer and Huszczo (1988). 
5. Loss of Member Commitment and Union Influence
See Schlesinger and Walton (1977); Kochan, Katz, and Mower 
(1984, pp. 134-146); Guest (1979); Watts (1982).
Fundamental Problems Encountered
When the parties experience too much of the potential cost or too little 
of the potential benefits outlined above, problems arise. Indeed, one 
could identify a multitude of day-to-day problems and frequent crises 
encountered in cooperative activities. Most of these problems, it ap 
pears, boil down to several more fundamental problems. First, the 
literature and testimony repeatedly suggest that cooperative efforts 
between unions and employers are based on fairly uneasy or delicate
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partnerships and that sufficient trust between managers and union lead 
ers must be developed over time. When sufficient trust cannot be 
developed, joint activities are limited. When trust wanes or is violated, 
joint activities likewise wane. (Schuster 1984; Rosow 1986; Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower 1984.)
Sufficient commitment by all parties to cooperative efforts is also an 
essential ingredient to any long-run success. (See Schuster 1984, pp. 
199-200; Cutcher-Gershenfield 1988; Wintergreen 1986; Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower 1984.) The stronger the commitment, the more 
intensified and diffused these cooperative activities are likely to become. 
Furthermore, trust and commitment appear to be inextricably inter 
twined. Without sufficient trust, commitment is hard to attain; and 
without sufficient commitment, high levels of trust are unobtainable.
In their survey of approximately 140 union representatives, Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower (1984) ask the extent to which "loss of union support" 
and "loss of plant management support" limit the expansion of the 
participation process. They report (see their table 5-3, p. 147) that 43 
percent of the respondents do not perceive loss of plant management 
support as a problem. About 37 percent perceive it to be somewhat of a 
problem and 20 percent perceive it to be "quite a bit" or "a very great 
deal" of a problem. With respect to loss of union support, roughly 55 
percent of the respondents report that it is not a problem, 37 percent 
report it to be somewhat of a problem, and about 20 percent report it to 
be a much more serious problem.
A third fundamental problem that arises is disenchantment and de 
moralization when anticipated or hoped-for gains are not gotten. When 
the kinds of potential benefits described above are not realized, enthusi 
asm for joint activities is known to wane (Camens 1986; Cutcher- 
Gershenfeld 1988; Kochan, Katz, and Mower 1984). Kochan, Katz, 
and Mower report that, based on their survey of union representatives, 
over 60 percent of union respondents perceive "worker disenchantment" 
as somewhat of a problem, and nearly 35 percent perceive disenchant 
ment as "quite a bit" or "a very great deal" of a problem. Only 4 percent 
respond that disenchantment among workers is not a problem. In a 
second related question, Kochan, Katz, and Mower report that 27
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percent of the union respondents find "layoffs or other employment 
cutbacks" to be somewhat of a problem, whereas 53 percent find it to be 
a more serious problem limiting the expansion of cooperative activities.
Last, some recent literature describes how many problems arise 
because of the inherent difficulty of juxtaposing or balancing coopera 
tion and more traditional collective bargaining (Bluestone 1987; Wever 
1988; Hammer and Stern 1986; Smaby et al. 1988). Alternating be 
tween traditional contract negotiations and administration of contractual 
rights via grievance, arbitration, and discipline procedures, on one 
hand, and cooperative, mutually beneficial problemsolving, on the 
other, requires a delicate balancing of two fairly distinct processes.
Although the literature addressing these fundamental problems is 
rich, it remains largely testimonial and descriptive. There appear to be 
no scientific investigations into causes of these problems or their effects 
on cooperative efforts. Nearly all the literature addressing the problems 
of distrust, insufficient commitment, and demoralization, furthermore, 
has been filtered through the views of union leaders and rank-and-file; 
the views of managers are generally missing.
Conclusions
With very few exceptions, the existing literature about American 
union-management cooperation is generally descriptive and impres 
sionistic. Although it is a rich and valuable literature, as a whole it lacks 
comparability across reports. It is piecemeal in its focus and, hence, 
lacks a broad theoretical grounding. It rarely provides any form of 
empirical testing of basic propositions or related specific hypotheses. 
The limited number of empirical investigations, furthermore, have 
largely attempted to determine whether or not joint efforts have had an 
effect on company performance and labor relations (Schuster 1983 and 
1984; Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille 1983; Katz, Kochan, and Weber 
1985; Katz, Kochan, and Keefe 1987; Voos 1987 and 1989). Although 
these empirical studies provide important evidence about outcomes 
(which are reviewed in chapter 4), they tell us very little about which
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factors or what conditions lead to more or less successful cooperative 
efforts. Finally, except through highly descriptive assessments, the 
literature also tells us little about the key factors that induce or impede 
the establishment of cooperative arrangements between unions and 
employers. In summary, our understanding of cooperation is highly 
fragmented and incomplete.
The purpose of this study is to help begin filling in some of these 
holes, first by developing more fully a general theoretical model of 
labor-management relations and the role of cooperation in these rela 
tions, and second by developing and testing general propositions and 
specific hypotheses about factors affecting decisions to cooperate and 
the outcomes of cooperative efforts. Cooperation between American 
employers and unions historically has been uncommon and short-lived; 
in a sharp break with history, it is widespread today. A far richer 
understanding of what makes cooperation work or fail is imperative, 
since without that understanding history will surely repeat itself, not 
necessarily for the right reasons.

A Theoretical Framework
Juxtaposing Conflict and Cooperation
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a fairly general theoretical 
framework of labor-management relations. By establishing some highly 
simplified assumptions of behavior and general propositions about the 
relationship between labor and management, the framework guides the 
analyses of decisions to embark upon, maintain, and extend cooperative 
activities; the salient factors affecting the outcomes of cooperation; and 
the key problems encountered in cooperative relationships. The frame 
work also provides guidance in assessing several parameters of success 
fully moving from temporal experimentation with cooperative activities 
to long-term partnerships between labor and management, the subject 
of chapter 6.
There have been recent efforts at developing a general theoretical 
framework of labor-management relations by Kochan, Katz, McKersie 
(1986), Cooke (1985), and Barbash (1984). In all three models, en 
vironmental factors (economic, technical, and sociopolitical) play key 
roles in shaping the employment relationship and associated outcomes. 
In all three, certain organizational factors (e.g., collective bargaining 
structure, size, history, etc.) also shape the employment relationship 
and associated employment outcomes. The general environmental and 
organizational contexts of these models are basically extensions of 
Dunlop©s (1958) systems framework of industrial relations.
Barbash and Cooke develop some fairly explicit assumptions of 
behavior of employers, employees, and union leaders. Within the en 
vironmental and organizational constraints, the parties go about max 
imizing or minimizing toward preferred optimal outcomes in the em 
ployment relationship. Barbash, however, is not explicit about how these 
behaviors within given constraints lead the parties to engage in cooper-
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ative activities. Although largely consistent with Barbash©s and Cooke©s 
models, Kochan, Katz, and McKersie fail to clearly state a full set of 
fundamental assumptions of behavior for all parties that would drive the 
employment relationship, and in turn explain employment-related out 
comes. Although (unlike Barbash) Kochan, Katz, and McKersie ad 
dress cooperation, except in a piecemeal fashion it is unclear how their 
theoretical framework predicts the decision to cooperate or explains 
either the intensity of those efforts or associated outcomes. In this 
chapter, I extend my earlier theoretical treatment of industrial relations 
theory (Cooke 1985) by focusing more sharply on the logic underlying 




In the discussion that follows, it is held that both management and the 
workforce want to get "as-much-as-possible" for itself out of the employ 
ment relationship. This does not imply that each party is purely egoistic 
or downright greedy (although such behavior is not necessarily ex 
cluded). Nor does this imply that either party completely ignores the 
interests of the other party; it cannot without at some point jeopardizing 
its own welfare, or ultimately destroying the relationship altogether. 
Getting as-much-as-possible simply implies that most people prefer 
more over less of a desired "pie," and that this basic desire strongly 
governs each party©s behavior.
In getting as-much-as-possible, two key dimensions of the employ 
ment relationship come into play: (1) the overall size or value of the pie 
available to the parties, and (2) the division of the pie between the 
parties. American history shows that, until very recently, management 
stakeholders were typically viewed as having sole responsibility for 
increasing the size or value of the pie via decisions related to operations, 
marketing, finance, and human resources. This view of management©s
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exclusive domain has, historically at least, not only been widely shared 
by management and its stakeholders, but by the workforce and union 
leaders as well. Concurrently, union leaders have been viewed as agents 
whose primary role has been to wrest from management as-much-as- 
possible for the workforces they represent, leaving to management the 
full responsibility and task of baking a bigger pie or else giving up some 
of the dessert it might otherwise enjoy. Hence, until lately, management 
has baked the pie and fought with the union over how it was going to be 
divided (in Doug Eraser©s words) "even before it got baked." 1
Union-management cooperation, in contrast, reflects a concerted 
effort in which the workforce and its representatives share some of the 
responsibility and, hence, decisionmaking in baking the pie (ideally a 
larger pie, at a lower cost and/or of higher quality). The basic dilemma 
underlying cooperation is that it requires cooperation and trust. The 
table is laid, knives and forks clearly in sight. Each party knows where 
the other is coming from. When it comes to dividing the pie, however 
(especially when a 9-inch pie has been reduced to an 8-inch pie), the 
parties again pit themselves against one another. The knives are held in 
hand, trust diminishes if not vanishes, and there are losers and winners.
In the following subsection, I lay out a more thorough and rigorous 
theory than the metaphor of baking and dividing pies. Although the 
reader may find the exposition a bit abstract, over-simplified, and/or 
cumbersome for his or her tastes, the theoretical framework yields some 
fundamentally important propositions about cooperation, which in turn 
guide the empirical investigation and overall analysis.
General Assumptions and Propositions
In the abstract, one can, for the moment, imagine that there is a fixed 
sum of net gains derivable from a given employment relationship at any 
point in time. This sum of net gains is a function of both extrinsic 
rewards (e.g., profits and wages) and intrinsic rewards (e.g., recogni 
tion and autonomy). For ease in the discussion that follows, the com 
bination of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards will be referred to as "utility."
This fixed sum of utility at any point in time is divided between (a)
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management (including all management stakeholders in the employ 
ment relationship) and (b) the workforce (including its union represen 
tatives). Assuming that both management and the workforce prefer 
more over less utility from the employment relationship, it follows that 
each party normally seeks to maximize its respective gains (hereafter 
called "absolute utility"). This dimension of the employment rela 
tionship is characterized by inherent conflicts of interest; what one party 
gets has been lost by the other or is foregone. These conflicts of interest 
are resolved at any point in time by relative power.
The absolute amount of utility enjoyed by either party, however, is 
dependent on the total utility derivable from the employment rela 
tionship. It is this variable-sum dimension of the employment rela 
tionship that inhibits either party from exercising too much power over 
the division of total utility. It is also this variable-sum dimension that 
may induce the parties to cooperate in ways that will increase total utility 
over time. As discussed below, the variable-sum dimension is a function 
of the combined organizational power of management and the work 
force, not the relative power of either.
For illustration, the area within the solid-line circle in figure 2.1 
depicts the total level of utility at any given point in time (TUi + j, t). The 
shaded area within TUi + j.t envelops the absolute amount of utility 
derived by management (AUi )t) in a hypothetical employment rela 
tionship, while the nonshaded area represents the absolute level of utility 
derived by the workforce (AUj )t). The relative share of utility by man 
agement equals AlT/PUi + j, and the relative share of utility by workers 
equals AUj/TUi + j. The area under the broken-line circle (TUi+j,t + n) 
depicts potential total utility in period t+n. The greater the circum 
ference of the circle, the greater the total utility.
For the sake of simplicity, an underlying assumption of the present 
theory is that both managers and workers seek to maximize the absolute 
level of utility derivable from the employment relationship. Toward the 
goal of gaining as-much-as possible, the parties© behavior is dependent 
upon relative and total power. Relative power determines the distribu 
tion of a fixed sum of utility derivable from the employment rela-
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Figure 2.1 




tionship. Total power, on the other hand, determines the size of the total 
utility available to the two parties.
Relative Power
In defining relative power, we begin with Chamberlain©s definition:
[I]f the cost to B of disagreeing on A©s terms is greater than the cost of 
agreeing on A©s terms, while the cost to A of disagreeing on B©s terms is 
less than the cost of agreeing on B©s terms, then A©s bargaining power is 
greater than that of B©s. (Chamberlain 1951, p. 221)
Chamberlain©s definition requires that we estimate the perceived costs 
of agreeing and disagreeing in order to determine which party has 
greater relative power. Our interest, however, is one of identifying
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factors that increase or decrease the costs of agreeing and disagreeing 
for each party. Toward this understanding, the following implicit model 
of relative power is stated and briefly explained below:
n , .. n f ( 1 , sources of power;Relative Powen=f I         +      -——-




The first component of the relative power function envelops Cham 
berlain©s notion of the "cost of agreeing," which maintains that the 
relative power of party i decreases as the cost of demands upon party j 
increase. For example (everything else the same), a union demanding a 
$0.25 increase in compensation per hour is less likely to obtain that 
demand than if it demanded only $0.05. In the first instance, the 
employer will resist more because the added labor costs will have more 
of an effect on current profits or on product price and, hence, future 
profits. In addition, where profitability changes over time or differs 
across employers, and/or the ability to pass along costs to consumers 
changes over time or across employers, the cost of a $0.25 increase in 
hourly compensation varies; consequently, the ability of unions to obtain 
such increases changes over time and varies across employers. Addi 
tionally, the cost to employers and union representatives appears to vary 
according to perceived nonpecuniary costs associated with demands 
upon either party. Demands by management to involve workers in 
quality circles, for instance, will be perceived by various union repre 
sentatives as more or less costly to their constituents© well-being or to the 
union as an institution. Similarly, demands by union leaders to have 
input into strategic decisions over plant closures will be perceived by 
various managers as a more or less costly intrusion on their authority or 
status.
In summary, the central point here is that either party has greater 
relative power to obtain smaller demands than larger ones (everything
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else constant). Hence, in comparing shifts in relative power between the 
parties, either over time or across organizations, by definition alone one 
must control for the actual or perceived costs of any demands.
Sources of Power
The second component of the relative function holds that as the 
sources of power available to party i to force its demands on party j 
increase (relative to the sources of power available to j to reject the 
demands of i), the relative power of i increases. With respect to Cham 
berlain©s thesis, sources of power depict the ability of either party to 
impose costs of disagreeing upon the other party.
The sources of power available to the parties are derived from the 
economic, sociopolitical, and technical environments of the employer 
and from organizational features of the employer and union. The eco 
nomic environment reflects at any given point in time the supply and 
demand conditions of the employer©s product and labor markets. An 
increase in area unemployment, for instance, may increase the supply of 
workers to an employer. In turn, the employer©s relative power at the 
bargaining table increases, allowing the employer to "toe the line" on 
demands for increased wages and benefits if not obtain give-backs 
from the union. The sociopolitical environment affects relative power as 
public sentiment, laws, regulatory policies and procedures, and court 
decisions favor the bargaining stance of either party. The shift in the 
stance of the NLRB from Milwaukee Spring I to Milwaukee Spring II, 
for example, increased the relative power of companies to relocate 
production (or obtain concessions) during the life of an agreement 
(unless explicitly otherwise written in the contract). 2 The technical 
environment imposes constraints on either party as the substitutability 
of capital for labor, the continuous nature of production, and/or the 
strategic positioning of work groups changes or differs across organiza 
tions. The increased capabilities and reduced price tags on industrial 
robots over the last 15 years, for example, have effectively reduced the 
relative power of workforces in many industries.
Finally, certain features of organizations enhance the relative power 
of either party and/or certain groups within organizations. Of particular
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importance are the organizational structures, philosophies, and re 
sources of employers and unions. Compare, if you will, two companies, 
identical with the exception that Company A has all of its ten manufac 
turing plants organized by the same national union, and Company B has 
only two of its ten plants organized by the same national union. Given 
Company B©s ability to shift production from its two unionized plants to 
its eight nonunion plants in the event of a strike, the union©s relative 
power is greater in Company A than in Company B.
Bargaining Skill
Relative bargaining skill is the third component of the relative power 
function. In attempting to maximize the relative share of total utility, 
each party attempts to change the perceptions of the other regarding the 
sources of power available to each and the costs of demands on the other. 
Given the complexity and subjective nature inherent in the assessment of 
the sources of power and the pecuniary/nonpecuniary costs of demands, 
one can imagine that there is significant opportunity for changing 
perceptions (and hence demands). That party which is more skilled or 
adept at changing the perceptions of its opponent (of course to the given 
party©s benefit) effectively increases the given party©s relative power over 
the other.
In the context of union-management relations, these bargaining skills 
are especially important during regular contract negotiations, as the 
terms and conditions of employment are established or modified. Rela 
tive bargaining skills, however, also come into play during the life of 
agreements. No written agreement in spite of its length, detail, and 
duration can possibly determine all the terms and conditions of em 
ployment. Hence the parties must, in effect, continue negotiating over 
formal and informal rules governing the employment relationship. In its 
most obvious form, disputes over the agreements are resolved through 
grievance and discipline procedures, including arbitration. Here, rela 
tive negotiation skills play a significant role in determining how total 
utility is divided. That party which is more skilled, for instance, at 
interpreting or utilizing to their advantage (1) the rights and responsibil 
ities arising from the contract and past practices, and (2) the facts
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surrounding disagreements, effectively increases the given party©s rela 
tive power (Meyer and Cooke 1988).
In addition to these day-to-day negotiations over the interpretation 
and application of contracts, unions may also attempt to influence 
management decisions at a more strategic level, such as management 
decisions regarding expansion or shrinkage of operations or capital 
investments. The birth of GM©s Saturn Corporation jointly devised by 
UAW and GM representatives is perhaps the outstanding example along 
these lines. 3 Again, relative negotiation skills can make a difference.
Total Power
Total utility derivable from the employment relationship is deter 
mined by the combination of human and technical capacity of the 
employing organization, constrained by the economic and sociopolitical 
environments of the organization. In attempting to maximize total 
utility, the parties rely on total organizational power, which is the ability 
of an organization to extract from its environment the kind and magni 
tude of benefits preferred.
The total organization power function can be stated as:
Total
_ . . , _ / Human+Technical Capacity of Organization Organizational=f (            -—-———-     
\ Economic+Sociopolitical Environmental
Constraints
The capacity of an organization to produce a product or provide a 
service at a profit is a function of both human capacity and technical 
capacity. Human capacity is the combined capacity of all stakeholders of 
the organization, from the top strategic decisionmaking offices down to 
the shop floor. Those organizations (1) employing the most talented and 
productive individuals across and throughout all the managerial and 
employee ranks, and (2) whose managerial processes and practices and 
structure maximize the combined productive utilization of all indi 
viduals, in turn maximize human capacity.
Technical capacity represents the combination of all the types of
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technologies utilized throughout the organization, how these technolo 
gies are integrated, and how well these technologies and their integra 
tion are utilized in production or in the provision of services by all 
members of the organization. Across organizations and over time, the 
availability of less costly and/or more productive technologies and 
innovations differ, as well as the ability of the organization to integrate 
and utilize the technologies in the most productive and efficient manner.
In addition to the human and technical capacity of an organization, 
total organizational power is determined by the constraints (or lack 
thereof) imposed by the economic and sociopolitical environments. 
With respect to constraints of the economic environment, by way of 
example, the reader hardly needs to be reminded of the changing 
economics of global competition. Off-shore competition continues to 
penetrate both the domestic and foreign markets of many American 
businesses. As demand for American-made products falls, profits 
shrink, employees are laid off, concessions may be negotiated, assets 
stripped, and facilities closed. In short, total utility for many companies 
diminishes. In response to the impact of heightened global competition, 
organizational capacity adjusts: organizations restructure through mer 
ger, acquisition, or joint ventures; centralize or decentralize operations; 
they replace top executives; they make bold capital investments in new 
and old facilities both here and off-shore; they transfer production off 
shore; or they restate corporate visions with new concentration, for 
example, on product quality improvement, employee involvement in 
management decisionmaking, or cooperation with unions.
Sociopolitical environments also differ across organizations and over 
time, sometimes imposing greater and sometimes imposing lesser con 
straints on organizational capacity. Several examples come quickly to 
mind. Recent deregulation of the trucking and airline industries has 
certainly affected the total organizational power of companies within 
these industries, resulting in widespread reorganization. Recent protec 
tive U.S. trade practices in the steel, textile, and auto industries offset 
diminishing total organizational power for some companies. The 
federal government©s break-up of AT&T altered the organizational ca-
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pacity of AT&T and effectively increased the total organizational power 
of its competitors within the telecommunications industry.
Relative Power v. Total Organizational Power
Based on perceptions of relative power and total power, workers and 
managers seeking to maximize the absolute level of utility must weigh 
the expected net gains from (a) relying solely on relative power or (b) 
also working jointly to increase total organizational power. Under the 
assumption of maximizing behavior, we must hold that each party seeks 
to utilize that combination of relative and total power it perceives as best 
serving its own interests. Hence, each party weighs the perceived costs 
and benefits of various combinations of relative and total power ac 
tivities that could maximize its absolute utility. Both parties, however, 
must come or be forced to the same conclusion on the appropriate mix. 
Historically, with few exceptions until lately, this conclusion has been 
that management has sole responsibility for managing total organiza 
tional power (and, hence, total utility), and that both parties utilize their 
relative power to maximize their relative utility (and, hence, absolute 
utility).
In attempting to understand the recent widespread move toward plant- 
level cooperative activities (intentionally undertaken to increase total 
organizational power), we need to ask: what are the key factors that have 
changed the perceptions of one or the other party or both parties such 
that the perceived net benefit from cooperation has changed signifi 
cantly? Later, factors that increase the perceived benefits or reduce the 
perceived costs of cooperation are identified. For the moment, let us 
stay at a more general theoretical level.
In deciding that some degree of cooperation will lead to increased 
utility for each party, the parties are attempting to (a) increase organiza 
tional capacity and/or (b) reduce the constraints of the economic or 
sociopolitical environments directly. Herein, I focus on efforts aimed at 
increasing organizational capacity at the corporate and plant levels. An 
example of cooperative efforts to reduce environmental constraints is 
the ongoing lobbying efforts of both manufacturers and unions in the
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textile and steel industries to have Congress embrace protective trade 
legislation.
With respect to increasing total organizational power, the following 
kinds of behavior are observed: (a) one party relinquishes some absolute 
utility (and, hence, relative utility) with the expectation that this will 
increase total utility in subsequent periods (for which that party regains 
its relinquished absolute utility but not ipso facto its relative utility), or 
(b) both parties voluntarily alter the set of work rules for which each 
party believes that relinquished absolute utility will subsequently be 
regained.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 should help illustrate these concepts. In figure 
2.2, the solid-line circle (TUt) depicts total utility in period t. Presume 
for the moment that the potential total utility in subsequent periods is 
reflected by the broken-line circle (TUt + n). To obtain the greater 
potential total utility in t+n, however, changes in the existing utility 
must come about. One option is for the parties to exchange control of 
selected work rules, without simultaneously altering relative utility 
(e.g., workers might exchange restrictive work rules for a gainsharing 
plan). Diagrammatically, the line of demarcation of relative utility, RU, 
rotates to RU©. Such trade-offs increase total utility from TUt to TUt + n , 
reflecting the assumed maximizing behavior, since absolute utility in 
creases for both parties. A second option illustrated in figure 2.2 is the 
shift from RU to RU". The reduction in relative utility (and, hence, 
absolute utility) by party j depicts a calculated move by j in period t as a 
means of obtaining AUj, t + n . Party j would behave as such only if what is 
added in absolute utility for j in period t+n is perceived to be greater 
than what is to be relinquished in period t. Although relative utility in 
this instance becomes smaller in period t+n, party j has behaved in such 
a way that absolute utility is maximized over time.
Now consider figure 2.3, where expectations (e.g., about interna 
tional competition) are such that total utility will be reduced in period 
t+1 (depicted by the - - circle). When expectations about obtaining 
greater total utility in subsequent periods (e.g., returning to TUt) are 
insufficient to compel the parties to behave cooperatively during period t 
+1, the parties will rely on relative power to wrest away more absolute
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Figure 2.2 
Expected Increases in Total Utility in Period t+n
TU,
Figure 2.3
Expected Reductions in Total Utility in t+1 
and Expected Increases in Total Utility in t+n
t+n
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utility from one another. This has become known as "concession" or 
"give-back" negotiations. As illustrated, the shift in the relative power 
position of the parties from RU to RU© has allowed party i to lose less (if 
any) of its absolute utility between periods, while party j has lost some 
absolute utility between periods. Of course if the changes in the eco 
nomic and/or sociopolitical environments that caused the reduction in 
total utility do not effectively alter the relative power positions of the 
parties, then no shift in relative utility will be generated. Consequently, 
both parties experience proportionately equal reductions in absolute 
utility.
A fundamental dilemma becomes apparent as the parties simul 
taneously weigh relative and total power options and requisite behavior. 
Given that, historically, employers and unions have largely attended to 
resolving conflicts of interest via the exercise of relative power, it would 
appear to be a safe presumption to hold that the appeal of resolving 
conflicts of interest supersedes the appeal of working jointly on mutual 
interests. A key challenge to unions and employers, therefore, is to find 
ways to juxtapose or balance the resolution of conflicts of interest with 
the pursuit of mutual interests. That balance, however, goes well beyond 
the efforts of the parties at the bargaining table to jointly solve problems. 
These "integrative bargaining" practices have long been a part of the 
collective bargaining experience (see Walton and McKersie 1965, chap 
ter 5). That balance, furthermore, goes beyond joint committees estab 
lished to mutually resolve problems like health and safety, training, and 
employee assistance. These limited joint problemsolving efforts may be 
viewed as an extended form of integrative bargaining and are likely 
precursors to the kind of joint programs to be examined herein.
Sharing Gains From Cooperation
Among those parties choosing to cooperate, it can be assumed that 
each party wants its fair share of any increase in total utility derivable 
from cooperative activities. The parties ultimately must decide upon an 
appropriate fair share for each, presumably based on each party©s 
contribution to added total utility via cooperation. In deciding on a fair
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share, the parties must first determine the amount of total utility that has 
been derived from cooperative efforts-an amount that must be dis 
tinguishable from any gains in total utility not derived from cooperative 
efforts (e.g., gains derived from decisions about technology invest 
ments, acquisitions, product development, marketing, etc. for which 
the union may not have participated in making).
By way of example, assume that in period t+n, total utility increased 
by X amount, where X=NC+C, and where NC equals the gain from 
noncooperative activities and C equals the gain from cooperative ac 
tivities. As diagrammed in figure 2.4, the unshaded area marked NC 
depicts increases in total utility that would have been obtained without 
cooperation. This gain is, in turn, distributed via relative power, a 
mechanism which is acceptable (albeit, perhaps begrudgingly) to both 
parties. The shaded area marked C in figure 2.4 depicts increases in total 
utility only obtainable through cooperation. Here the parties can be 
assumed to seek their fair share; shares not based on notions of relative 
power but on notions of contribution to C.
One can readily imagine that sharing any gains from cooperation is 
wrought with difficult assessments about (a) how much of any increases 
in total utility are attributable to noncooperative and cooperative efforts, 
and (b) what proportion of any increases in total utility attributable to 
cooperative efforts are due to each party©s contribution.
These difficult assessments inevitably lead to problems, problems 
which diminish if not destroy cooperative relations (as discussed in 
detail in chapter 6), when the parties are unable to resolve them in 
mutually satisfactory ways. For the sake of illustration, assume that the 
union©s contribution to added total utility via cooperative efforts is 75 
percent or at least perceived to be by the union. Assume, however, that 
management©s relative power would be sufficient to extract 50 percent of 
that added total utility. If management were to impose its relative power 
will on the union, the union would forego 25 percent of added total 
utility it perceives itself to have contributed. The union, therefore, may 
obtain more absolute utility through cooperation than without, but 
management gains even more in relative terms. This relative difference 
raises an obvious dilemma. The process of cooperation requires ele-
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Figure 2.4
Sharing Cooperative and Noncooperative 
Gains to Total Utility in t+n
t+n
\
ments of sufficient trust and fairness, which are not required in adver 
sarial relations. To divide the added utility derived from cooperation via 
relative power diminishes, therefore, the necessary trust and fairness 
underlying cooperation. In turn, the intensity of cooperative efforts is 
diminished (if not destroyed), which, as discussed in chapter 4, reduces 
the magnitude of gains from cooperative activities. Upon reducing the 
added total utility from cooperation, management (in our example) 
consequently also loses added utility. In summary, each party must 
weigh (a) any losses in absolute utility caused by using relative power to 
divide cooperative gains against (b) the absolute utility derived from 
cooperative gains, which are divided fairly according to what each party 
contributes to the added total utility from cooperation.
Feedback From Experience
Because the decisions and behavior of the parties are shaped or 
constrained by subjective interpretations of the costs of demands, the
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sources of power, and the net benefits of any mix of cooperation and hard 
bargaining, feedback from experience (both internal and external to the 
organization) plays a critical role in determining (and, hence, under 
standing) the behavior of the parties. This feedback mechanism or 
learning curve effect on perceptions and, in turn, presumably on behav 
ior, applies to all the underlying dimensions of the relative power and 
total power functions.
Since employers and unions traditionally have had very limited expe 
rience in cooperation, the feedback mechanism is obviously quite 
important to the maintenance, as well as expansion of joint labor- 
management activities. In particular, depending upon the magnitude of 
any problems encountered and/or changes in the expected outcomes of 
joint endeavors, the parties can be expected to adjust the intensity, 
extensiveness, or content of joint activities in an effort to effectively 
increase organizational capacity and, hence, total organizational power.
The perceptions of outcomes and the relative costs of problems 
encountered are also likely to change with the longevity of joint pro 
grams, given the possibility of diminishing returns of these efforts over 
time or abrupt changes in expected outcomes (e.g., as may arise from a 
disheartening round of concession bargaining). These changes in per 
ception over time can result in subsequent termination of programs. In 
the chapters that follow, I explore these perceptions of outcomes and. 
moreover, attempt to track how perceptions change over the life of 
programs.
Potential Benefits and Costs of Cooperation 
Vis-a-Vis Relative Power Options
Both management and its stakeholders and the workforce and its 
selected union representatives must sort through the options underlying 
both the relative and total power functions. In sorting through these 
options the parties, in effect, weigh the perceived potential costs and 
benefits (both pecuniary and nonpecuniary) of a wide range of possible 
actions, ranging from no cooperation to extensive cooperation. Assum 
ing that the parties act rationally in selecting among available options,
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the parties will behave in ways at least perceived to be most beneficial to 
them (i.e., that which maximizes absolute utility). This maximizing or 
optimizing behavior, however, is based on subjective expectations about 
various costs and benefits, is constrained by incomplete information and 
limited experience, and is sometimes influenced by inaccurate or mis 
leading information. Furthermore, and very important, organizational 
decisionmaking is quite complex, as it involves a large cast of indi 
viduals with varying interests and varying degrees of authority and 
influence. This decisionmaking process differs, of course, across em 
ployers and across unions.
Bearing these caveats in mind, the decision to cooperate must satisfy 
two general conditions:
(1) Each party (management, the workforce, and union leadership) 
must perceive that the benefits from proposed joint programs outweigh 
the costs.
(2) Each party must perceive that the net benefit from cooperation is 
greater than the net benefit derived from exclusive utilization of relative 
power.
The basic thesis herein is that the likelihood that parties establish and 
are able to manage successful joint programs varies directly with the 
following perceptions for each party:
a. higher perceived benefits from cooperation;
b. lower perceived costs of cooperation;
c. higher perceived costs of relative power options; and
d. lower perceived benefits of relative power options.
In modeling the factors that influence the joint decision of the parties 
to establish and manage successful cooperative programs, therefore, we 
must turn to identifying factors and circumstances that are associated 
with either increasing or decreasing these perceived benefits and costs.
In chapter 1, potential benefits and costs and fundamental problems 
associated with cooperative activities were identified. There is no need 
to revisit that synthesis in this chapter, but several observations about the 
difficulty of weighing potential benefits and costs is warranted. Subse 
quently, perceived benefits and costs associated with exercising relative 
power options (e.g., concession bargaining, subcontracting, etc.) are 
discussed.
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Assessing Potential Benefits and Costs of Cooperation
Several general observations about the above costs and benefits are 
warranted. First, costs and benefits can be either extrinsic or intrinsic in 
nature. Although each party is expected to weigh both extrinsic and 
intrinsic variables, it should be underscored that the parties are typically 
weighing apples and oranges. Management, for instance, may be able to 
weigh (a) the perceived reduction in production costs attributable to 
increased productivity, improved product quality, and reduction in 
scrappage against (b) the incurred education and training cost for 
workers and supervisors (in, say, statistical process control techniques, 
problemsolving, and teamwork methods). But how does management 
then compare those extrinsic costs and benefits to the intrinsic costs and 
benefits associated with, say, perceived loss of status for middle manag 
ers and supervisors, or improved communications between and among 
white-collar and blue-collar workers? The key point to be made here is 
that the literature addresses both extrinsic and intrinsic costs and bene 
fits of cooperation, but it is silent with regard to how the parties go about 
weighing potential intrinsic costs and benefits. In part, this is a measure 
ment problem. How does one measure, for example, the benefits of 
improved communication? In addition, this is a valuation problem. How 
does one place a cost-benefit value on improved communication, which 
can then be compared to other intrinsic costs and benefits and, more 
over, to extrinsic costs and benefits?
A second observation is about the distinction between what may be 
called, for present purposes, primary and secondary outcome variables. 
Secondary outcome variables may have value in and of themselves, but 
they also lead to more tangible primary outcomes. An example may best 
illustrate this distinction. Improved communication or harmony be 
tween managers and employees (secondary outcomes) may be valued 
outcomes in and of themselves, but they may also lead to other outcomes 
such as fewer grievances, enhanced job security, or increased productiv 
ity (primary outcomes). The literature on joint programs is again silent 
on how the perceived costs and benefits of primary outcomes are 
weighed or stack up against secondary outcomes. In most cases, one can 
imagine that primary outcomes get closer to the "bottom-line" thinking
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of the parties and, hence, play a more important role in the decision to 
embark upon and/or maintain joint programs. We have much to uncover, 
however, with respect to what outcomes are primary or secondary in 
nature; how this distinction may differ between management, workers, 
and union leaders; and how much weight is given to each type of 
outcome as the parties go about deciding the fate of cooperation.
The third observation is that some potential outcome variables reflect 
costs or benefits specific to a given party (e.g., increased employee 
commitment to the union primarily benefits the union leadership). Other 
outcome variables reflect costs or benefits to more than one party (e.g., 
a reduced grievance load saves both management and the union lead 
ership lost time and resources in resolving grievances). Going one step 
further, what may be viewed as a benefit to one party can alternatively be 
perceived as a cost to another party. For instance, more rank-and-file 
autonomy may be viewed as a benefit by a work unit but not by its 
supervisor.
Finally, the potential magnitude of any cost or benefit is bound to 
differ across organizations as circumstances differ. Take, for illustra 
tion, an organization with a very low grievance rate. It has less to gain 
from reducing grievances through joint program activities than an 
organization with a very high grievance rate.
In summary, the salient variables identified in the existing literature 
that appear to be weighed by the parties (a) include both extrinsic and 
intrinsic costs and benefits, which makes meaningful comparisons very 
difficult; (b) represent what may be called primary and secondary 
outcomes, which may differ across parties and, again, make com 
parisons very difficult; and (c) may reflect costs and benefits specific to 
one party or shared by other parties, or may reflect costs to one party but 
benefits to another. Finally, the reader should bear in mind that the 
potential magnitude of any cost or benefit is bound to differ across 
employers, workforces, and union leadership.
Assessing Potential Benefits and Costs of Exercising Relative 
Power Options
Toward maximizing their own absolute utility without cooperation, 
employers attempt to bolster their relative power, and, when possible,
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increase total utility. Within our theoretical framework, these efforts are 
concentrated in altering organizational features (via the relative power 
function) and altering the human and technical capacity of the firm (via 
the total organizational power function). From the vantage point of 
unions, pursuit of increases or maintenance of their own absolute utility 
(without cooperation), rests solely with reshaping organizational fea 
tures (via the relative power function).
From a more practical plane of analysis, we need to examine the 
salient relative power options. Both the popular and more academic 
literature identify several key management options: concession bargain 
ing, subcontracting, curtailing operations and closing plants, substitut 
ing computer-based automation for labor, and deunionizing. Except for 
improving organizing activities, union options reflect, for the most part, 
defensive strategies to the above management options.
Other than in the broadest of terms, the literature has little to say 
about the estimated costs and benefits of the various relative power 
options. Assuming, however, that top management is driven to max 
imize profits for the company as a whole and that middle and lower 
management in production have been directed to maximize efficiency, 
quality, and productivity and minimize labor costs, it follows that 
management decisions are viewed by managers as providing the greatest 
net benefit to the company. It is evident that, except for concession 
bargaining, no option selected is based strictly on reducing labor costs, 
albeit the reduction of labor costs may be an important if not a primary 
factor in selecting options.
In examining the perceived costs and benefits of relative power 
options, several dimensions of the subject are worth underscoring. 
First, most key options appear to be more aggressively pursued under 
increasingly competitive, if not adverse, economic circumstances. In 
theoretical terms, total organizational utility has diminished or is ex 
pected to diminish, short of some organizational adjustments. Second, 
although management may be able to estimate the direct net benefit from 
a selected option (e.g., the projected net savings in materials handling, 
inventory, labor costs, etc., from subcontracting), the indirect potential 
costs of lower employee morale, union-management hostility, and
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heightened insecurity are not readily ascertainable. One might even 
surmise that in an already existing adversarial union-management rela 
tionship, indirect costs associated with relative power options may have 
been given little if any consideration. Still, these are costs, which later 
may become apparent in higher grievance rates, absenteeism and tar 
diness, and in reduced productivity or product quality. Finally, any net 
gains or losses from any option differ across employers and unions, and 
are determined in part by certain controlling or intervening variables 
(e.g., market conditions).
Mixing Conflict and Cooperation 
A Summary
Joint labor-management programs designed to improve company 
performance and the labor-management relationship have recently be 
come widespread in manufacturing because the companies, unions, and 
employees involved have come to perceive (at least for the moment) that 
the net gains from cooperative efforts to each party outweigh the net 
gains from exclusive reliance on traditional uses of relative and total 
power. The theory presented in this chapter, as well as American history, 
suggests that when the relative power of a party increases sufficiently at 
any point in time, that party will exercise its added relative power to 
increase its own absolute utility and at the perceived expense of the other 
party. It follows, therefore, that in many cases where the parties cooper 
ate, one party (as a practical matter, almost always the employer) will 
first pursue the kind of relative power options described above. After the 
net benefits from these options have been reaped and expected net 
benefits from further usage of relative power options have been signifi 
cantly reduced, both parties may come to a similar conclusion: greater 
net benefit can be derived from joint efforts than from the continued 
exclusive exercise of relative power options. It is at that point where the 
parties begin to design and implement joint programs.
In other cases, the reduction in total utility experienced as the pie 
shrinks may not significantly alter the relative power of the parties. In
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these cases the loss of utility by both parties may trigger an examination 
of the potential costs and benefits of cooperation, as it becomes apparent 
that the net gain from attempting to use the relative power options is 
zero, if not negative. Once both parties perceive that the potential net 
benefits of cooperation outweigh the potential costs, then the parties 
begin to design and implement joint programs.
None of the above suggests, however, that companies and unions have 
not exercised their relative power in conjunction with joint program 
activities. In those cases where they do, the parties must find a means of 
satisfactory balance that allows for the coexistence of the two processes. 
Shifts in relative power are bound to occur over time, and the gaining 
party invariably will be inclined to exercise that added relative power. 
Consequently, when the perceived net benefits of relative power options 
begin to outweigh the perceived net benefit of cooperation, the parties 
must be prepared for the potential exercise of relative power and its 
implications for the continuance of joint program activities. Because the 
relative power options heighten conflict, the use of these options 
threaten, if not ultimately undermine, the cooperative process.
NOTES
1. Quote selected from presentation made by Mr. Douglas Fraser (former President of the UAW) 
at the University of Michigan, February 1, 1987.
2. See the case of Milwaukee Spring Division of Dlinois Coil Spring Company v. UAW Local 547, 
NLRB Decisions and Orders, 265 NLRB 28 (1982) and Second Court of Appeals decision, 765 
F2d 175 (1985).
3. See James Treece, "Here Comes Saturn," Business Week, April 9, 1990, pp. 56-62.

Choosing to Cooperate
Company Strategies and Plant Programs
The central objectives of this chapter are to examine company wide 
strategic choices to pursue union-management cooperation and to de 
scribe joint activities at the plant level in companies that have chosen to 
cooperate. To set the stage for these investigations, however, I first 
briefly describe the economic context in which important shifts in 
company wide strategies have occurred, and second I review the limited 
literature about these company wide strategic choices. Because the em 
pirical evidence used to examine company strategies and plant-level 
joint activities are based on several survey data collections, these data 
collections are then reviewed. Subsequently, I examine company wide 
strategic choices with respect to factors influencing these choices and 
the implementation of these strategies over the 1975 to 1986 period. 
Finally, I describe in some detail plant-level joint activities.
Market Factors Inducing Change
During the latter half of the 1970s and throughout much of the 1980s, 
the economic environment was marked by uncharacteristic short-term 
volatility, coupled with the emergence of long-run global and domestic 
nonunion competitive threats and other long-run trends demanding 
change in traditional collective bargaining relationships.
Short-Run Forces
With respect to short-run forces, several factors are illustrative of 
substantial market volatility or instability. First, annual nationwide
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unemployment rates bounced erratically from 5 percent in 1973 to a 
postwar high of 9.4 percent in 1983. 1 In some regions of the U.S., 
unemployment rose to much higher levels. During the same period, 
annual inflation rates likewise jumped and dropped as much as 12 
percentage points, with both the Consumer Price Index and Producer 
Price Index reaching nearly 14 percent in 1980. 2 Between 1977 and 
1981, the annual average prime rate charged by banks for short-term 
business loans rose from 7 percent to a post-War high of nearly 19 
percent. 3 The annual inflation-adjusted U.S. exchange rate rose sharply 
from a low of 84 points in 1978 to 130 points by 1985 (1973 indexed at 
100 points). These real exchange rates then dropped nearly as sharply to 
88 points in 1988. 4 Finally, crude oil (and to a lesser extent natural gas) 
prices rose and fell rapidly over the 1973 through 1988 period. Indeed, 
crude oil prices jumped nearly fivefold from $1.25 per million Btu in 
1973 to nearly $6 per million Btu in 1981 (in constant 1982 dollars). 5 
By 1988, unemployment, inflation, prime interest rates, real ex 
change rates, and energy costs returned to their pre-1975 levels. One 
might be inclined to conclude, therefore, that these market factors have 
taken their short-run toll on American businesses and unions and that we 
have returned to normalcy or stability in the market place. The volatility 
of this recent period, however, vividly demonstrates that were the future 
to hold similar periods of volatility, companies and unions that have not 
become more flexible and adaptable in their relations will find them 
selves at a competitive disadvantage. And that disadvantage could, 
indeed, be substantial.
Long-Run Forces
In addition to short-run volatility, several long-run forces are at work. 
First, the proportion of all employees represented by unions in the U.S. 
has dropped steadily since the mid-1950s, from roughly 35 percent to 
under 17 percent today. In the private sector, the proportion has dropped 
to 13 percent. 6 Although the accuracy of any given union penetration 
estimates can be questioned, the precipitous decline in union penetration 
cannot. The threat of rising domestic nonunion competition has rather 
obvious implications for unionized companies and for unionized facili 
ties within multiplant companies partially unionized.
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In addition to steadily rising domestic nonunion competition, global 
competition likewise clearly poses a long-run threat to much of Ameri 
can industry. The import penetration ratio (value of imports over total 
value of domestic shipments and imports) for all manufacturing rose 
from 7 percent in 1974 to 13 percent in 1986. 7 For some industries, the 
rise in import penetration has been far more dramatic. The value of 
durable good imports alone rose dramatically from $150 billion in 1983 
to $300 billion in 1989 (in constant 1982 dollars). Although U.S. 
exports likewise rose dramatically after 1983, total goods and services 
imports have continued to outrun exports; a difference that reached as 
high as $130 billion in 1986 but narrowed to $56 billion in 1989. 8
Major investments in computer-aided technology may also be viewed 
as a long-run force at work. North American investments in robotics 
rose more than fourfold (in constant dollars) between 1981 and 1985 to 
$525 million-tapering off, however, to $430 million in 1988. After 
dropping sharply from roughly $2.4 to $1.6 billion between 1982 and 
1983, capital expenditures in computer-aided machine tools rebounded 
by 1985 and rose to $2.8 billion in 1988. 9
A fourth long-run force at work is the steadily rising cost of medical 
care and associated benefits. Indexed to 1982 costs, the real cost of 
medical care has risen threefold since 1975; and there is no indication 
that these costs will soon be contained. 10
Although a number of other important long-run forces at work can be 
identified (for example, effects of deregulation of the transportation 
industry, divestiture of AT&T, the aging population, and rising female 
labor force participation and divorce rates), the four long-run forces 
described sufficiently document the need for restructuring labor-man 
agement relationships. Although the form of any restructuring is debat 
able, those unionized companies that cannot adapt to these long-run 
forces are very likely to become uncompetitive.
Companyvvide Labor Relations Strategies: The Literature
The forces at work described above have inevitably required adjust 
ment by unionized companies, either to maintain or regain competitive
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advantages or in some cases to minimize further erosion of competitive 
advantages. Recent case studies undertaken by researchers associated 
with the Sloan School of Management at M.I.T. identify three suffi 
ciently distinct and emerging corporate labor-relations strategies: one in 
which the purpose is to avoid if not reduce union representation (call it 
Union-Avoidance), another in which the parties choose to cooperate 
(call it Cooperation), and a third encompassing both union-avoidance 
and cooperative activities (call it Mixed). 11
The Union-Avoidance strategy is basically a highly adversarial strat 
egy that encompasses several kinds of activities designed to reduce the 
proportion of plants unionized. Toward this end, Union-Avoiders ag 
gressively campaign against the unionization of existing, newly opened, 
or acquired nonunion facilities. Although it comes as no surprise that 
employers generally prefer to operate in a nonunion environment, 
recent evidence reported by Freedman (1979, 1985) indicates that top 
management of large firms places a high priority on avoiding unioniza 
tion of the firm©s nonunion facilities. According to the Freedman sur 
veys, 31 percent of large, double-breasted firms (i.e., those firms with 
union and nonunion establishments) in 1977 and 45 percent in 1983 
reported that it was more important to them to keep as much of the 
company nonunion than it was to achieve the most favorable bargain 
possible.
In addition, Union-Avoiders make greater capital investments in 
nonunion than in unionized plants, reduce employment in unionized 
plants while increasing employment in nonunion plants, and, where 
possible, seek decertification of unions. Tough positional negotiations 
that demand concessionary bargains over wages, benefits, and work 
rules are standard practice. Joint union-management activities at the 
plant level are anomalies; they are sometimes used as temporary play 
grounds for experimentation with employee involvement, with the 
lessons learned to be transferred to nonunion plants. In many, if not most 
cases, the Union-Avoidance strategy is an attack on the very legitimacy 
of union representation.
The Cooperation strategy is an endorsement of joint decisionmaking 
at the plant level. Generally, union participation is formalized through
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the establishment of committee-based and/or team-based programs. 
The purpose of these joint programs is to improve company perfor 
mance via increased efficiency and productivity, higher product quality, 
and better supplier/customer services. In some settings, union leaders 
participate in strategic business decisions. Although Cooperators do not 
engage in aggressive union-avoidance or deunionization activities, they 
do not relinquish relative power advantages.
Companies pursuing a Mixed strategy are double-breasted companies 
that engage in many of the above union-avoidance activities in their 
nonunion operations but engage in cooperative efforts in their unionized 
operations. These companies, in short, are pursuing strategies that 
embrace simultaneously what might appear to be two irreconcilable 
approaches to union-management relations.
In addition to the case reports about the above strategies, in their 
analysis of the 1983 Conference Board survey of large companies, 
Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff (1986) briefly report on a model of 
the determinants of the extent of "workplace innovations" across com 
panies (see their table 2, page 493). Although not described in detail in 
their report, the following factors are reported as statistically significant 
in their regression estimation of factors influencing the extent of work 
place innovations.
  When corporate executives have emphasized a union- 
avoidance strategy, the extent of work place innovations in 
unionized facilities is lower.
  The more the union(s) participates in workplace innova 
tions, the more extensive are these innovations.
  The greater the influence of line executives vis-a-vis indus 
trial relations executives, the more extensive are workplace 
innovations in unionized establishments. (Presumably, line 
executives are not as frozen in traditional labor relations 
practices as are industrial relations executives.)
  Larger companies engage in more extensive workplace 
innovations.
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Perhaps just as interesting as the statistically significant estimates, are 
two insignificant estimates. First, Kochan et al. do not find a statistically 
significant relationship between "percentage of firm organized" and 
extent of workplace innovations. Second, executive perceptions of 
"competitive pressures on the firm (foreign and domestic)" are not 
significantly related to extent of workplace innovations. Generally 
speaking, these latter results are at odds with the Cooke and Meyer 
(1990) results summarized below and as discussed by Kochan et al. 
(page 494), apparently at odds with their own expectations.
Plant Manager, Local Union Officer, 
and Executive Survey Data Collection
Three separate but complementary data collections were conducted 
for this study. The first surveyed plant-level managers, the second sur 
veyed their local union leader counterparts, and the third surveyed 
executives of companies parent to the plants surveyed. These survey 
data are supplemented by a variety of secondary data sources.
As discussed in chapter 1, one of the limitations of the literature is the 
lack of comparability across single case study observations. An addition 
to the current literature, therefore, is the collection of comparable data 
across establishments. Short of having unlimited resources and un 
limited access to organizations, however, we necessarily sacrifice details 
obtained through intensive observation and data collection at a given 
organization in exchange for greater comparability and generalization 
of less detailed observations across a wide sample of organizations. In 
order to obtain opinions and impressions across a wide sample of 
companies, plants, and local unions, each organizational response is 
based on a single response from plant managers, local union leaders, 
and company executives, respectively.
The data collection began by randomly selecting 430 unionized 
manufacturing companies listed in A Directory to Collective Bargaining 
Agreements: Private Sector, 1982. The directory, published by Micro 
filming Corporation of America in 1983, is based on collective bargain-
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ing agreements filed with the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1982 (or 
agreements that were filed before but encompassed 1982). Approxi 
mately 1,800 agreements across all manufacturing are listed. Although 
agreements affect 900 or more employees, listed agreements are some 
times master agreements covering more than one facility. Any given 
facility, consequently, need not employ 900 or more bargaining unit 
employees.
Company names were then matched with Dun©s Marketing Service©s 
DMI unpublished files. These files provide names, addresses, phone 
numbers, and employment figures at the establishment level. After an 
extensive telephone search, only 350 of the 430 establishments could be 
located. The establishments that could not be located apparently had 
been sold or closed between 1980 and 1986. Given the extent of 
company mergers, acquisitions, and plant closures during the early 
through mid-1980s, this less than 20 percent turnover of unionized 
plants would not be unexpected.
Labor relations managers or plant managers identified through the 
initial telephone inquiries as the most knowledgeable with respect to 
union-management activities and plant production were surveyed. After 
three requests for a response, 55 percent (194) returned useable ques 
tionnaires. The data base compiled through this survey will hereafter be 
referred to as the "Plant Manager Survey." (See appendix A for a copy of 
the questionnaire.)
Through the initial telephone inquiries to plant management, the 
telephone number of the local union office was obtained. The local union 
office was then contacted to explain the purpose and scope of the survey 
and to identify the top local officer most familiar with the given plant. 
These officers were then surveyed. After three requests for responses, 
33 percent (114) returned useable questionnaires. Of the 114 responses, 
74 were from unions representing employees in plants for which plant 
manager responses were also obtained. The remaining 40 were not 
matchable to any plant manager response. The data base compiled 
through this survey will hereafter be referred to as the "Union Officer 
Survey." (See appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire.)
In the survey of plant managers, respondents were asked to identify
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the top labor relations or human resource executive at the parent com 
pany or division headquarters who would be most familiar with labor 
relations at all the company©s plants. Initial telephone calls were made to 
headquarter executives to explain the purpose and scope of the survey 
and to check whether the executive identified from the Plant Manager 
Survey was the most knowledgeable executive for the purpose of com 
pleting the survey. After two follow-up requests for responses, 121 
useable questionnaires were returned. Because some headquarters re 
sponding were parent to more than one plant in the sample, headquarter 
information is available for 135 (or 71 percent) of the 194 plants 
represented in the Plant Manager Survey. The data base compiled 
through this survey will hereafter be referred to as the "Headquarters 
Executive Survey." (See appendix C for a copy of the questionnaire.)
Analysis of Headquarters Executive Survey Data
In the Headquarters Executive Survey, executives were queried re 
garding company policy toward union representation of nonunion plants 
and executive attitudes toward the establishment of joint programs in 
their plants. With some adjustment explained below, responses to these 
questions are used to classify companies as pursuing one of three grand 
labor relations strategies.
Respondents were asked to complete the following two statements:
(1) "In general, it is company policy to
___ strongly oppose ___ oppose ___ remain neutral to
union representation of nonunion manufacturing plants."
(2) "In general, company executives are
___ not in favor of ___ in favor of ___ indifferent to
joint management-union programs or activities."
The responses to these two questions are cross tabulated below.
When respondents reported it was company policy to strongly oppose 
or oppose union activities, the company is categorized as following a 
Union-Avoidance strategy. Companies reportedly strongly opposed to
























union representation and at the same time in favor of joint activities are 
categorized as following a Mixed strategy. Companies reportedly neu 
tral to union representation of nonunion plants and in favor of joint 
activities are categorized as following a Cooperation strategy.
There is some question as to whether the 32 companies opposed to 
unionization (but not strongly opposed) and in favor of joint activities 
are pursuing Cooperation or Mixed strategies. Here a comparison is 
made using the percent of plants with formalized joint programs and the 
percent of plants unionized in 1986. Of the 32 cases, 9 are distinctly 
different from the remaining 23 cases. Among these 9 cases, 8 com 
panies had established joint programs in fewer than 12 percent of their 
unionized facilities; whereas the other 23 companies had, on average, 
established joint programs in 72 percent of their unionized facilities. In 
the 9th case, the percent of the company©s domestic plants unionized was 
only 36 percent in comparison to an average 90 percent in the other 23 
cases. Given these sharp distinctions, the 9 cases identified are included 
in the Mixed strategy.
Only four companies were reportedly neutral to unionization and 
indifferent to joint activities. These four companies are excluded from 
the analyses because their responses do not readily fall into one of the 
three identified strategies. Finally, two respondents failed to answer both 
questions and thus are also excluded.
By partitioning headquarter responses as described, 35 percent of the
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Chart 3.1
Labor-Relations Strategy Choices 
Among U.S. Manufacturing Corporations
34% 35%
31%
sample of headquarters have chosen to pursue Union-Avoidance strat 
egies, 34 percent Cooperation strategies, and 31 percent Mixed strat 
egies (See chart 3.1). Next, I summarize the results of an empirical study 
of key factors influencing executive choices of these three grand strat 
egies, conducted with David Meyer and published in the Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review in January 1990 (Cooke and Meyer 1990).
General Propositions About Choice of Strategy
Guided by the general theoretical model developed in chapter 2, 
executives choosing a grand strategy are expected to weigh the per 
ceived costs and benefits of relying solely on their relative power (as 
depicted by Union-Avoidance strategies) against the perceived costs and 
benefits of juxtaposing relative power options and cooperative activities 
(as depicted by Cooperation or Mixed strategies). Market and structural 
factors (operational, financial, and extent of union representation) are 
expected to influence these perceived costs and benefits, and in turn lead 
corporate executives to choose one grand strategy over the others. 
Assuming executives act to optimize net benefits to the corporation, it
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follows that by choosing either a Cooperation or Mixed strategy, execu 
tives and union representatives have concluded that, more or less, 
cooperation yields greater benefits than no cooperation. Among those 
companies choosing a Union-Avoidance strategy, it follows that execu 
tives perceive they will derive greater net gain from relying strictly on 
their relative power than from juxtaposing relative power options and 
cooperative activities. Union leaders representing employees in these 
companies may agree or disagree with that corporate choice. Union 
leaders, that is, may agree that traditional adversarial relationships are 
preferred over cooperative relationships. They are unlikely to agree, 
however, to corporate activities designed to destroy the union, activities 
that are part and parcel of many aggressive Union-Avoidance strategies.
Among the three grand strategies identified, the Mixed strategy is 
viewed as the least aggressive. In choosing a Mixed strategy, manage 
ment needs to find some balance between union avoidance activities on 
one hand, and cooperation activities on the other. In finding this balance, 
companies will be less able to act aggressively in pursuing union 
avoidance activities if simultaneously they are to aggressively pursue 
cooperation. As aggressive union avoidance activities will be perceived 
by union leaders as a challenge to the very legitimacy of union represen 
tation (Oswald 1986), the contradictory message to union leaders under 
lying a Mixed strategy becomes less manageable the more aggressive 
the company©s union avoidance activities. One can also imagine that joint 
activities are less extensive and intensive in plant settings where both 
plant management and local union leaders perceive that upper manage 
ment is less than fully committed to cooperation (Boylston 1986).
In comparison to the Mixed strategy, the more aggressive Union- 
Avoidance and Cooperation strategies are also more risky. Among 
highly unionized corporations (as in the present sample), an aggressive 
Union-Avoidance strategy pits the company against its union(s), and 
unions are not without considerable power to inflict costs on companies 
for aggressively pursuing Union-Avoidance strategies. Aggressive 
efforts at cooperation are likewise risky. Until very recently, the parties 
had very limited experience or expertise at formulating and implement 
ing the significant organizational changes required to make cooperative
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efforts successful. History also demonstrates that unless the parties find 
ways to minimize the problems that undermine cooperative efforts (see 
chapters 5 and 6), these recent efforts will follow the course of Ameri 
can history, a history of short-lived efforts.
Finally, in choosing a grand strategy, it seems reasonable to assume 
that, in general, executives prefer to manage without unions. Hence, 
after weighing the potential costs and benefits across the three strategic 
choices (in light of market pressures and the company©s collective 
bargaining, operational, and financial structures), all factors the same, 
executives will choose a Union-Avoidance strategy. Indeed, some exec 
utives may be willing to accept an unnecessary additional cost merely to 
satisfy their antiunion ideologies. To the extent they are, the more likely 
they will choose a Union-Avoidance strategy.
An Empirical Test of Factors Influencing 
the Choice of Strategies
In order to test hypotheses about financial structure and to control for 
changes in market conditions, data derived from the Headquarters 
Executive Survey were merged with financial records of publicly held 
corporations (provided by COMPUSTAT12) and industry data (pro 
vided by the U.S. Department of Commerce 13). Only 90 headquarters 
surveyed could be matched with corporations listed by COMPUSTAT. 
Because of missing data on one or more variables in COMPUSTAT, the 
final sample comprises 58 publicly held corporations.
The time frame selected for predicting the choice among strategies is 
1981, a point in time at which unionized corporations were experiencing 
substantial increases in domestic and global competition and other 
market pressures demanding substantial adaptation. Although 1981 is 
not necessarily the year in which all corporations in the sample shaped 
and embarked upon their grand strategies, the very early 1980s appear 
to closely approximate the timing of these choices.
In modeling and testing the hypothesized effects of market and 
various structural factors on the choice of strategies, it is recognized that 
the choices are not ordered. That is, some factors are expected to
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influence the choice between the less aggressive, less risky Mixed 
strategy and one or the other more aggressive, more risky single- 
approach strategies (Union-Avoidance or Cooperation). While some of 
these factors, furthermore, are not expected to signal employers that a 
Union-Avoidance strategy should be preferred over Cooperation (or 
vice versa), other factors are expected to signal employers to choose 
Union-Avoidance over Cooperation (or vice versa). An appropriate 
statistical estimator for testing this kind of discrete unordered choice 
model is multinomial logit (Amemiya 1981).
Effect of Market Factors on Choice of Strategy
All other factors held constant, it is found that the greater the increase 
in import penetration (over the 1978 to 1981 period) in the corporation©s 
primary product market, the more likely the corporation chooses a 
Union-Avoidance strategy over either a Cooperation or Mixed strategy. 
Given the greater need to be aggressive and risk taking, it can be 
expected that corporations would choose a Union-Avoidance strategy 
over a Mixed strategy. It remains unclear, however, why a Union- 
Avoidance strategy would also be much more preferred than a Coopera 
tion strategy. Perhaps the difference is attributable to management©s 
general preference for managing in nonunion settings.
Another market factor significantly related to choice of strategy is the 
change in the corporation©s industry employment (measured over the 
1978-1981 period). The more serious the decline in employment, the 
more likely corporations chose either Cooperation or Union-Avoidance 
strategies over Mixed strategies. Again, it is inferred that more serious 
market threats require more aggressive, riskier strategies.
Extent of Union Representation on Choice of Strategy 
The evidence strongly supports the expectation that the more highly 
unionized the corporation, the less likely Union-Avoidance strategies 
are pursued. Indeed, the larger the proportion of a corporation©s plants 
unionized, the more likely Cooperation strategies are chosen over either 
Union-Avoidance or Mixed strategies. These results are consistent with 
the expectation that the potential disruptive costs associated with Union-
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Avoidance activities in highly unionized companies are substantially 
higher than in companies with lesser union representation.
Effects of Operational and Financial Structures on Choice of Strategy 
There is substantial evidence that the choice of strategies is also 
significantly influenced by a variety of factors reflecting differences in 
the operational structure and the financial structure or conditions of 
corporations. First, the higher the average labor cost component of 
production, the less likely corporations pursue either one of the more 
aggressive, riskier strategies. This finding is consistent with the expec 
tation that the more labor-intensive the operations, the riskier becomes a 
Union-Avoidance or Cooperation strategy. Labor©s resistance to union 
avoidance activities, that is, leads to greater disruption costs, the higher 
the labor-intensiveness. Failure to successfully implement and maintain 
joint activities across a company©s plants, likewise, would lead to greater 
losses in reorientation and training investments in joint programs, the 
greater the labor-intensiveness of production. Underlying this latter 
argument is the presumption that the necessary reorientation and train 
ing costs associated with joint programs are greater, since the labor cost 
component of production is greater.
Second, in weighing the potential costs and benefits of the various 
grand strategies in light of the labor cost component of production, the 
overall size of the average investment in plant operations is also evalu 
ated by executives. Here it is hypothesized that the larger the investment 
in plant operations, the greater becomes the potential loss from failed 
strategies, since more is put at risk. Hence, everything else the same, 
larger average investments in plant operations reduces the likelihood 
that either Union-Avoidance or Cooperation strategies are chosen (and 
vice versa). Two variables were used to test this hypothesis: average 
employment per plant and average sales volume per plant. The results of 
estimation yield evidence that the larger the average sales volume per 
plant, the more likely corporations choose a less aggressive, more risk 
averse Mixed strategy over either a Union-Avoidance or Cooperation 
strategy. Insignificant results are obtained with respect to the effect of 
average plant size on strategy choice.
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It is also found, as would be expected,that the fewer the number of 
plants companywide, the less likely corporations choose a Mixed strat 
egy. The logic is that the fewer the number of facilities, the more difficult 
it becomes to effectively manage the contradictory signals of embracing 
cooperation on one hand while engaging in union avoidance activities on 
the other.
Finally, strong statistical support is obtained, showing that the tighter 
the average cost/price squeeze across facilities (measured as cost-of- 
goods/sales), the more likely corporations choose Cooperation strat 
egies over either Union-Avoidance or Mixed strategies. Joint activities at 
the plant level are typically designed to identify and resolve production- 
related problems and to devise ways to improve productivity and quality 
and to reduce operating costs. As the potential net benefit from cooper 
ative activities rises, therefore (as depicted by higher cost of goods-to- 
sales ratios), the likelihood of choosing a Cooperation strategy rises.
In summary, the limited statistical analysis reviewed herein strongly 
suggests that corporations went about choosing among several grand 
labor relations strategies in the early 1980s. The evidence is strongly 
consistent with a decisionmaking model, wherein corporate executives 
have chosen strategies that appear to fit within the competitive pressures 
of their industries and within their collective bargaining, operational, 
and financial structures in the early 1980s. In the following section I 
report how companies went about implementing the three grand 
strategies.
Implementation of Grand Strategies
Key changes in operational and collective bargaining relationships 
over the 1975 to 1986 period are reported to highlight several distinct 
outcomes associated with these strategies. The data presented are based 
on the 115 headquarter executive responses, and companies are classi 
fied by grand strategy by the method described above.
Setting the context for the description of key changes that follows, in 
1975 Union-Avoiders on average had 26 plants, of which 68 percent 
were represented by unions. Cooperators, on average, had 13 plants, of
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which 90 percent were unionized. Companies pursuing Mixed strat 
egies had, on average, 17 plants in 1975, of which 68 percent were 
unionized. Over the 1975-1986 period Union-Avoiders, on average, 
increased the number of plants by roughly 29 percent, whereas com 
panies pursuing Cooperation and Mixed strategies increased the 
number of plants by roughly 18 percent.
As shown in chart 3.2, there are apparent differences across strategies 
with respect to changes in the union status of manufacturing plants. 
Over the 1975 to 1986 period, on average, Union-Avoiders increased the 
proportion of total plants that are nonunion by 23 percent, whereas 
Cooperators increased the proportion by only 6 percent and companies 
pursuing Mixed strategies increased the proportion of plants that are 
nonunion by 15 percent. Second, with respect to the closure of union 
ized facilities (chart 3.3), on average, Union-Avoiders closed approxi-
Chart 3.2
Proportional Change in Nonunion 














Choosing to Cooperate 59
Chart 3.3
Proportion of Unionized Plants Closed 
















mately 12 percent of their unionized plants over the 1975-1986 period, 
where in comparison companies pursuing Mixed strategies closed 20 
percent and Cooperators closed 25 percent of their unionized plants. 
Given the figures reported in chart 3.2, although Cooperators closed the 
largest proportion of unionized plants, they also did not aggressively 
resist the unionization of plants opened and/or acquired.
A third variable of interest is the extent to which corporations were 
associated with decertification elections. As reported in chart 3.4, 
Union-Avoiders were five times as likely to experience decertification 
elections over the 1981 to 1986 period as were Cooperators (25 percent 
and 5 percent, respectively). In comparison, companies pursuing 
Mixed strategies were about three times as likely as Cooperators to 
experience decertification elections.
Finally, on average, Cooperators had established formalized joint 
programs (designed to improve company performance and/or quality of
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worklife) in 75 percent of their unionized plants (chart 3.5). Corpora 
tions pursuing Mixed and Union-Avoidance strategies in contrast have 
established joint programs in 50 percent and 15 percent, respectively, of 
their unionized plants.
In conclusion, the kind of strategic thrusts described herein indicate 
that three broadly defined labor relations strategies have evolved over 
the last 10 to 15 years. Within these three grand strategies, however, 
there is also some notable variation in activities. In particular, within the 
Union-Avoidance category, approximately one-third of the companies 
did not close any unionized facilities nor experience any decertification 
elections. Union avoidance has been restricted apparently to the opening 
and/or acquiring of nonunion plants. Within the Cooperation category, 
approximately one-third of the companies closed a relatively large 
proportion of unionized plants (on average, one-third) and simul 
taneously opened or acquired a relatively large proportion of nonunion 
plants (on average, increasing the proportion of nonunion plants by 
about 20 percent). Except for extensive joint activities across their 
unionized plants (on average, across 83 percent of their plants), the 
strategic changes in these companies look similar to the those observed 
for companies in the Mixed category.
Plant-Level Joint Programs 
Objectives and Design
Based on the Headquarters Executive Survey, companies pursuing 
Cooperation strategies have established joint programs in 75 percent of 
their unionized facilities, those pursuing Mixed strategies have estab 
lished joint programs in 50 percent of their unionized facilities, and even 
15 percent of plants parented by Union-Avoiders have established joint 
programs. My purpose in this section is to report on the objectives 
underlying these joint efforts and on variations and commonalities in 
their design.
In both the Plant Manager Survey and Union Officer Survey, re 
spondents were first asked to identify any kind of formalized joint
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Table 3.1 
Type and Extent of Joint Programs Across Manufacturing
Type of program Percent of plants
with program*
Health and safety committees 48
Quality circles 31
Substance abuse committees 21






Scanlon or other gainsharing
(with employee involvement) 7
Employee stock ownership
(with employee involvement) 6
Profit sharing
(with employee involvement) 6
Other than above 12 
©Based on 194 company responses and 40 unique union responses, N=234
activity that had been established (see questionnaires in appendix). 
Combining the 194 plant manager responses with 40 unique union 
officer responses (unique in that no Plant Manager Survey responses 
were obtained), 54 percent of the 234 facilities represented by these 
survey responses have embarked on one or more joint programs. Ex 
cluding joint health and safety programs (which 48 percent of the 
sample reportedly have), table 3.1 shows that the most common form of 
joint activity is the jointly administered quality circle. The least com 
mon type of joint program, on the other hand, are programs that tie 
financial incentives such as gainsharing, profit sharing, and stock
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Table 3.2
Most Important Joint Programs: 
Type and Extent






Quality of work life/ 
employee involvement 15
Productivity committees 8
Scanlon or other gainsharing
(with employee involvement) 2
Employee stock ownership
(with employee involvement) 2
Other than above 3
N = 129
ownership to employee involvement. Excluding health and safety, sub 
stance abuse, and training committees, plants report having, on aver 
age, 2.4 different joint programs: 38 percent having one program, 31 
percent having two programs, and 31 percent having three or more 
programs.
Of course, not all programs survive. Some never get beyond a 
memorandum of agreement between the parties; some bloom and then 
flounder; others get terminated de facto as a result of plant closure. In 
the sample of 129 plants that established one or more joint programs, 30 
plants (23 percent) reported having terminated one or more joint pro 
grams. About 60 percent of these 30 plants, however, continued with or 
established other joint programs despite the terminations. Of the 320 
joint programs established by the 129 plants in the sample (again 
excluding joint health and safety, substance abuse, and apprenticeship 
programs), only 35 programs were terminated by 1986. Hence only 11 
percent of all joint programs appear to have been terminated.
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Objectives and Structure of Joint Programs
In questionnaires sent to both plant-level management and local union 
leaders, respondents were asked an identical set of questions about the 
focus and structure of program activities. In the questionnaire to local 
union leaders, respondents were asked an additional set of related 
questions. This section first reviews the responses to the first set of 
questions asked of both parties, and then reviews the responses to 
questions asked only of local union leaders.
In response to the survey of plant-level management, 111 responses 
describing joint programs were received. In addition, 18 responses were 
received from local union leaders describing joint programs for which 
no plant management response was obtained. These responses are 
combined to describe programs in 129 different manufacturing plants.
As discussed above, 62 percent of those facilities that have engaged in 
joint activities have established two or more joint programs. In asking 
respondents to describe programs and evaluate program success, re 
spondents were asked to answer questions as they would apply to their 
most important program, where more than one had been established. 
Table 3.2 reports the type and distribution of joint programs identified 
by respondents as their most important joint effort.
In asking respondents to describe the focus and structure of their most 
important joint program, it is found that, in general, team-based pro 
grams are very similar in focus and structure in spite of the categoriza 
tion reported in table 3.2. Labor-Management Committees (LMCs) and 
Productivity Committees, on the other hand, appear to have a somewhat 
different focus and structure than the team-based programs. To facilitate 
the description of programs, therefore, the sample is divided into two 
broad categories: (1) team-based programs (quality circles, work 
teams, QWL/EI, gainsharing, and ESOPs) and (2) committee-based 
programs (labor-management and productivity committees). As de 
rived from table 3.2, this partitioning of the sample yields 90 team- 
based programs and 35 committee-based programs that are next de 
scribed (four programs were not categorizable as either).
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Table 3.3
Team- Versus Committee-based Programs:
Key Problems That Led To and 
Are Addressed by Joint Programs































Using an open-ended format, respondents were asked to describe the 
key problems that led to and are addressed by their program. The key 
problems identified were then categorized, and up to three problems 
were coded for each respondent. Reported in table 3.3 are the coded 
responses. Vague responses (e.g., "global competition," "new technolo 
gy," "changing values of workers," etc.) were coded as "Other."
Among those facilities identifying team-based programs as their most 
important programs, the most widely cited problems were associated 
with quality of product (49 percent) and productivity (33 percent). 
Eleven percent or fewer of the respondents with team-based programs 
identified any other key problem.
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Among those facilities identifying committees as their most impor 
tant joint efforts, the most widely cited problems addressed by these 
programs are productivity (37 percent), the labor-management climate 
(29 percent), and product quality (20 percent). Nine percent or fewer 
identified any other key problem.
Program Initiation and Start-Up
The great majority of joint programs appear to have been initiated by 
management (see table 3.4). Approximately 86 percent of key team- 
based programs and 85 percent of key committee-based programs were
Table 3.4 
Initiation and Start-up of Joint Programs
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Table 3.5 
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initiated by management. Only 4 percent of these key programs were 
initially promoted by unions.
Also reported in table 3.4 are the years programs began. It is obvious 
that joint efforts are relatively new, given that 89 percent of the team- 
based programs and 86 percent of the committee-based programs were 
established in 1980 or later. Over 50 percent of all programs described 
were begun between 1983 and 1985.
There are several nonprofit organizations and federal government 
agencies involved in the promotion of labor-management cooperation. 
In particular, these include areawide and industrywide Joint Labor- 
Management Committees (JLMCs), the Federal Mediation and Concil 
iation Services (FMCS), and the U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of 
Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs). Re 
spondents were asked to indicate the extent to which their plant worked 
with the above "organizations in designing and/or implementing cooper 
ative programs." As reported in table 3.5, the parties have not relied to 
any substantial degree on either kind of outside JLMC or on either the 
FMCS or U.S. Department of Labor for assistance in getting started. 
Only 9 percent of the plants were assisted by industrywide JLMCs, 18 
percent by the FMCS, and 19 percent by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Overall, however, 33 percent of the plants with joint programs worked at 
least "some" with one or more of these outside nonprofit agencies.
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Formal Structure
Team-Based Programs: Upon examining the formal structures of 
joint programs, some clear commonalities among team-based programs 
are found. On average, steering committees that oversee team-based 
activities consist of five union representatives and five to six manage 
ment representatives. The most common split is four union and four 
management representatives. Some steering committees, however, are 
considerably larger, with up to as many as 12 union and 12 management 
representatives. In some committees, furthermore, union representa 
tion accounted for as little as 5 percent of committee membership, in 
others as high as 90 percent.
On average, steering committees meet every five weeks, but most 
commonly every four weeks. Regularly scheduled meetings, however, 
ranged anywhere from every week to every 16 weeks. The work groups 
or teams themselves generally meet far more frequently, on average 
every two weeks. The most common schedule is to meet once every 
week. In one case, however, teams meet only once every three months.
Committee-Based Programs: The formalized structure of committee- 
based programs also has strong commonalities across facilities. On 
average, committees are comprised of seven top union officials and 
seven to eight company officials. The most common configuration is five 
to six union and five to six management officials. The largest committee 
is comprised of 15 union and 15 management officials, while the 
smallest is comprised of one union official and four managers.
Roughly 50 percent of the committees meet every four weeks. The 
remaining programs have scheduled meetings ranging from biweekly to 
16-week intervals. In addition to the regular committee meetings, ap 
proximately 40 percent report having some form of shop-floor team 
meetings either as special task groups assigned by the committees or 
as departmental labor-management or productivity committees. How 
ever, in contrast to the team-based programs, for which teams generally 
meet every week or two, these shop-floor committees meet on average 
only every four weeks.
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Employees Covered in Team-Based Joint Programs
An attempt was made to estimate how widely diffused or extensive 
joint activities are among bargaining unit employees. Regrettably, the 
question was apparently stated in such a way that the responses have 
ambiguous value. Respondents were asked to report "the proportion of 
bargaining unit employees covered by the program." The responses 
ranged from 1 percent to 100 percent, with 58 percent responding that 
all bargaining unit employees were covered by the program described. 
Respondents apparently interpreted "covered" to mean either (a) the 
proportion of bargaining unit employees for which the joint program 
was applicable but not necessarily the proportion of employees who 
have been actively involved in joint program activities, or (b) the 
proportion of employees who have been actively involved in joint 
program activities.
Given the recency of the shift toward joint endeavors, it is highly 
unlikely that many unionized plants have extended their team-based 
joint programs to actively involve 100 percent of bargaining unit em 
ployees. Assuming that respondents who reported 100 percent coverage 
did, indeed, misinterpret the intent of the inquiry, some light can be shed 
on how widely diffused these joint activities are within facilities.
Table 3.6 provides a breakdown of coverage into several categories, 
both from the original responses and then excluding the 100 percent 
category. As shown for the latter case, in 56 percent of the plants, 
between 1 and 25 percent of bargaining unit employees are covered; in 
28 percent of the plants, between 26 and 50 percent of employees are 
covered; and in 16 percent of the plants, between 51 and 99 percent of 
employees are covered. On average, roughly 21 percent of bargaining 
unit employees are actively involved in joint program activities. Al 
though the reader must exercise caution with these figures, they provide 
some tentative evidence that three out of four team-based programs have 
yet to actively involve a majority of bargaining unit employees.
Additional Union Officer Survey Responses
The survey mailed to union officials asked several questions about the
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structure and process of joint activities not asked in the survey to plant- 
level managers. In this section we briefly review these union responses.
Outside Assistance: First, 41 percent of the respondents report that 
national or regional union offices provided expertise or resources re 
garding joint activities. The majority, therefore, did not receive any such 
assistance from the union hierarchy. Second, 47 percent responded that 
one or more neutral outside consultants were used to help facilitate joint 
activities in their plants. Approximately 22 percent of the respondents 
indicated that assistance from both the national or regional offices and 
outside neutral consultants was used, whereas 33 percent indicate that 
neither form of outside assistance was utilized.
Union Facilitators: Union officials were asked whether any union 
representatives had been assigned or elected by the union to act as joint 
program coordinators or facilitators. About 35 percent responded they 
had. Of these, 68 percent had one or more full-time joint program 
facilitators and 32 percent had one or more part-time joint program 
facilitators. There was no overlap in these two categories; facilitators 
were either all full time or all part time. The majority of those unions 
with full-time coordinators or facilitators have one such person, but the
Table 3.6
Proportion of Bargaining Unit Employees Covered 
by Team-based Programs
Percent in category Percent in category
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Table 3.7 
Joint Program Modification of Contract

















number ranges to as high as 18. Those local unions with part-time 
coordinators or facilitators typically have one or two, but in several 
cases the locals had eight to ten part-time facilitators.
Attendance Record: According to union respondents, both steering 
committee meetings and shop-floor meetings are generally well at 
tended. Only 9 percent of respondents indicated that steering committee 
meetings were poorly attended. Only 2 percent indicated that shop-floor 
team meetings were poorly attended.
Infringement on Labor Contracts: Finally, several questions were 
asked addressing the potential overlap or infringement of joint activities 
on the terms and conditions of the contract. First, respondents were 
asked to what extent joint teams and committees were allowed to modify 
either work rules or wages and benefits negotiated in the labor agree 
ment. As reported in table 3.7, 89 percent of the respondents report that 
joint teams and committees are NOT allowed to modify wages or 
benefits. In only 3 percent of the programs are participants allowed 
"much" leeway in altering negotiated wages or benefits. With regard to 
work rule modification, the parties allow more opportunity to change 
contractual agreements. \et even here, little change is generally al 
lowed; 63 percent allow for no modifications and 30 percent allow for 
very little or little change.
Respondents were further asked to describe the procedures to be 
followed when proposals for contract modifications are allowed. The
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standard procedure has two steps: first, the top level steering or labor- 
management committee of the program must agree to the proposed 
changes. Second, a majority ratification vote of the bargaining unit must 
be obtained.
A third question pertinent to the issue of overlap asked, "to what 
extent do union representatives who serve on the contract negotiation 
team or who are regular grievance committeemen also serve in key 
positions in joint program committees?" Roughly 72 percent responded 
that there was "much" or "very much" overlap; 23 percent reported "very 
little" overlap. Only 5 percent reported no overlap.
Summary and Conclusion
Based on a survey of company headquarters, executives have very 
recently fashioned three fairly distinct labor-relations strategies. 
Among those companies pursuing Cooperation strategies, by 1986 
about 75 percent of their unionized manufacturing plants had estab 
lished formalized joint programs. Among companies pursuing Mixed 
strategies, about 50 percent of their unionized plants had established 
formalized joint programs by 1986. Only 15 percent of the unionized 
plants in which parent companies are pursuing Union-Avoidance strat 
egies have established joint programs. In choosing among these grand 
strategies, the evidence presented herein implies that executives 
weighed the perceived effects of market conditions and corporate struc 
tural variables on the potential costs and benefits associated with the 
three grand strategies. In turn, the strategy chosen reflects executives© 
perceptions about which grand strategy optimizes net gains. Key factors 
associated with these choices can be summarized as follows.
  The more severe become market conditions (depicted by 
rising import penetration and declining industry employ 
ment), the more likely companies choose either the more 
aggressive Union-Avoidance or Cooperation strategies over
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the Mixed strategy. On net, the choice is most likely to be a 
Union-Avoidance strategy.
  The greater the union strength (depicted by percent of 
company facilities unionized), the more likely companies 
choose a Cooperation strategy over both Union-Avoidance 
and Mixed strategies.
  The lower the labor intensity of production (measured by 
labor cost/total value ratios and by the average value added 
per employee) and the smaller the average plant investment 
(proxied by plant sales), the more likely a Union-Avoidance 
or Cooperation strategy is chosen over a Mixed strategy, and 
the more likely a Union-Avoidance strategy is chosen over a 
Cooperation strategy.
  The greater the number of plants, the more likely com 
panies choose a Mixed strategy, with a larger proportion 
moving away from choosing a Cooperation strategy than 
moving away from choosing a Union-Avoidance strategy.
  The higher the cost-to-sales ratio, the more likely com 
panies choose a Cooperation strategy. As the cost-to-sales 
ratio rises, companies move away from choosing a Mixed 
strategy but not away from choosing a Union-Avoidance 
strategy.
I have also attempted to document the objectives and structure of joint 
union-management programs in U.S. manufacturing. Based on a survey 
of 350 plant managers and their local union leader counterparts, 
roughly one-half of these manufacturing facilities have embarked on 
joint programs established to improve plant-level performance and/or 
labor-management relations. This figure excludes joint programs on 
health and safety, substance abuse, and apprenticeship training. Nearly 
all joint programs were begun in the last 10 years; over 50 percent of 
programs were begun during the 1983-1985 period. The primary foci or 
purposes of these joint programs are enhancing product quality, increas 
ing productivity, and improving labor-management climates.
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Joint programs can be categorized reasonably well into two basic 
types. The first are team-based efforts, in which bargaining unit employ 
ees are involved in shop-floor problemsolving (quality circles, work 
teams, quality of work life/employee involvement, and those employee 
involvement programs with gainsharing or profit sharing incentives). 
The second are committee-based efforts, in which plant management 
and local union leaders are involved in plantwide problemsolving 
(labor-management or productivity committees). It appears that within 
plants, the diffusion of team-based activities has yet to involve a majority 
of hourly employees. One must bear in mind, however, that most joint 
efforts are relatively new and that expansion of employee involvement 
activities takes considerable time. It is important to note that only 11 
percent of all joint programs established in recent years have been 
terminated, suggesting that these new cooperative efforts have some 
durability.
Lest the reader gets the wrong impression, the statistical analysis of 
the choice to cooperate should be viewed with caution. The analysis is 
based on a small and unique data base, the information available is 
limited (potentially leading to incomplete and overly simplified analy 
ses), and the theory underlying any tests of hypotheses is in a formative, 
incomplete stage and hence, any inferences about causality are 
tentative.
One can readily surmise, however, that unless cooperative efforts 
maximize net gains to all parties involved, the parties that have chosen to 
engage in cooperative activities will ultimately choose to abandon these 
efforts. Abandonment would be American history repeating itself, 
except in today©s competitive markets the alternative is not yesterday©s 
adversarial relationship of hard-nosed bargaining and contract adminis 
tration. Today©s alternative is to pit unions against employers in an all- 
out struggle over deunionization.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
In this appendix are tables pertinent to the analysis of factors affecting corpo 
rate choics of labor relations strategies. These tables are reprinted from 
William N. Cooke and David G. Meyer, "Structural and Market Predictors of 
Corporate Labor Relations Strategies," published in the Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Volume 43, Number 2 (January 1990), pp. 280-293.
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Table 3A.1 
Variable Construction and Data Sources
Variable Construction
AlMPORT 1981 import penetration ratio minus 1978 import penetration 
ratio of company©s primary 2-digit SIC industry [Source: 
Dept. of Commerce industry and import files]
AEMPLOY ((1981-78 total industry employment/1978 total industry 
employment) * 100), using company©s primary 2-digit SIC 
code [Commerce]
% UNION Percentage of the company©s total domestic manufacturing 
plants represented by unions in 1975 [author©s survey]
LCTV ((Total 1981 industry payroll/(total 1981 shipments) -I- (total 
1981 inventory - 1980 inventory)) * 100), using company©s 
2-digit SIC code [Commerce]
ADDVALUE ((1981 operating income + (1981 inventory - 1980 
inventory))/1981 total company employment) 
[COMPUSTAT]
PLNTSIZE Total company employment in 1981/total manufacturing 
plants in 1975 [COMPUTSTAT: survey]
vWGSALES Total company sales in 1981/total manufacturing plants in 
1975, in millions of dollars [COMPUTSTAT: survey]
NPLANTS Total number of domestic manufacturing plants in 1975 
[survey]
SQUEEZE ((1981 total sales - 1981 operating income)/1981 total sales) 
[COMPUTSTAT]
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Table 3A.2
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) 
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Table 3A.3













X2 = 58.842***, 
































































Pua = the probability of selecting the union avoidance strategy; Pm — the probability of 
selecting the mixed strategy; Pc = the probability of selecting the cooperation strategy. 
*Significant at the .10 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level (two- 
tailed tests.
Outcomes Associated With Cooperation
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I report the perceptions 
of plant-level managers and local union officers regarding changes in 
company performance, labor relations climates, and outcomes specific 
to unions and their members. These reported changes, however, apply to 
perceived changes occurring after the introduction of joint programs 
and not necessarily as the result of the introduction of joint programs. In 
the second section, therefore, the theoretical linkage between joint 
activities and these perceived plant-level outcomes is modeled and 
findings from several empirical tests are summarized. At a more aggre 
gated level, I then examine the effects of the various grand labor 
relations strategies on corporate performance.
Perceived Outcomes Associated With 
Joint Activities at the Plant Level
In both the Plant Manager Survey and Union Officer Survey re 
spondents were asked: "Comparing the five year period prior to imple 
mentation of the most important joint program identified above, please 
indicate the degree to which the variables identified below have 
changed." The response categories provided are: much higher, modestly 
higher, about the same, modestly lower, and much lower. Presented 
graphically in charts 4.1 through 4.11 are the responses from approxi 
mately 110 plant managers and 65 local union leaders who reported 
having established joint team-based or committee-based programs de 
fined in chapter 3. Responses indicating that the selected outcome had 
either worsened "modestly" or by "much" are collapsed into one cate 
gory because very few responses indicated the selected outcomes had
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worsened by "much." For ease of presentation, the proportion of re 
spondents reporting that the selected outcome was "about the same" are 
omitted.
In charts 4.1 and 4.2 are the management and union leader reported 
changes in worker productivity, product quality, and rate of scrappage or 
waste. In general, it appears that the perceptions of managers and local 
union leaders are largely consistent with respect to these changes in 
company performance. At least one-half of the respondents perceived 
that there have been modest improvements in productivity and quality. A 
much smaller proportion of managers and union leaders (about 10-20 
percent) perceived that there has been much improvement in productiv 
ity, quality, and rate of scrappage. Very few respondents (but some) 
reported that productivity and quality have worsened. One obvious 
difference in opinion between managers and union leaders is observed in 
reference to scrappage and waste; 18 percent of the union leaders 
reported worsening performance, whereas only 4 percent of managers 
reported worsening performance.
Charts 4.3 and 4.4 report responses to several outcomes related to 
what might be thought of as labor relations climate variables. Again, the 
responses across the management and union leader samples are largely 
consistent. With respect to grievance rates, it appears that in roughly 20 
percent of the plants with joint efforts, grievance rates have become 
much lower, and in approximately 30 percent of the plants, grievance 
rates have become modestly lower. It appears, however, that in many 
settings (about one in five) grievance rates are at least modestly higher.
With respect to absenteeism and tardiness, about one-half of the 
respondents perceive some improvement, most of that being modest. 
With respect to changes in flexibility of work rules, only about 5 percent 
report having obtained much greater flexibility after embarking on joint 
activities, and only about 25 percent report having obtained modestly 
greater flexibility.
Charts 4.5 through 4.8 summarize responses to several outcomes 
pertinent to changes in labor-management relations. Direct com 
parisons of responses between union leaders and plant managers cannot 
be made here because some questions were worded differently in the
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Chart 4.3
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survey instruments to each sample and other questions were asked only 
of local union leaders. As reported in charts 4.5 and 4.6, it appears that 
just over 25 percent of respondents perceive that the adversarial or 
problemsolving relationship between plant managers and union leaders 
has been much improved. Another 40 percent perceive modest improve 
ment in these relations. Plant-level managers appear to perceive that 
there has been much greater improvement in reducing adversarial super 
visor-worker relationships than do local union leaders. (These reported 
differences, however, could be attributed to differences in the wording of 
questions.) It also appears that some parties have been able to capitalize 
on improved cooperative relations developed through joint efforts when 
subsequently engaging in contract negotiations. About 15 percent re 
port much improvement in the cooperative spirit at negotiations and 
another 30 percent report experiencing modest improvement. The diffi 
culty of juxtaposing the more cooperative process of joint activity with 
the inherently more adversarial process of contract negotiations is 
highlighted, however, by noting that over 20 percent of the union leaders 
and 15 percent of the plant managers report that the cooperative spirit of 
negotiations has worsened since joint activities were begun.
As reported in charts 4.7 and 4.8, a majority of local union leaders 
report that the parties to cooperative efforts have improved their under 
standing of each other©s interests, objectives, and roles. One-fifth of 
union leaders report that management©s understanding of the union 
leader roles and interests has been much improved. Another one-third 
perceive there has been modest improvement. Union leaders also report 
some improvement in plant management©s understanding of worker 
interests and objectives, with nearly 50 percent of union leaders report 
ing modest improvement and just over 10 percent reporting much 
improvement along these lines.
The opposite also appears to be true. That is, (see chart 4.8) in a 
majority of settings union leaders and members have improved their 
understanding of management©s business interests and objectives. This 
appears especially to be the case for union leaders, whereby over 20 
percent report having a much better understanding and over 50 percent 
report having a modestly better understanding of management interests.
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Chart 4.5
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Chart 4.7
Perceived Changes in Management
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Local union leaders were also asked a fairly wide range of questions 
about potential gains to their members and the union as a whole. As 
reported in chart 4.9, less than a majority of union leader respondents 
perceive that member satisfaction with job tasks or work conditions have 
improved. Most of the improvement, if any, has been modest. A large 
majority of union leaders, on the other hand, perceived that manage 
ment has shared more information since the establishment of joint 
programs (See chart 4.10). Indeed, nearly 30 percent report that much 
more information has been shared and another 40 percent report that 
there has been modestly more information shared. In spite of this greater 
sharing of information, however, it appears that the opportunities for 
greater union input into business decisions have been relatively limited. 
Only about 25 percent of the respondents report any greater input after 
cooperation than before.
Any improvement in the ability of the union leadership to resolve 
member problems is also a benefit to the leadership. About 10 percent of 
the union respondents perceive their ability to resolve member problems 
has become much better; another one out of three leaders report modest 
improvements. In contrast, approximately 15 percent have found that 
their ability to resolve member problems has actually lessened.
Finally, several potential gains to the union as an institution are 
examined. As presented in chart 4.11, unions apparently have not 
experienced any substantial gains in member commitment to the union. 
Indeed, only one-third of the union leader respondents reported modest 
improvement in commitment and nearly one out of five reported com 
mitment has been reduced. On the other side of the coin, however, local 
union leaders do not perceive companies have gained much higher 
commitment. Although over 40 percent perceive a modest increase in 
member commitment to the company, over 20 percent perceive a re 
duced commitment to the company. Finally, according to local union 
leader perceptions, the public image of their unions has improved 
modestly, if at all.
In summary, it is important to emphasize that the reported perceptions 
above are not attributable to joint activities, but rather merely reflect the 
perceptions of plant managers and union officers with respect to ob-
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Chart 4.9
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Chart 4.11
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served changes since embarking on joint activities. As the theoretical 
framework presented in chapter 2 highlights, many other factors come 
into play in cooperative settings that affect these outcomes. My purpose 
in the next section is to examine the contexts in which cooperation is 
more or less successful in improving plant performance and labor 
relations.
Successful Cooperation 
Factors That Make a Difference at the Plant Level
Previous Literature
There are a limited number of empirical investigations of cooperative 
efforts that examine the effects of joint activities across establishments. 
Schuster (1983) studied nine unionized manufacturing plants to exam-
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ine productivity and employment levels prior and subsequent to the 
implementation of gainsharing and joint union-management commit 
tees. Based on his interrupted time-series analysis, he finds that, in the 
short run, in six of eight establishments productivity rose significantly 
and in eight of nine establishments employment levels remained un 
affected after joint activities began. Upon extending his analysis to 
additional sites, Schuster (1984) found less favorable results. Based on 
23 sites, productivity rose in about 50 percent of the sites in the 
immediate period following the introduction of cooperative programs. 
In the longer run (up to five years), however, productivity rose in only 17 
percent of these sites. Based on a sample of 27 sites, employment 
remained stable or rose in roughly 80 percent of the sites, in both the 
immediate period following the introduction of programs and in the 
longer run.
Voos (1987, 1989) analyzed 350 unionized firms in Wisconsin 
(1983-1984) and reached the following conclusions:
  All forms of joint programs at the establishment level have 
positive effects on nearly all performance outcomes (quality, 
productivity, labor costs, and profits).
  Gainsharing, profit sharing, and employee involvement 
programs have greater effects on performance outcomes than 
committee-based programs.
  All forms of joint programs have positive effects on changes 
in flexibility, absenteeism, and turnover.
  Only general plant committees have consistently positive 
effects on union leader-management relations, grievance 
rates, and the ability to resolve grievances informally.
  Profit sharing and employee stock ownership plans have 
negative effects on union leader-management relations.
Whereas Voos finds that formalized joint activities generally have 
positive effects, Katz, Kochan, and their co-authors come to the op 
posite conclusion. In three separate analyses of selected plants repre 
sented by the UAW in one American auto company, Katz, Kochan, and
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others find that QWL and related activities have some very modest 
effects at best on performance and costs. Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille 
(1983) conclude that in their sample of 18 plants (1970-1979), more 
extensive QWL efforts modestly improved quality but had no effect on 
efficiency. Katz, Kochan, and Weber©s (1985) study of 25 plants 
(1978-1980) leads the authors to conclude that greater QWL involve 
ment had no effect on efficiency and a negative effect on quality. Greater 
participation in suggestion programs, however, is reported to have 
positive effects on quality, but still no effect on efficiency. In a more 
elaborate examination of 53 plants (1979-1986), Katz, Kochan, and 
Keefe (1987) examine the effects of joint activities on changes in the 
ratio of supervisors to workers, labor hours in production, and quality. 
The authors construct composite indices of worker-union participation 
in group decisions and in technology decisions. The results of their 
investigation lead the authors to conclude:
  More extensive team-related activities increase labor hours 
in production and have no effect on either the ratio of super- 
visors-to-workers or quality.
  Greater worker-union participation in group decisions has 
no effect on any of the given performance outcomes.
  Greater worker-union participation in technology decisions 
has generally positive effects on reducing hours of labor for 
production but inconsistent effects on the ratio of supervisors- 
to-workers and quality.
In summary, the few studies conducted across plants lead to mixed 
results with respect to the overall effects of joint programs at the plant 
level. Although these analyses examine changes in outcome variables 
within cooperative settings and have to some extent controlled for 
additional variables expected to affect the outcomes of interest, the 
authors generally fail to address how other factors in combination with 
joint activities affect the outcomes of interest.
Next, I examine statistically the importance of a set of key variables 
expected to influence performance and labor relations outcomes in
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cooperative settings. First, drawing on the theoretical framework devel 
oped in chapter 2, a simplified empirical model of the determinants of 
cooperative success is presented. Second, the model is operationalized 
and tested separately with respect to three basic outcomes: perceived 
changes in product quality, worker productivity, and supervisor em 
ployee relations. These three outcomes are chosen for detailed study 
because, as reported in chapter 3, they reflect the central foci of joint 
programs.
Theoretical Model
Guided by the theoretical model presented in chapter 2, it is first 
assumed that each party to cooperation seeks to find the mix of relative 
and total power activities that optimizes its own utility. It can be as 
sumed, in turn, that the intensity of joint activities reflects that perceived 
optimal mix or balance. Central to the analyses that follow is the 
proposition that the greater the intensity of joint activities at any point in 
time, the greater the gains derived from those activities at subsequent 
points in time.
The challenge in identifying important factors that affect the success 
of joint efforts is the identification of factors that increase the perceived 
costs or benefits to cooperative efforts. Factors increasing the perceived 
costs to joint efforts are expected to diminish the intensity of effort and 
hence degree of improvements. Factors that increase the perceived 
benefits have the opposite effect on intensity and hence degrees of 
success.
Based on the available literature and the general theoretical model 
presented in chapter 2, the outcome model diagrammed in figure 4.1 
guides the statistical analyses that follow. The model holds that once 
joint programs have been established, changes in company performance 
and labor-management relations in general depend, in large part, on the 
intensity of joint efforts. Intensity of joint efforts not only has direct 
effects on performance, but also has indirect effects on performance via 
any improvements in labor relations. Changes in company performance 
and labor relations (specifically supervisor-employee relations in the
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Figure 4.1
Model of the Effect of Cooperation on 






tests that follow) are also directly affected by the relative power of the 
union and company and by certain organizational constraints faced by 
the parties. Changes in company performance are also affected directly 
by the exercise of relative power options available to management.
Central to understanding the analysis herein is the intensity of effort. 
Intensity refers to the amount of time, effort, commitment, and the 
quality of input applied to joint activities. In part, the level of intensity is 
structured. For instance, the larger the proportion of the bargaining unit 
employees, the union leadership, and plant management engaged in 
joint activities, the more intensive the effort. The literature indicates that 
there is enormous variation in these structured levels of involvement. 
The more frequently the parties schedule their problem identification 
and resolution meetings and the better these meetings are organized or
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facilitated, the more intensive the structured joint activities. Intensity, 
furthermore, is structured in part by the amount, type, and quality of 
orientation and training undertaken toward developing important tech 
nical, team building, and joint decisionmaking skills.
In addition to and within the formalized parameters of joint pro 
grams, intensity is conditioned by the level of energy and involvement 
applied to these efforts by all parties involved. For example, employees 
may be more or less willing to participate in joint efforts, attend 
scheduled meetings, or give serious attention to resolving problems or 
pursuing improvements. As detailed in chapter 5, the greater the extent 
of problems encountered (e.g., perceived violations of trust or commit 
ment), the less intensive will be cooperative activities. The degree of 
intensity is also often constrained by various organizational features 
(e.g., age of workforce, size of facility, and level of resources).
In summary, the simplified model diagrammed in figure 4.1 holds that 
certain key factors influence performance and labor-relations outcomes 
in cooperative settings, either directly or indirectly by affecting the 
intensity of effort. In testing the fundamental propositions underlying 
the model described, however, it should be borne in mind that the tests 
conducted do not estimate the separate independent direct and indirect 
effects, but instead estimate the combined direct and indirect effects of 
key variables on the selected outcomes. Given limitations of the data 
collection, it is not possible, furthermore, to test the effect of changes in 
supervisor-employee relations on changes in company performance. 
Instead, separate tests are made of the effects of selected variables on the 
changes in supervisor-employee relations and company performance. In 
short, in the tests of the model of changes in performance, the effect of 
changes in labor-management relations are unobserved.
Empirical Tests of Key Factors Influencing Outcomes
The data used for the analyses reported herein are drawn from the 
Plant Manager Survey responses to the question about the perceived 
extent of change in quality, productivity, and supervisor-employee rela 
tions. Ordered probit estimators are used to estimate the independent
96 Outcomes Associated With Cooperation
effects of selected variables on the outcomes. The rationale underlying 
the selected hypotheses tested and the results of the estimations are 
discussed next. A summary of the results is subsequently presented in 
figures 4.2 through 4.4. (For further details of the statistical analyses, 
see Cooke 1989a and Cooke 1990.)
Cooperative Structure
With respect to the formalized structure of programs, it is first 
hypothesized that since team-based programs involve a larger propor 
tion of the workforce and supervision than do committee-based pro 
grams, company performance and supervisor-employee relations will 
improve more under team-based efforts. It is hypothesized, in addition, 
that the more frequently the parties meet in team-based efforts, the 
greater the improvements obtained. The results of the statistical tests 
support the hypothesis (across all three outcomes) that more active 
team-based programs yield substantially greater improvements than less 
active team-based programs. Specifically it is found that the likelihood 
of not obtaining improvements in performance is much greater in team- 
based programs in which teams are scheduled to meet less frequently 
than every two weeks than those team-based programs in which teams 
meet weekly or at least once every two weeks. The same general finding 
applies to changes in supervisor-employee relations, except that team- 
based programs in which teams are scheduled to meet weekly are far 
more likely to yield modest or much improvement in relations than 
teams meeting less frequently than weekly. From these tests it appears 
that unless team-based programs call for regular weekly or biweekly 
meetings, there is very little or no payoff to team-based efforts.
The evidence indicates that committee-based programs are no more 
effective in improving supervisor-employee relations than team-based 
programs that schedule meetings less often than weekly. On the other 
hand, it is found that, on average, committee-based programs have no 
less effect on quality and productivity improvements than team-based 
programs in which teams are scheduled to meet at least once every two 
weeks.
Another factor related to program structure that has a substantial
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effect on all three outcomes is the extent of union leader participation on 
top joint steering committees. Where more than six union represen 
tatives sit on the top steering committee, the odds of improving quality, 
productivity, and supervisor-employee relations are considerably 
greater than when fewer representatives are members of these steering 
committees. On average, it can be noted that steering committees are 
comprised of five to six union representatives and five to six managers, 
albeit the composition of steering committees is fairly wide-ranging. 
The statistical estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that the more 
input from union leaders on top steering committees, the greater the 
intensity of the cooperative effort. That is, greater union leader par 
ticipation is expected to demonstrate greater support for any team-based 
or ad hoc subcommittee activities on the floor, to provide greater 
interaction between plant managers and union officials, and in some 
cases provide active policing of joint activities vis-a-vis traditional 
contract administration.
Consistent with the literature, it is found that the gains from cooper 
ative efforts appear to increase initially, rising at diminishing rates, then 
eventually falling and leveling off. As reported in numerous cases, there 
is typically a strong burst of enthusiasm for involvement and participa 
tion. However, over time enthusiasm for joint activities wanes, as it does 
with many new endeavors (Boyle 1986). Second, the identification and 
resolution of many production and other workplace problems are fairly 
easy to tackle, but over time become successively more difficult. As 
gains are harder to accomplish, enthusiasm is harder to maintain, and 
hence commitment to joint activities often dwindles. Third, over time 
adversarial conflicts often re-emerge (Hoyer and Huszczo 1988). These 
events increase distrust between the parties, which only undermines 
cooperative efforts.
The results of the statistical estimations of this hypothesized rela 
tionship between program duration and outcomes are statistically signif 
icant with respect to perceived changes in quality and supervisor- 
employee relations, but not for changes in productivity. Based on the 
estimates, improvements appear to peak, on average, at about the third 
to fourth year of program activity.
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Union and Management Relative Power
The parties engaged in cooperative activities do not ipso facto relin 
quish the exercise of relative power activities. Instead they must fashion 
an acceptable balance of relative and cooperative power activities. In 
choosing to exercise relative power options, the parties must contend 
with the potential negative effects of that exercise on the labor-manage 
ment relationship and, in turn, on the intensity of the cooperative effort.
In the statistical estimations, it is clear that, on average, subcontract 
ing out bargaining unit work has a strong negative relationship with 
changes in quality, productivity, and supervisor-employee relations. It is 
inferred that this exercise of relative power by management has a serious 
demoralizing effect on the workforce and union leadership, an effect 
that reduces the union©s commitment to joint activities. Indeed, the 
likelihood that there is "much" improvement in supervisor-employee 
relations is reduced by more than 2.5-fold when management sub 
contracts (every thing else the same). When translated into the effects on 
performance, the likelihood that there is "much" improvement in quality 
and productivity is reduced threefold and fivefold, respectively, when 
management subcontracts.
Although subcontracting out bargaining unit work has very strong 
negative effects on outcomes, concession bargaining appears to have no 
effect, on average, on the selected outcomes studied. Nor does tech 
nological displacement have a significant effect on changes in product 
quality or supervisor-employee relations. Technological displacement, 
however, is significantly associated with improvements in productivity. 
Here, any negative demoralizing effects on the workforce appear to be 
offset by the productivity gains associated with new capital investments. 
As capital investments in plants may be a signal to the union leadership 
and membership that management is committed to making the plant 
competitive by allocating resources to capital advancements, one could 
reasonably conjecture that management©s exercise of this relative power 
option does not carry with it the demoralizing message sent by sub 
contracting out work.
The economic forces at work that trigger the cooperation more often 
than not shift the relative power advantage toward management. In the
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face of management©s exercise of the above kind of relative power 
options in the context of serious competitive threats, unions are hard 
pressed to exercise their traditional relative power options of striking 
and slowing down production. As a practical matter, it is difficult to 
readily identify and measure for statistical purposes the relative power 
activities of unions in cooperative settings, except as may be inferred 
(but only in part) by the absence of management©s exercise of relative 
power options. In the present empirical analysis, the percent of produc 
tion workers represented by unions is used as a rough proxy of a union©s 
relative power (albeit, this is not a fully satisfactory measure of a union©s 
relative power). In any case, it is found that the larger the proportion of 
employees represented, the more likely there are perceived improve 
ments in quality and productivity. No statistical support is found, how 
ever, showing that a larger proportion of employees represented leads to 
improvements in supervisor-employee relations.
Organizational Features and Constraints
The statistical investigation indicates that there are a number of 
organizational features and constraints that have independent effects on 
performance and labor-relations outcomes. First, the evidence indicates 
that in plants where employment continues to decline, the likelihood 
that there will be improvements in productivity is diminished. Only very 
modest support is obtained, however, for continued employment decline 
reducing the likelihood of obtaining improvements in quality. With 
respect to changes in supervisor-employee relations, the evidence sug 
gests that where the reduction in force is greater than 25 percent, 
relations actually improve.
These results are fairly consistent with the hypothesis that continued 
layoffs have a demoralizing effect on the parties, which diminishes the 
intensity of the cooperative effort. In the opposite direction, stability or 
growth in employment has an uplifting effect on the parties, which 
reinforces the perceived value of cooperative efforts. In the extreme, 
however, it appears that sharp reductions in employment may have a 
"shock" effect on the parties, whereby when the very livelihood of the
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plant is at stake, the parties are shocked into improving relations on the 
shop floor.
The size of the plant also appears to have an independent effect on 
outcomes. It is hypothesized that the larger the organization, the less 
likely improvements in performance and supervisor-employee relations 
will be obtained. First, the larger the organization, the longer it takes to 
diffuse cooperative activities across work groups and departments, 
which, overall, makes cooperative efforts less intensive. Second, the 
larger the organization, the greater the organizational complexity, mak 
ing communication and control links more cumbersome to master; all of 
this reduces intensity of effort. Furthermore, one can imagine that 
general workforce alienation is greater, the larger the organization, 
which in turn makes cooperative efforts more difficult to facilitate.
The results of the statistical estimation indicate that all else the same, 
there is strong statistical support to conclude that it is far more difficult 
to obtain improvements in productivity and supervisor-employee rela 
tions in larger organizations. There is modest support for this conclu 
sion with respect to changes in quality. It is also found, however, that in 
relatively small plants (fewer than 500 employees), supervisor-em 
ployee relations are less likely to improve than in larger plants. This 
latter finding is consistent with expectation that supervisor-employee 
relations are generally better to begin with in small vis-a-vis medium 
and large-sized establishments.
Finally, it is often heard that the intensity of cooperative efforts is 
reduced in establishments employing older, more senior workforces. 
More senior workers may have more hardened distrustful perceptions 
about management and, consequently, see less value in cooperating with 
management. More senior employees, furthermore, enjoying greater 
job security (via accumulated seniority rights) or facing retirement with 
accumulated benefits, can be expected to be less enthusiastic about 
volunteering or participating in joint team-based efforts. Except at the 
extreme, however, there is reason to believe that greater seniority up to 
some point increases the intensity of cooperative efforts. First, with 
greater seniority comes a richer understanding of production problems, 
and greater skill in devising solutions. Second, more senior employees
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can be expected to have greater attachment to the place of employment 
than employees with few years of service. In light of threats of employ 
ment loss, employees with greater seniority (but insufficient seniority to 
protect them from sizable layoffs), can be expected to be more willing to 
embrace and join in joint activities.
The statistical evidence suggests that indeed, greater average plant 
seniority, up to 15 years, is associated with greater improvements in 
supervisor-employee relations. Beyond 15 years, improvements in rela 
tions become harder and harder to come by. No statistical support is 
found, however, to indicate average years of seniority influence im 
provements in quality or productivity, not even at the extremes.
Summary of Findings
No statistical analyses of human behavior and perceptions have ever 
proved or disproved any cause-effect relationships. The analysis herein 
is no exception. Statistical analyses, however, can provide us with more 
sophisticated forms of evidence upon which to make judgments about 
important cause-effect relationships. Bearing in mind the many pitfalls 
and limitations of formulating theory, specifying models of that theory, 
and empirically testing those models, the statistical analyses herein 
provide relatively strong evidence that supports a number of common- 
sense notions about factors that influence the outcomes of cooperative 
activities. Keeping these caveats in mind, findings of the present em 
pirical investigation are summarized.
To ease the summary, the inferred effects of the variables examined 
herein on the three major outcomes of interest are presented in figures 
4.2 through 4.4. Those variables that on average are associated with 
greater improvement in a given outcome are listed near the top of each 
scale. Variables that generally are associated with no perceived im 
provement or even worse outcomes are listed near the bottom of each 
scale. Those variables that appear to have no average effect are listed 
near the middle range of each scale. In reality these latter variables may 
have positive or negative effects; but if they do, their effects are offset by 
other unobserved variables not accounted for in the tests.
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Figure 4.2
Effect of Selected Variables on Perceived 
Changes in Quality
Scale of improvement
• High union leader
participation 


















• Teams meet frequently 
• Committee-based
programs 











• Low union leader 
participation
Review of the figures highlights a number of tentative conclusions. 
Note that generally, unless teams in team-based programs meet suffi 
ciently frequently (at least once every two weeks, if not more often) 
there appear to be no gains. Additionally, note that where union leaders 
appear to be more actively involved in joint activities and where union 
representation is more secure or stronger, joint efforts realize greater 
improvements. At the other end of the scale, it appears that more 
positive outcomes are harder to come by when management sub 
contracts out bargaining unit work, where employment levels continue 
to decline, and in larger manufacturing facilities.
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Figure 4.3
Effect of Selected Variables on Perceived 
Changes in Productivity
• High union leader 
participation

























• Concession bargaining 
(no effect)
• Program duration 
(no effect)
• Large plants
• Teams meet 
infrequently
• Low union leader 
participation
It appears that on average concession bargaining (which typically 
precedes or accompanies the establishment of joint programs) and 
technological displacement do not, on net, have strong demoralizing 
effects on the intensity of cooperative efforts. Last, it appears that 
positive outcomes derived from joint activities typically peak at about 
the third or fourth year.
Several general conclusions or lessons can be drawn from this data 
analysis. First, cooperative efforts can in part be structured to increase 
intensity of effort, for without sufficient intensity they have no discerna- 
ble effects on performance or labor relations. Special attention could be
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Figure 4.4
Effect of Selected Variables on Perceived 
Changes in Supervisor-Employee Relations
• High union leader 
participation 
• Program in 3rd or 
4th year
• Low average 
seniority 
• Percent union 
representation 
(no effect)
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• Concession bargaining 
(no effect) 
• Program in 5th year 
or later
• Low union leader 
participation 
• Small plants 
• Very large plants
given to these efforts (typically) in the third or fourth year, in order to 
infuse greater intensity into the effort. This attention may need to be 
focused on any demoralizing factors (e.g., growing distrust or factors 
negatively influencing perceived commitment), and/or on enhancing 
the problem identification and resolution skills of the workforce.
Another general lesson is that the success of cooperative efforts are 
dependent on union leader endorsement and participation. To secure or 
enhance this union leader involvement, the union must be viewed as 
relatively strong and secure.
Management practices that undermine this involvement, likewise, 
undermine the potential success of cooperative efforts.
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The evidence suggests that the parties in general can juxtapose some 
forms of relative power activities with cooperative activities (e.g., 
concession bargaining and technological displacement). Special atten 
tion must be paid, however, to the demoralizing effect of subcontracting 
bargaining unit work. Unless the union leadership and membership can 
see its justification in light of serious competitive threats and a joint 
process is established to justify any subcontracting, employers are 
bound to undermine joint activities by engaging in subcontracting.
Finally, there appear to be factors that are not in the direct control of 
the parties, but which, when confronted, require special attention. 
These factors include the continued decline in employment and the 
organizational constraints of managing in large establishments and 
where the age or seniority of the workforce is relatively high.
Performance Outcomes Associated With Corporate Strategies
This section summarizes the results of an investigation of the effects 
of corporate strategies on financial performance (see Meyer and Cooke 
1990 for a detailed report). In particular, the independent effects of the 
competitive restructuring activities reviewed in chapter 3 (the extent of 
joint programs across plants, the acquisition and/or opening of non 
union plants, the closure of unionized plants, and the decertification of 
unions) on changes in return-on-sales and average added value per 
employee are estimated. These estimates are made in light of differences 
in industry market conditions and several other contextual factors across 
the three grand strategies identified in chapter 3: Union-Avoidance, 
Cooperation, and Mixed.
Empirical Investigation
As illustrated in figure 4.5, the objective of the investigation has been 
to account for any changes in performance between 1974-1975 and 
1984-1985 attributable to four key strategic labor-relations options 
identified. In performing this analysis, the independent effect of each of
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Figure 4.5
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the strategic options on changes in performance is estimated. Addi 
tionally, the cumulative effect of various mixes of options chosen on 
changes in performance is estimated.
Because of limitations on the availability of financial data, the statis 
tical tests are made against a subsample of 56 corporations from the 
original sample of 115 headquarters. Ordinary least squares regression 
was used to estimate the effects of the restructuring options on changes 
in performance. The performance indices are percent change in return- 
on-sales (calculated as operating income divided by sales) and percent 
change in added value per employee (calculated as operating income 
plus inventory, divided by number of employees).
One cannot predict, a priori, which of the various restructuring
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activities or which combination of activities will yield the greatest 
performance improvements. As discussed in chapter 3, the parties 
appear to have chosen strategies expected to optimize performance 
given their specific financial, operational, and collective bargaining 
structures, as well as market constraints. There are many unknowns, 
however, about the potential costs, benefits, and risks associated with 
each strategy. In particular, the degree of union retaliation to various 
union-avoidance and deunionization activities and the costs incurred 
therefrom would be difficult to accurately predict. The same can be said 
about the returns to joint efforts at the plant level. Hence, instead of 
testing hypotheses about the effect of chosen strategies, Meyer and 
Cooke attempt to simply estimate effects using a before-after analysis. 
The results of the estimations can be summarized as follows:
• The greater the extent of nonunion plants opened and/or 
acquired, the greater the increase in return-on-sales. Changes 
in added value per employee appear unaffected.
• The greater the extent of unionized plants closed, the 
greater the decrease in return-on-sales. Changes in added 
value per employee appear unaffected.
• Decertification activity reduces return-on-sales and added 
value per employee.
• Where joint programs have been established in a majority 
of unionized plants, both return-on-sales and added value per 
employee increase.
The results of estimation additionally indicate that market conditions 
have a significant bearing on performance outcomes. The greater the 
increase or less the decrease in value of domestic industry shipments 
over the 1975-1985 period, the greater the improvement in return-on- 
sales and added value per employee. The more severe the increase in 
import penetration in a corporation's primary industry, the greater the 
reduction in return-on-sales and added value per employee.
Although Meyer and Cooke do not provide estimates of the average 
overall gain or loss associated with the three grand labor relations
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Table 4.1
Estimated Cumulative Effects of Strategic 
Activities on Performance by Grand Strategy 
(1974-1975 to 1984-1985)
Percent change in added 
Percent change in value per employee 










Note: Estimates derived from data provided in Meyer and Cooke (1990).
strategies, here I estimate the cumulative or combined net effect of the 
identified strategic activities (i.e., extent of joint programs across 
plants, the acquisition and/or opening of nonunion plants, the closure of 
unionized plants, and decertification of unions) on company perfor 
mance. The average cumulative net effects of the various bundles of 
activities on changes in return-on-sales and added value per employee 
are reported in table 4.1.
These estimates indicate that Cooperators have gained, on average, 
the most from their efforts. The change in return-on-sales rose 1.4 
percent and the change in added value per employee (using nominal 
dollars) rose approximately 19 percent over the 1974-75 to 1984-85 
period. Union-Avoiders, on the other hand, gained the least from their 
efforts, on average, increasing return-on-sales by .5 percent and reduc 
ing added value per employee by 15 percent. In comparison, those 
corporations pursuing Mixed strategies increased return-on-sales by .6 
percent and added value per employee by 1.7 percent.
Implications and Conclusions
The statistical analysis performed on this small sample of highly 
unionized manufacturing corporations implies that overall (and only on
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average), Cooperators have to date gained more from their strategy 
choice than either the Union-Avoiders or those corporations pursuing 
Mixed strategies. The estimated gains, however, must be put in a 
broader perspective. First, the estimated changes in return-on-sales and 
added value per employee attributable to any combination of the restruc 
turing activities are very modest, indeed. Second, although the Cooper 
ators appear to have gained the most with respect to improvements in 
return-on-sales, as of 1984-1985 they still reported having the lowest 
return-on-sales at about 10.75 percent, whereas return-on-sales was just 
over 11 percent for Union-Avoiders and 13.5 percent for corporations 
pursuing Mixed Strategies. On the other hand, Cooperators report 
having the highest added value per employee in 1984-1985 at nearly $33 
in comparison to roughly $25 for corporations pursuing either Union- 
Avoidance or Mixed strategies.
Third, along these lines it must be recognized that the analysis 
examines only two indices of performance. Indices of financial perfor 
mance are chosen because the kinds of restructuring activities examined 
are designed largely to improve production efficiencies and product 
quality and reduce labor costs. These factors of production have an 
obvious bearing on the cost-price ratios of production and consequently 
on profitability derived from sales. These performance measures, how 
ever, provide only a partial picture of overall corporate performance. 
Other measures of performance utilized by executives include market- 
to-book ratios, return on equity, and return on assets. In the only other 
published report that begins to address the effects of cooperative strat 
egies on company wide financial performance, the authors conclude that 
in highly unionized companies, employee involvement programs actu 
ally reduce return-on-assets (Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1988).
Finally, it is doubtful that the 10-year period examined reflects long- 
run equilibrium. The anticipated gains of the Union-Avoiders may 
simply require a longer time period in which returns to their strategy are 
realized. That is, one could argue that the average 20 percent reduction 
in union coverage of plants among Union-Avoiders is still insufficient to 
extract the expected gains from deunionization. On average, 50 percent 
of the Union-Avoiders' plants are still represented by unions. How well
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will these corporations fare if, over the next 10-year period, union 
representation is reduced another 20 percent or more?
Add to this that American history clearly highlights the short-lived 
endurance of cooperative efforts, presumably because the costs out 
weigh the benefits to at least one party or the other. The limited evidence 
indicates that the gains from joint efforts peak at the third or fourth year 
and then slide downward. Applied in the present context, the perfor 
mance improvements observed by 1984-1985 may, on average, reflect 
peak performance derived from cooperation. One can surmise that 
unless these gains can at least be maintained (if not improved upon) over 
the next 10 years, Cooperators could easily lose any short-term differen 
tial they enjoy over Union-Avoiders.
Cooperative Outcomes in Perspective
One anonymous labor-relations executive of a company that touts its 
new partnerships with unions recently commented to me that "there have 
been a lot of first-base hits and very few home runs." That sobering 
statement from an experienced advocate of cooperation is consistent 
with the investigation presented herein. In general, joint activities have 
had modest but important effects on labor-management relations and 
performance. Many exceptions, of course, exist.
The few other empirical studies (those that go beyond specific case 
analyses) yield mixed results that generally support this conclusion. 
Unlike most of these other investigations, the analysis presented herein 
has sought to examine the factors that influence the intensity of effort, 
and in turn the effects of joint efforts on selected performance and labor 
relations outcomes. The evidence indicates that there needs to be a 
certain level of intensity to obtain substantial improvements. This inten 
sity can in part be structured but in part is moderated by other contextual 
factors and the exercise of relative power. Without sufficient effort to 
reduce the influence of factors that reduce intensity, it is likely that the
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parties will continue to bat only first-base hits. Unless these first-base 
hits translate into a lot of runs, the Cooperators' score card could prove 
disappointing. It is in this sobering light that key problems undermining 
the intensity of cooperative efforts are discussed in chapter 5 and 
prescriptions for success are proposed in chapter 6.

Appendix to Chapter 4
Provided in this appendix are variable definitions, descriptive statistics, and the 
results of the estimations of the models of perceived changes in productivity, 
quality, and employee-supervisor relations. These results have been published 
elsewhere as cited.
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Appendix 4A
Reprinted from: William N. Cooke, "Improving Productivity and 
Quality Through Collaboration," Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, No. 2, 




Change in Productivity Perceived change in productivity per unit of
labor. Equals 0 if "modestly lower," 1 if "about 
the same," 2 if "modestly higher," and 3 if "much 
higher."
Change in Quality Perceived change in product quality. Equals 0 if 
"modestly lower" or "about the same," 1 if 
"modestly higher," and 2 if "much higher."
Committee-Based Equals 1 if key joint program is a labor- 
Program management or productivity committee, 0 
otherwise.
Less Active Teams Equals 1 if key joint program is a team-based 
program and teams regularly meet less often 
than once every two weeks, 0 otherwise.
Benchmark category for both Committee-Based Program and Less 
Active Teams includes team-based joint programs in which teams meet 
once every one or two weeks.
Leaders on Steering Equals 1 if more than 5 union 
Committee representatives sit on top steering committee, 0 
otherwise.
Steering Committee Equals 1 if number of union representatives 
Make-up Unknown sitting on top steering committee is not reported, 
0 otherwise.
Multiple Programs Equals 1 if more than one joint program exists, 0 
otherwise.
Program Duration 1987-year program activities began.
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Program Duration2 Equals log(Z) when X > Program Duration,
equals - (log(Z)) when X < Program Duration, 
and equals 0 when X=Program Duration; where 
Z=l + abs. ((X-Program Duration)/(X/ 
Program Duration)).
Technological Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975 
Displacement any "bargaining unit employees have lost their 
jobs in the plant because of the introduction of 
new technologies or automation," 0 otherwise.
Subcontracting Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975 
the "proportion of bargaining unit jobs [that] 
have been subcontracted out on a permanent 
basis" has been either "modest" or "substantial," 
0 otherwise.
Concession Bargaining Number of negotiations since 1975 that 
respondent characterizes as "concession 
bargaining (i.e., wage or benefit freezes or 
cutbacks, elimination of restrictive work rules, 
etc.)."
Percent Union Percent of production workers under the 
identified union contract.
Layoffs Equals 1 if average plant employment in 1983, 
1985 is less than average plant employment in 
1979, 1980, 1981; 0 otherwise.
Plant Size Average size of plant during 1983, 1985.
Average Years Average length of employment within bargaining 
unit.
Average Years2 Equals log(Z) when X > Average Years, equals 
— (log(Z)) when X < Average Years, and equals 
0 when X=Average Years; where Z = l + abs. 
((X—Average Years)/(X/Average Years)).
Percent Female Percent of bargaining unit employees that are 
female.
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Table 4A.3
ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES 
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*** = significant < .01 level, ** = significant < .05 level, and * = significant at < .10 level; 
using two-tailed tests for all variables except Less Active Teams, Leaders on Steering Committee, 
Multiple Programs, and Layoffs where one-tailed tests are appropriate.
Appendix 4B
Reprinted from: William N. Cooke, "Factors Influencing the Effect of Joint 
Union-Management Programs on Employee-Supervisor Relations," Industrial 
















Perceived change in adversarial relationship 
between supervisors and workforce. Equals 0 if 
"modestly higher" or "about the same"; 1 if 
"modestly lower," and 2 if "much lower."
Equals 1 if joint program is team-based and 
teams regularly meet weekly, 0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if joint program is committee-based, 0 
otherwise.
Benchmark category for both ACTIVE TEAMS 
and COMMITTEES includes team-based 
programs in which teams regularly meet less 
often than weekly.
Equals 1 if more than 6 union representatives sit 
on top steering committee, 0 otherwise.
1987-year program activities began.
Equals log(z) when X > PROGRAM 
DURATION; equals - (log(z)) when X < 
PROGRAM DURATION; and equals 0 when X 
= PROGRAM DURATION; where z = 1 + 
abs((X - PROGRAM DURATION) / (X/ 
PROGRAM DURATION)).
Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975 
any "bargaining unit employees have lost their 
jobs in the plant because of the introduction of 
new technologies or automation"; 0 otherwise.
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Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975 
the "proportion of bargaining unit jobs [that] 
have been subcontracted out on a permanent 
basis" has been either "modest" or "substantial"; 
0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if since 1975 respondent characterized 
one round of negotiations as "concession 
bargaining" (i.e., wage or benefit freezes or 
cutbacks, elimination of restrictive work rules, 
etc.)"; 0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if since 1975 respondent characterized 
two or more rounds of negotiations as 
"concession bargaining"; 0 otherwise.
Percent of production employees under the 
identified union contract.
Equals 1 if average plant employment in 1983, 
1985 is 25% higher than average plant 
employment in 1979, 1980, 1981; 0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if average plant employment in 1983, 
1985 is 25% lower than average plant 
employment in 1979, 1980, 1981; 0 otherwise.
Average length of employment within bargaining 
unit.
Equals 1 when average size of plant during 1983, 
1985 < 500; 0 otherwise.
Equals 1 when average size of plant during 1983, 
1985 > 3500; 0 otherwise.
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Table 4B.2
Ordered Probit Estimates of Perceived Changes 
in Employee-Supervisor Relations 

















































































Dependent variable is ARELATIONS, with the following ordered categories and proportion of 
outcome represented by each category: 0 = about the same or modestly higher (38%); 1 = 
modestly lower (43%); 2 = much lower (18%).
*** = significant < .01 level, ** = significant < .05 level; * = significant < .10 level; using two- 
tailed tests for all variables except ACTIVE TEAMS, SUBCONTRACT and LEADERS-ON- 
STEERING COMM, where one-tailed tests are appropriate.
Key Problems Encountered
As synthesized in chapter 1, the literature and testimony identify 
several fundamental problems encountered in the process of establish 
ing and maintaining good relationships necessary for cooperation. 
These problems are:
• Distrust
• Lack of Commitment
• Demoralization from Gains Not Gotten
• Juxtaposing Cooperation and Traditional Collective Bargaining
Distrust
Distrust between the parties inhibits the establishment of joint pro 
grams. Because distrust between employers and unions often has deep 
roots, however, the establishment of joint programs typically only 
signals that the parties are willing to experiment with joint programs. 
Existing literature and testimony make it clear that joint efforts reflect 
fairly uneasy partnerships in joint problemsolving. The widely shared 
conclusion of the literature and testimony is that sufficient trust must be 
developed over time, else joint efforts will wane and ultimately be 
undermined by distrust.
Trust is a "firm belief or confidence in the honesty, integrity, reliabil 
ity, justice, etc. of another person or thing." To trust another party, 
moreover, means allowing them "to do something without fear of the 
outcome" (Webster's New World Dictionary 1968). In the context of 
union-management cooperation, the parties typically ask on a day-to-
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day basis the following kind of questions in making their assessments of 
the level of trust that exists between them.
• Do you consult with me?
• Do you share pertinent information, avoiding surprises?
• Are you straightforward and honest with me, relinquishing 
hidden agendas?
• Do you listen to my opinions?
• Do you follow through with joint decisions and any 
promises?
• Are you consistent and reliable in your actions?
• Do you forego using double standards for managers and 
employees?
• Do you forego using threats?
• Do you forego "cutting deals" on the side that are inconsis 
tent with cooperation?
• Do you forego intentionally undermining my role and 
responsibilities?
• Do you accept unintended failures?
• Do you live up to your role and responsibilities?
When answers to the above questions are answered in the negative, trust 
is diminished. The more negative the response, the more trust is dimin 
ished. As trust is diminished, the parties are unable to develop rela 
tionships that maximize the potential benefits of cooperation. Instead, 
distrust merely increases the potential costs of cooperation, and the 
intensity of effort applied to cooperative activities is diminished. Serious 
violations of trust, furthermore, are apt to cause cooperative efforts to 
be put on hold, if not destroy them altogether.
To examine the perceived magnitude of distrust as a problem, charts 
5.1 and 5.2 report the responses of both plant managers and local union 
leaders to several questions pertinent to the issue of trust. Respondents 
to the Plant Manager Survey and Union Officer Survey were asked: "To
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Chart 5.1
Lack of 
Sufficient Trust Between Parties













what extent have the following problems affected the successful imple 
mentation and maintenance of your most important joint program...?" 
Respondents were given a choice of four answers: not a problem, 
somewhat a problem, very much a problem, or important factor in 
termination of program. For the sake of simplicity, those few responses 
that the given problem was an "important factor in termination of 
program" are included in the charts under "very much" a problem. The 
responses reported throughout this chapter are drawn from approxi 
mately 110 plant manager questionnaires and 60 union officer question 
naires.
Chart 5.1 reports the responses with respect to the extent to which
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Chart 5.2
Trust: Violations, manipulation, Cooptation 
(Union Response)

















"lack of sufficient trust between parties" is a problem. There appears to 
be close agreement as to the extent of the trust problem between 
managers and local union leaders. Only about 15 percent do not find 
trust to be a problem, whereas about 50 percent find it to be somewhat a 
problem and roughly 35 percent find it to be very much of a problem. 
Chart 5.2 reports the proportion of union leader responses to several 
trust-related questions. (These problems were not raised in the survey to 
managers.) The first question asked the extent to which "violation of 
trust by either party" is a problem. About 45 percent find it to be 
somewhat of a problem and another 25 percent find it to be very much a 
problem. The second question asked the extent to which "perceived
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manipulation of program (or bonus formula) by management" was a 
problem. Here, about 35 percent find perceived manipulation to be 
somewhat of a problem and 25 percent find it to be very much a 
problem.
The literature indicates that union leaders often fear that cooperation 
with management will be perceived by union members as a form of 
cooptation. Union leaders, of course, want their members to trust that 
the leadership has in mind the best interests of the membership upon 
embarking on joint endeavors. To address this dimension of trust, union 
leaders were asked the extent to which "perceptions by workers that the 
union leadership has been coopted by management" was a problem. 
Over 65 percent report that perceptions of cooptation are somewhat of a 
problem, but only 7 percent find it to be very much a problem.
One aspect of trust focuses on how much trust the union has in 
management's capabilities to manage the company well. Since skep 
ticism of management's abilities to manage is also likely to be a problem 
for some organizations, union leaders were asked the extent to which the 
"local union leadership trust management's capabilities to manage this 
company." Approximately 21 percent reported "very little," 47 percent 
reported "little," 22 percent reported "much," and only 10 percent 
reported "very much."
In summary, the responses to several questions pertinent to trust 
clearly support the conclusion that the lack of trust is a widespread 
problem. For a large majority of the parties involved in team-based and 
committee-based joint programs, distrust is at least somewhat a 
problem.
Commitment
To "commit" to something means to obligate or bind to some course of 
action. In the case of union-management cooperation, commitment 
means to obligate to joint decisionmaking. This commitment, however, 
is not necessarily to a given program or set of decisionmaking param 
eters (e.g., to a quality control circle program, where team members
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meet every week and report to a joint steering committee comprised of 
five union and five management representatives), but rather to the 
general process of joint problem identification and resolution. Bear in 
mind, on the other hand, that in practice the parties may characterize or 
address commitment in the form of a given joint program structure or set 
of activities.
There appear to be a number of questions asked by the parties on a 
day-to-day basis, answers to which help formulate their perceptions 
about the level of commitment to joint decisionmaking.
• Are you willing to commit time and resources to 
cooperation?
• Are you willing to work hard at this new process?
• Are you interested in obtaining gains for the other party as 
well as selfish gains?
• Do you see this process as a long-run effort?
• Are you willing to take political risks in supporting and 
soliciting support for cooperation?
• Are you willing to assist the other party with his/her organi 
zational and personal political constraints?
• Are you willing to reward subordinates who actively sup 
port and engage in joint activities?
• Are you willing to share authority?
• Are you willing to share responsibility for failures and 
recognition for successes?
When answers to the above kind of questions are answered in the 
negative, perceptions of lack of commitment arise. The more negative 
the responses, the more negative the perceptions of commitment. These 
perceptions may be formulated about the representatives of the other 
party, or about representatives of one's own organization. The result, in 
either case, is (again) diminished effort at effective cooperation.
In the survey to local managers and union leaders, respondents were 
asked a number of questions about the extent to which various dimen-
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Chart 5.3 
Upper Management Commitment to Joint Programs













sions of the lack of commitment was a problem. Charts 5.3 and 5.4 
report these responses about the extent that "lack of commitment by 
upper management" and "lack of broad commitment among plant man 
agers," respectively, were problems affecting the success of joint pro 
grams. Chart 5.5 reports responses about the extent that "lack of broad 
commitment by union leaders" was a problem.
As shown in chart 5.3, a majority of both plant managers and local 
union leaders find that the lack of upper management commitment to 
joint programs is a problem. Indeed, just under one-third of managers 
and just over one-third of union leaders perceive the lack of upper 
management commitment to be very much a problem. With regard to
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plant-level management commitment (chart 5.4), there is substantial 
disparity between management perceptions and union leader percep 
tions. In particular, note that only 17 percent of managers perceive that 
the lack of broad commitment among plant managers is very much a 
problem. In sharp contrast, 37 percent of union leaders perceive plant 
management commitment to be very problematic.
These perceptions of commitment are reversed when the parties are 
asked about the lack of broad union leader commitment. As reported in 
chart 5.5, nearly 80 percent of managers report union leader commit 
ment to joint programs as a problem, whereas only 50 percent of union 
leaders report union leader commitment as a problem. Although, over-
Chart 5.4 
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Chart 5.5 
Union Leader Commitment to Joint Programs
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all, local union leader commitment seems to be a less serious problem 
than broad plant management commitment, 27 percent of managers find 
union leader commitment to be very much of problem, whereas 14 
percent of local union leaders report union commitment to be very much 
a problem.
In the Union Officer Survey, leaders were asked the extent to which 
"skepticism or lack of interest of workers" is a problem. This question 
was asked to get indirectly at the question of union member commitment 
as a potential problem affecting the success of joint efforts. Eighty-five 
percent perceive it to be a problem, with nearly one-third reporting it to 
be very much a problem.
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Chart 5.6
Support for Joint Programs: 
Perceptions of Local Union Leaders



















In an earlier part of the questionnaire to local union leaders, leaders 
were also asked the following question: "To what extent do the following 
parties support the establishment of joint labor-management pro 
grams?" Chart 5.6 shows the given "parties" and two response catego 
ries: generally opposed or generally in favor of joint programs. Not 
reported in chart 5.6 is the remaining proportion of responses in which a 
given party is perceived as generally indifferent to joint programs. Note 
that the responses apply only to those local unions engaged in joint 
programs.
According to those responses, the party least opposed to joint ac 
tivities are national union leaders. Here, only 4 percent are perceived to
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be generally opposed. At the other extreme, 31 percent of the re 
spondents perceive that plant managers are generally opposed to joint 
programs. In the opposite direction, it is perceived that 69 percent of 
national union leaders, 74 percent of local union leaders, and 61 percent 
of company executives are generally in favor of joint programs. How 
ever, just under 50 percent of local union members and plant managers 
are perceived to generally favor joint programs. Overall, based on local 
union leader perceptions, the least enthusiastic parties to cooperation 
are local union members and plant-level managers.
Finally, in regard to commitment, in the Headquarters Executive 
Survey, the top labor relations or human resource executive was asked 
two questions that indirectly address company headquarters' commit 
ment to cooperative efforts in manufacturing plants. The first was, "In 
general, company executives are: not in favor of, in favor of, indifferent 
to joint management-union programs or activities." Restricting the 
subsample of responses to those headquarters in which at least one plant 
reported having joint activities, the following responses were obtained: 
78 percent generally in favor, 14 percent generally indifferent, and 8 
percent generally not in favor of joint activities.
The second related question asked was, "Specifically, the company 
has: (a) instructed plant management to actively pursue joint manage 
ment-union activities, (b) instructed management NOT to engage in 
joint management-union activities, (c) left the decision to engage in joint 
management-union activities to plant-level managers." The following 
responses were obtained: 46 percent instructed plant management to 
pursue cooperation, 50 percent left decisions to plant management, and 
4 percent instructed plant management not to pursue joint activities.
As with the problem of perceived distrust, the perceived lack of 
commitment is a problem that affects the success of a majority of joint 
programs. As with distrust, lack of commitment (at least its perception) 
is a serious problem, in one form or another, for one-quarter to one-third 
of the parties involved in cooperative activities.
Finally, there is bound to be a high association between the problems 
of trust and commitment. That is, commitment is hard to attain when 
trust is questioned and a high level of trust is hard to accomplish when
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commitment from any of the parties is perceived to be problematic. This 
association is demonstrated, for example, by the high correlations 
between responses to the Plant Manager Survey on the survey questions 
pertinent to trust and commitment as problems. The zero order correla 
tions between responses to the question about (a) the extent of sufficient 
trust between the parties as a problem and responses to the questions 
about (b) the extent of upper management commitment, plant manage 
ment commitment, and union leader commitment are all very high and 
statistically significant (ranging from .33 to .50).
Demoralization From Gains Not Gotten
Over time, the enthusiasm for innovative joint activities is known to 
wane and under severe market conditions, the intensity of effort appears 
to decline. In the Union Officer Survey, leaders were asked several 
questions about the extent to which demoralizing outcomes were prob 
lematic for the successful maintenance of joint activities. In the first 
question, union leaders were asked the extent to which "expected gains 
from programs not gotten" were a problem. As reported in chart 5.7, 
approximately 80 percent respond that not attaining expected gains was 
a problem. Nearly 30 percent report this factor to be very much a 
problem. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents also find that "insuffi 
cient job security" is problematic. Indeed 40 percent report the issue of 
employment security to be very much a problem.lt has also been 
reported that turnover of key management and union leaders, who have 
played instrumental roles in spearheading or managing joint activities, 
has a demoralizing or at least a detrimental effect on program success. 
In asking union leaders about the extent to which the "turnover of key 
managers" or "key union leaders" has proven to be problematic, the 
response indicates that union leaders find turnover of key managers 
much more problematic than turnover of key union leaders. Just over 60 
percent find management turnover as problematic, but less than 30 
percent find union leader turnover as problematic. At the extremes, 20
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percent find management turnover as very much a problem, whereas 
only 7 percent find union leader turnover as very much a problem.
Juxtaposing Cooperation and Traditional Collective Bargaining
A fundamental thesis underlying our analysis of cooperation is that 
the successful implementation, maintenance, and expansion of joint 
activities require that the parties find ways to juxtapose cooperation and 
more traditional collective bargaining. In addition to what has been 
presented in earlier chapters, the parties were directly asked how prob 
lematic it is to juxtapose these two dimensions of the relationship.
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Chart 5.8 
Juxtaposing Cooperation and Contract Negotiations












Reported in chart 5.8 and 5.9 are responses to two questions which 
asked the parties the extent to which they have had difficulty "juxtapos 
ing cooperation" or "balancing joint activities" with contract negotia 
tions and contract administration. As shown in the charts, the majority 
of managers and union leaders find that juxtaposing joint activities with 
contract negotiations and administration presents problems. About 20 
percent of all respondents report juxtaposing cooperation and contract 
negotiations as very much a problem. Likewise, about 20 percent of 
managers find juxtaposing cooperation and day-to-day contract admin 
istration very much of a problem, but only 12 percent of union leaders 
report this to be very much of a problem.
In many respects, the issue of juxtaposing relative power and cooper-
Key Problems Encountered 135
Chart 5.9 
Juxtaposing Cooperation and Contract Administration












ative power envelops the problematic issues of distrust, perceived lack 
of commitment, and demoralization from gains not gotten. The exercise 
or threat of using relative power depicts a process in which distrust is 
magnified as traditional conflicts are rekindled and old wounds are 
opened. Commitment to cooperation is likewise challenged when either 
party uses relative power advantages to maximize its overall gains. 
Often enough, cooperative activities are held "hostage," i.e., put on 
hold until adversarial conflicts are satisfactorily resolved. Demoraliza 
tion with cooperation is also often heightened. In this latter regard, 
resolution of conflicts of interest via relative power raises the important 
concern over fair and equitable distribution of overall gains (or losses). 
The difficult process of identifying and distributing gains derived di 
rectly or indirectly from cooperative activities is visited or revisited.
136 Key Problems Encountered
All this does not imply that hard bargaining and legalistic contract 
administration necessarily undermine cooperation. Indeed, what is 
learned from cooperation with respect to joint problemsolving often 
improves the negotiation and contract administration process. The po 
tential for diminishing the cooperative process, however, must be recog 
nized and dealt with effectively if cooperation is not to be diminished or 
destroyed. This is not to suggest, however, that the parties should resort 
to short-sighted compromising in the spirit of demonstrating commit 
ment to cooperative relations. Several prescriptions designed to help 
labor and management avoid serious problems and minimize unwanted 
and unnecessary consequences are proposed in chapter 6.
Implications and Prescriptions for 
Making Partnerships Work
In this final chapter, I first briefly discuss several fundamental im 
plications derived from the analyses presented in the first five chapters. 
Second, I propose several fairly general prescriptions that may hold 
some promise of enhancing labor-management partnerships—for those 
parties, of course, choosing to cooperate. In this chapter I take the 
liberty of releasing myself from the burden of providing empirical 
documentation or support for either the implications drawn or prescrip 
tions proposed. My intention here is to open a debate and discussion, not 
test the soundness of any propositions.
Implications
One overriding implication of the present inquiry is that neither labor 
nor management can avoid making some hard choices fundamental to 
their relationships. It appears that for most American unions and com 
panies, the choices faced are either all-out conflict or all-out coopera 
tion. The traditional ways simply don't work well in highly competitive 
and volatile markets. Indeed, there is no option of maintaining or 
returning to the "good old days" of traditional collective bargaining.
In thinking about alternative labor-relations strategies, it seems rea 
sonable to assume that some companies have selected and designed 
strategies to deunionize; and they have done so without any or with very 
little consideration of choosing cooperation. In these companies, unions 
face no choice. They are forced to challenge the company. Weaker 
unions will simply lose, but strong unions have some opportunity to 
force a shift in management strategies. Failing to seek or failing to force
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a shift to cooperation, strong unions will slowly destroy the companies 
and themselves in battle. Needless to say, this scenario will prove to be a 
hollow victory for all parties concerned. But for recalcitrant employers 
unwilling to cooperate, strong unions cannot sit back and watch their 
own institutions destroyed while these employers are allowed to have 
their aggressive way unopposed.
Alternatively, some companies seek to cooperate initially but their 
union leader counterparts cannot find their way to cooperate. Denied by 
their unions the choice of cooperation, these companies are forced (and 
perhaps easily so) to embark on union avoidance strategies—com 
pany wide or in given plants where local unions refuse to cooperate. 
Again, weak unions will lose and unnecessarily so. Strong unions will 
lose in the longer run, unless they recognize that traditional adversarial 
relations won't work and they too eventually embrace cooperation. One 
can imagine, however, that the longer unions deny management the 
choice of cooperation, the less likely management will be interested in 
shifting course, especially where management has reduced union 
strength over time via union avoidance and deunionization strategies.
The general implication, therefore, is that, except in that handful of 
unionized settings not seriously threatened by domestic or global com 
petitors, unions have little choice but to cooperate. A second implica 
tion, on the other hand, is that unions have many choices regarding what 
cooperation looks like. In making these choices, the focus is on the 
means of cooperation not the fundamental goals of unions or manage 
ment. The union still seeks to gain as much as possible for its mem 
bership in compensation and in the terms and conditions of employ 
ment. Management still seeks to optimize profits. In general terms, 
therefore, cooperation does not require (indeed, it cannot require) the 
parties to shift their fundamental priority goals, or the fundamental 
values and ideologies underlying these goals. Instead, cooperation 
requires that the parties shift their values and ideologies about the means 
of pursuing priority goals. The prescriptions proposed in the next 
section address some of the more important shifts along this line.
A third implication is that relative power plays an important check- 
and-balance role in cooperative efforts. Choosing to cooperate does not
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change the inherent conflict of interests between management and 
union. The wealth generated from the employment context will always 
require dividing and relative power will always underlie any mechanism 
for dividing it. Consequently, as in any traditional collective bargaining 
relationship, attention to the relative power of one's own organization is 
essential. This implication, given changes in the market, is perhaps 
most important to unions. Diminished relative power not only under 
mines a union's ability to maximize gain via the process of dividing 
wealth, but also undermines the cooperative effort to increase the wealth 
to be divided. This implication is consistent with the empirical analyses 
of performance and labor relations outcomes presented in chapter 4 and 
the problems examined in chapter 5.
A fourth implication is that in highly competitive markets, "every 
thing else the same," employers cannot endure incurring higher costs 
per unit of labor input. Unions, however, must obtain some combination 
of higher levels of compensation and better workplace environments 
than is obtained by employees of nonunion competitors, else employees 
have insufficient reason to retain or select union representation. It is 
imperative to union survival, therefore, that not "everything else be the 
same." Unions must offer some added value to production that offsets 
any differential in compensation and workplace environment costs.
Cooperation offers that potential added value, given that union lead 
ers provide an effective voice mechanism that leads to improved quality, 
greater efficiencies, productivity, or other cost reductions. Such a per 
spective assumes that the workforce and union leadership are well 
equipped to devise ways of organizing work and work relationships 
effectively. One might argue, however, that the same gains can be 
accomplished in nonunion settings and, hence, unions cannot provide 
sufficient added value relative to their nonunion competitors. That 
alternative argument holds if management in nonunion settings provides 
equivalent mechanisms for employee input and effectively utilizes that 
input. My limited observation indicates that a large majority of Ameri 
can managers do not willingly or purposely share their decisionmaking 
authority and status with their workforces. Without constraints im 
posed, managers who are less open to seeking the input of employees
140 Implications and Prescriptions for Making Partnerships Work
and sharing authority with them act in ways that do not maximize 
efficiencies and productivity.
Here, union leaders with the support of their members can constrain 
reluctant managers, insisting upon the sharing of decisionmaking and 
responsibility. By being worthy advocates of effective employee input, 
union leaders have before them a mechanism upon which to obtain 
higher compensation and better workplace environments for their mem 
berships and at the same time provide the added value to the enterprise to 
offset these added labor costs. Effective advocacy, however, demands 
that union leaders be far better equipped or skilled in the business 
functions of finance, operations, marketing, and human resource man 
agement. This does not imply that they become businessmen and busi 
nesswomen. It implies that they understand the market and organiza 
tional constraints of running a competitive enterprise, that they become 
the experts of human resource management, and that they, in turn, act 
vigorously as the advocates of the workforce. As advocates of the 
workforce (which notably requires no change in union philosophy), 
union leaders view the workforce as the key set of stakeholders in the 
enterprise. As such, their role is to construct and pursue avenues that 
effectively elevate the importance of legitimate workforce interests as 
stakeholders of the enterprise. In doing so, union leaders must be able to 
demonstrate that satisfying important interests of the workforce leads to 
added value, at least equivalent to the added costs of satisfying the 
interests of the workforce. As discussed subsequently, the interests of 
employees as stakeholders will need to be balanced with the interests of 
other stakeholders of the enterprise.
Finally, a central implication of the present analysis is that it is im 
perative the parties find ways to sufficiently mitigate the salient prob 
lems that undermine successful cooperation. Unless these problems can 
be dealt with effectively, the long-run prospects that cooperative efforts 
will have handsome payoffs are greatly limited.
Prescriptions for Long-Term Successful Cooperation
In this section, several prescriptions are proposed that are designed to 
avoid, mitigate, or resolve problems that undermine successful coopera-
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tion. They are proposed in a spirit that recognizes that in each labor- 
management setting, the relationship is unique, unique in history, with 
unique personalities, and with unique organizational and market con 
straints. The given parties, therefore, are best equipped to establish 
detailed mechanisms or processes around each prescription that 
follows.
Establish Triggers and Procedures for Resolving 
Serious Problems and Crises
The evidence indicates that a majority of efforts wane after a short 
period of time, and history shows that some efforts collapse (without 
much forewarning) under the weight of market pressures or flagrant 
violations of trust and commitment. It is proposed herein that the parties 
establish some trigger mechanism and a process to resolve disputes over 
problems or events that seriously threaten the livelihood of cooperative 
efforts.
Such a trigger mechanism and process, of course, have already been 
developed for resolving disputes over rights embodied in contracts. 
Because the parties cannot foresee all the problems and disputes that 
undoubtedly will arise during the term of negotiated contracts, griev 
ance procedures (usually with outside arbitration as a final step) have 
been implemented. The parties are allowed to grieve when problems 
arise, and grievance procedures provide an acceptable due process 
mechanism for resolution of disputes. In turn, grievance procedures 
provide a means for accomplishing labor-management stability; they are 
essentially a quid pro quo for eliminating strike threats, strikes, and 
other workplace disruptions during the life of agreements.
The strategic shift to joint activities is also wrought with unknown 
events and reactions that can undermine cooperative efforts—much like 
problems that test the rights and responsibilities negotiated in contracts. 
It is proposed, therefore, that a parallel structure or mechanism de 
signed to resolve disputes associated with cooperative activities be 
created. Here I would highly recommend that when a majority of the 
joint steering or policy committee believe the cooperative effort is 
seriously threatened, that a trusted (and preselected) mediator or neutral
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consultant be called in to help resolve disputes. Such a trigger (i.e., the 
vote of the committee) allows the parties to begin constructively tackling 
the problem at hand, instead of allowing it to have unintended and 
unnecessary negative snowballing effects.
This proposed mechanism would allow both management and the 
union leadership to explain to all parties that a serious problem (or 
problems) has been recognized and that the issue is being dealt with 
constructively and jointly through the mediation process, which was 
jointly decided beforehand. Once a resolution has been reached jointly, 
the resolution would be jointly presented to all the parties. This kind of 
procedure not only allows the parties to more effectively construct a 
resolution, it also is intended to help insure that cooperative activities 
remain intensive instead of dwindling, being held hostage, or at the 
extreme destroyed (a la Eastern Airlines).
Negotiate TVust and Commitment
One theme that is heard over and over (albeit not in every setting) is 
that "you can't trust em" and "they're really not committed" to this effort. 
Cooperation is a highly demanding exercise and it is clear that behaviors 
that increase distrust between parties and/or imply that either party is 
not sufficiently committed to the cooperative effort undermine it. It is 
important to recognize that assessments of trust and commitment are 
based on perceptions, some accurate and some not. In order to reduce 
the occurrence and magnitude of the effects of perceived violations of 
trust and commitment, the second proposal prescribes that the parties 
negotiate definitions and expectations of trust and commitment. By 
"negotiate" I do not mean to imply contractually binding rights. The 
overall objective is to delineate the kind of behaviors that lead each party 
to infer that the other party has violated or diminished the level of trust 
or commitment and to reach a compromise that both parties agree to 
live by.
By negotiating trust and commitment, each party has an opportunity 
to explain its view of what is expected from the other party. For instance, 
consider the following true but anonymous case. Division headquarters
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informed plant management that they intended to subcontract out a 
small proportion of plant production, which would displace 10 to 12 
hourly employees. Affected employees were informed of their antici 
pated displacement. After consultation with the local union chairman, 
an alternative proposal was devised at the plant and, in turn, accepted by 
division-level management. The affected employees were then notified 
by both the plant superintendent and local chairman that a solution had 
been found and they would not be displaced. A few days later, however, 
the plant superintendent was notified that division management had 
reversed its decision. The superintendent (without further consultation 
with the local chairman) informed the employees that the subcontracting 
decision had been reversed. In the eyes of the union membership, its 
leadership in this case appeared to have no control over or input into 
such key decisions; worse yet, the leadership appeared to have been 
coopted by management. Having lost faith in the cooperative process 
and support from its membership, the local union leadership sent out the 
word to the rank-and-file that management was not to be trusted and that 
the leadership now had serious reservations about ongoing joint 
activities.
By discussing the kind of behaviors that diminish or violate trust and 
the kind of responses that can be expected from such violations, the 
parties can then negotiate behaviors that enhance cooperation, not 
undermine it. In the above example, one condition of trust that could 
have been negotiated is that any announcement or notification concern 
ing displacement from subcontracting must first be presented to the 
union leadership or, going further, announced jointly. In addition, the 
parties could have agreed that the union leadership is not to withdraw its 
support for joint activities until a given perceived violation of trust is 
fully investigated and discussed within the appropriate joint steering or 
policy committee.
Negotiation over an acceptable definition and acceptable behaviors 
with respect to expected commitment to cooperative efforts is likewise 
proposed. For example, take the case where a supervisor has decided to 
have employees regularly work overtime instead of recalling laid-off 
union members. To the local union leader, this may be perceived as a
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violation of commitment to cooperation if, indeed, the union leader 
wants laid-off members recalled. As a form of political retaliation, the 
union leader encourages members not to volunteer for team-based 
activities the supervisor wants.
Upon discussion and negotiation, a solution to the above incident may 
become clear. In the present actual case, the supervisor assumed he was 
doing the right thing for the union; he had polled his employees, who 
overwhelmingly voted to work overtime instead of recalling laid-off 
members. However, the supervisor never queried the union leader for 
his preferences. Angered, the union leader failed to discuss in any detail 
with the supervisor, the dispute between them. Had the parties defined 
and negotiated acceptable behaviors as they pertain to expectations 
about commitment, the problematic circumstances that effectively led to 
withdrawal of support for cooperation by the union leader could have 
been avoided. Here, one could imagine that agreement could have been 
reached in advance that supervision and the union leadership were 
obligated to jointly decide the issue of overtime vs. recall anytime the 
extent of overtime exceeded an agreed upon level. More broadly, the 
parties could agree that supervision is not to make assumptions about 
union leader preferences. It could also have been agreed that the union 
leadership is obligated to consult with supervision when normal super 
visory discretion is perceived as being inconsistent with expectations of 
commitment.
As part of negotiating trust and commitment, the parties will need to 
establish a means or procedure by which to settle disputes and repair 
relations over violations of agreed upon behaviors. Those behaviors that 
lead to serious disruption perhaps can be best resolved using the pro 
cedures developed under the first proposal above. Less serious infrac 
tions can be addressed and resolved by members of an appropriate joint 
steering or policy committee. As a first step, the manager or union 
representative who perceives that a representative of the union or man 
agement has violated trust and/or commitment (as it has been negoti 
ated) is obligated to bring it immediately to the attention of that indi 
vidual. If after private conversation about the perceived violation, the 
individuals to the dispute cannot resolve it in a mutually satisfactory
Implications and Prescriptions for Making Partnerships Work 145
way, then other members (if not all members) of the joint steering 
committee are invited to discuss the dispute and help formulate a 
resolution. The key here is that a procedure requiring immediate atten 
tion to problems of trust and commitment be established, that the parties 
know well in advance that certain actions or behaviors will be immedi 
ately challenged, and that both labor and management are part of an 
agreeable resolution.
Finally, perceptions are often inaccurate. In sensitive labor-manage 
ment interactions, misperceptions are often the case, especially as the 
parties move from strictly adversarial relations to cooperative arrange 
ments. In the example above of perceived violation of commitment, the 
supervisor was genuinely surprised at the union officer's reaction to the 
use of overtime. By negotiating expectations of sufficient trust and 
commitment and by immediately bringing any perceptions of violations 
of trust and commitment to the attention of presumed offenders, many 
misperceptions would be cleared up and truly unnecessary withdrawal 
avoided.
Establish Labor©s Claim to Stake in Business Decisions and 
Performance Gains
As first presented in the theoretical discussion in chapter 2, coopera 
tion requires a different perspective and approach to labor's input into 
management decisions and the division of gains than is required by 
traditional collective bargaining. In traditional collective bargaining, 
the division of gains is primarily determined by the relative power of the 
parties. The introduction of cooperation, however, carries with it an 
expectation that gains are shared fairly, according to each party's contri 
bution to that gain. The clash inherent upon introducing cooperation to a 
traditional adversarial relationship clearly demands that the parties
• identify where and how much union input into company 
decisions is expected;
• agree to how union input contributes to cooperative gains 
(directly and indirectly); and
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• agree to the union's share of income and security rewards 
derivable from cooperation.
Where and How Much Input
In order to distribute fairly the gains derived from cooperation, it is 
essential that the parties first agree as to where cooperative input is 
expected. The organizational arrangements for union leader and mem 
ber input is wide-ranging. These arrangements include employee 
ownership and control (e.g. Weirton Steel and the Independent Steel- 
workers Union), consensus decisionmaking from top-to-bottom (LWW 
and GM, Saturn Corporation), membership on company boards of 
directors (e.g., currently, Chrysler and the UAW, and at one time 
Eastern Airlines and the Machinists), and more traditional structures 
with extensive cooperative activities but with ultimate executive author 
ity (e.g., Xerox and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union, and Ford and the UAW).
It is clear in any case that the choices for organizational arrangements 
for union leader and member input are wide-ranging. One would search 
in vain to find a satisfactory theoretical or empirical justification for 
considering any one form as optimal across all settings. But, pragmat 
ically, the parties can only benefit in the long run if they can fashion an 
agreeable organizational arrangement regarding the points of union 
input and the extent of that input. Problems enveloping trust and com 
mitment arise from the lack of clarity or agreement as to the appropriate 
degree of input and the points at which union input is expected. For 
instance, it is heard frequently enough that plant-level joint decisions are 
unilaterally overridden or "put on the back burner" by managers or 
executives at the division or corporate level. These experiences can only 
seriously frustrate the efforts at the plant level by undermining expecta 
tions of company commitment to cooperation, unless, of course, it has 
been agreed upon by both labor and management that joint decision- 
making occurs only at the plant level. If both parties or the union at the 
plant level conclude that it is essential to the success of plant-level 
cooperation to have division- or corporate-level joint decisionmaking,
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then arrangements need to be made to provide for upper-level union 
input into upper-level management decisions.
The form and degree of union input or participation within the 
hierarchy of the company must also be determined. For some union 
leaders and/or their management counterparts, the acceptable choice is 
that the top union leadership be consulted prior to company decisions. 
For others, the choice may be some degree of union membership on 
boards of directors, or regular consultation with executive committees, 
or some form of majority or consensus decisionmaking by upper-level 
joint policy committees. For others, the agreeable choice may be that 
union input and participation be restricted to within the scope of tradi 
tional plant-level decisions.
Although some observers of cooperative activities may argue that 
union input at all levels of the company structure is essential to the 
overall success of cooperative efforts, the real key is that the parties have 
identified and sufficiently clarified the various points and degree of 
union input and have agreed that these arrangements satisfy each party's 
interests. The primary objective here is to eliminate misperceptions by 
either labor or management as to where and how much input the union is 
to have into traditional management decisions. Misperceptions of this 
kind lead to serious problems of trust and commitment and, further 
more, they make it very difficult to ascertain labor's claim to cooperative 
gains.
Determine How Union Input Contributes to Performance Gains 
Having established and clarified where and how much union input is 
expected, the parties must next identify how union input contributes to 
overall company performance. Centrally important to an equitable 
distribution or sharing of gains from cooperation is the clarification of 
that portion of any recognizable gain that is attributable to cooperative 
activities. By way of example, if the company makes sizable capital 
investments that lead to productivity gains, are these considered gains 
obtained outside the cooperative effort? If efficiency gains are obtained 
through elimination of restrictive work practices via concession bar-
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gaining, are these gains treated as coming from outside cooperative 
efforts? If overall company performance improves (or worsens) due to 
the performance of nonproduction business units or nonbargaining units 
(e.g., from financial arms of the company), are these gains or losses 
considered outside cooperative efforts?
Acceptable answers to these questions obviously must be decided by 
the parties themselves. In some settings, the input of the union at the 
corporate level may have led management to make capital investments 
they otherwise would have foregone. Or capital investment decisions 
may have been borne directly from proposals generated by joint team- 
based efforts at a given facility. Or in other instances, employers may 
have based their investment decisions in part on the fact that joint 
activities at the plant would maximize the returns to such investments. 
As in the above examples where capital investment decisions are shaped 
directly or indirectly by union involvement, unions typically will have 
expectations that gains so derived are to be shared equitably. In other 
settings or instances, management decisions on capital investments may 
have been made independently of any union input or weight given to 
more cooperative relations or joint programs at the plant level. Per 
ceived as such, managers will expect any gains tied to capital investment 
as theirs, except to the extent that labor via its relative power can demand 
some of the gain.
With respect to gains obtained from concession bargaining, one could 
imagine that in some cases unions agreed to the elimination of restrictive 
practices as a quid pro quo for greater union input and participation in 
traditional management decisions. As a quid pro quo, the union lead 
ership and its members may very well expect to share the gains from 
concessions, since they would not otherwise have agreed to them. In 
other cases, efficiencies derived from concessions could not have oc 
curred without a much more trustful relationship having been developed 
through earlier cooperative efforts. As such, union leaders and mem 
bers may perceive they are entitled to share these indirect cooperative 
gains. In the third example above, management may hold that any 
profitability derived from production or nonproduction business units in 
which no cooperative efforts are ongoing is not subject to sharing,
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except as bargained for. Unions may hold otherwise, believing that these 
other units indirectly profit from business units in which cooperation 
does take place. By way of example, if a company's financial arm that 
provides credit to customers is profitable, the union may perceive that its 
profitability is tied to the price and quality of products sold. Because 
price and quality have been made more attractive by cooperative efforts 
in producing that product, the union can argue that the business unit 
providing attractive financing has benefited in part and indirectly from 
cooperation. Hence some of the profitability derived from the company's 
financial credit arm is expected to be shared, without resort to adver 
sarial negotiations.
The level of aggregation to which cooperative gains are tied is also a 
key issue to be decided. Is the profitability to be shared tied only to a 
given plant's performance, or to its division or operating company's 
performance, or to overall corporate performance? When either party 
believes any cooperative gains to be shared are based on a different level 
of profit aggregation than the other party so perceives, then the parties 
will remain in dispute over how the pie is to be shared— simply because 
the potential size of the pie has not been agreed upon. Again, expecta 
tions of receiving equitable sharing of cooperative gains are thwarted 
and problems of perceived distrust and lack of commitment go 
unresolved.
Agree On Equitable Sharing of Cooperative Gains 
Finally, having agreed upon where in the organization there is to be 
cooperative input, the extent of that input, and how that input contrib 
utes directly and indirectly to cooperative gains, the parties need to 
resolve differences of opinion regarding equitable sharing. As dis 
cussed, although each party always prefers more over less, each party 
ultimately wants nothing less than their perceived contribution to any 
gain generated by cooperative activities. As one can readily imagine, 
determining an equitable share becomes exceedingly complex. First, it 
is difficult enough to accurately measure overall improvements, be they 
productivity, quality, or efficiency gains. Except in the simplest con 
texts, accurately measuring any gains due in full or in part to coopera-
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tion is probably impossible. For example, how does one measure labor's 
contribution to cooperative gains derived from upper-level management 
consultation with upper-level union leadership? How does one measure 
labor's contribution to gains derived from capital investments, either 
with respect to labor's input into those decisions or labor's utilization of 
capital investments?
Second, not all performance gains or losses are due to cooperative 
efforts. Yet the parties must reach some agreement as to what portion of 
performance gains, if any, are to be divided based on equitable sharing, 
the remaining portion to be divided by traditional bargaining. In spite of 
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of accurately measuring the portion of 
any overall gain attributable to cooperation and then measuring each 
party's contribution to those cooperative gains, the parties still must 
reach an explicit agreement of sharing the fruits of cooperation.
From the union's viewpoint, sharing the fruits of cooperation has as 
much to do with job security as it does with compensation. The demor 
alization that arises from continued employment losses cannot be under 
estimated. Hence, agreements on sharing performance gains must be 
fashioned around compensation and employment security.
With respect to compensation, some negotiated formula for perfor 
mance gain sharing—be it gainsharing, profit sharing, and/or stock 
ownership—should be negotiated. The formulas are used to make ex 
plicit labor and management's equitable shares of performance improve 
ments. As best the parties can, these performance sharing plans should 
be tied to the various levels or points of cooperative input throughout the 
organization.
At the plant level in multiplant companies, gainsharing based on 
productivity or performance benchmarks may be most appropriate in 
sharing gains (if any) from cooperative input at that level of organiza 
tions. The formulas established necessarily should reflect the agreed 
upon intensity or degree of input from labor. That is, formulas used 
should satisfactorily reflect the perceptions of the amount of input for 
each kind of input (i.e., the points of input) by labor and management. 
For instance, if capital investments are made, the parties must agree how 
much, if any, performance improvements derived from capital invest-
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ments go to labor. Where management decides and acts unilaterally to 
make capital investments, but those decisions are predicated on the 
union's cooperative spirit, then the negotiated formula should reflect 
some measure of sharing any gains with labor as derived from such 
investments. One can imagine that the union's proportionate share 
would be smaller (say 10 percent of gains) than where capital investment 
decisions were first proposed by joint teams or joint committees. Here, 
the parties may agree that 25 or 50 percent of gains are to be shared with 
labor. Similarly, the parties must address the proportion of gains to be 
shared as derived from all other forms of union input and participation at 
the plant. The key, of course, is tying the proportion of gains to the 
degree of union input that leads to performance improvements.
As we move up the organization hierarchy to the division, group, 
or operating company level and then on to corporate headquarters, mea 
suring cooperative input and gains from cooperation becomes even 
more complex (and in many cases, perhaps hopelessly so). Some 
performance-sharing formula, however, must still be devised. Again, 
the parties must decide the form of sharing and base that sharing on the 
points of cooperative input. Given the added complexity and the more 
steps removed from the cooperative input, it would be advisable that the 
parties fashion some sort of profit sharing and/or stock ownership plan. 
Although more removed from the actual cooperative input, the ambigu 
ity inherent in tracing cooperative input to cooperative output demands a 
more ambiguous performance-sharing formula. It remains essential 
though that both labor and management come to agree that the method 
and formula used reflect the parties'joint effort to tie performance gains, 
at least roughly so, to cooperative gains (gotten both directly and 
indirectly).
In summary, by constructing acceptable performance gain formulas, 
the parties make explicit their perceptions and expectations of equitable 
sharing from cooperative efforts and they distinguish between gains (or 
losses) derived from traditional collective bargaining and those derived 
from cooperation. In so doing, the parties eliminate (or greatly mini 
mize) misperceptions about labor's claim to the company's wealth.
Performance sharing arrangements also carry with them other advan-
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tages. First they provide a mechanism by which the parties can better 
assess and monitor their performance. As discussed in chapter 4, it 
appears that performance gains from cooperation peak after a few years 
and then decline. By better monitoring of successes and failures, if and 
when performance begins to decline, the parties can more quickly and 
vigorously tackle the factors or problems leading to waning perfor 
mance. Second, advocates of performance-sharing arrangements 
largely premise their advocation on the grounds that such plans provide 
financial incentive for employees to become more committed to attain 
ing performance improvements. As such, employees are more inclined 
to actively participate in joint activities and more aggressively seek 
solutions to problems and barriers impeding performance. Finally, it is 
generally argued that performance-sharing arrangements not only allow 
employees to share in the responsibility and gains of improving com 
pany performance but also to share the risks associated with running a 
business. By sharing the rewards and risks, employees are expected to 
become more in tune with good business practices and managers are 
expected to become more in tune with good employee and labor- 
management relations practices. In turn, both parties learn to engage in 
more optimal employment-related behaviors.
As recognized above, compensation is only part of the performance- 
sharing equation; employment security is another. Underlying coopera 
tion is the important notion that each party learns to better appreciate the 
special interests of the other party. Underlying the trust and commitment 
surrounding cooperation is the important notion that each party (having 
recognized and having a better understanding of the legitimate interests 
of the other) becomes more committed to seeing those legitimate inter 
ests obtained. The issue at hand and one central to the long-run success 
of cooperative efforts is employment security. Along these lines, em 
ployees and union representatives expect that operational decisions give 
considerable weight to potential employment displacement. Several 
examples may best illustrate this point.
Strategic operational decisions about the opening and location of new 
facilities, the assignment of new product lines, the closing or idling of 
facilities, subcontracting bargaining unit work, and capital investments
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have been (short of contractual and NLRB-imposed restrictions) the 
exclusive domain of management decisionmaking. In cooperative set 
tings, however, the potential for substantial displacement carries with it 
an expectation by labor that (1) management will seek alternative 
business plans that minimize displacement while satisfying other legiti 
mate business concerns, and (2) those local parties who have worked the 
hardest at cooperation will be the least adversely affected. These legiti 
mate expectations by unions require that strategic operational decisions 
be influenced by employment security concerns. They obligate manage 
ment, furthermore, to reward local parties who have demonstrated their 
commitment to making joint activities successful. It is proposed herein 
that labor and management negotiate or management make explicit up 
front (a) the factors that are weighed in making various strategic opera 
tional decisions, (b) the weight or ranking among factors of the impor 
tance given to displacement of employees, and (c) the weight or ranking 
among factors given to the success of local joint efforts in improving 
productivity, quality, and operational efficiencies.
This proposal is not to imply that employment security or the reward 
ing of local cooperative efforts are factors to be given the top priority 
among all other factors (albeit that may be the optimal solution in some 
cases). Instead, the above proposal requires the parties to agree over the 
weighting or ranking among other factors of employment security and 
rewarding local parties for their cooperative efforts. Having reached an 
acceptable agreement, the parties are agreeing (at least for the present 
and until renegotiated) that they can live by the agreement, without 
misperceptions that lead to rising mistrust and diminishing commitment 
to cooperation.
Summary and Conclusions 
New Partnerships or Going in Circles?
Because of enormous and unrelenting market forces at work, labor- 
management relations have had to change. The volatility of the market 
during the late 1970s and throughout most of the 1980s, coupled with
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long-run market pressures, have required that unionized organizations 
become far more adaptable and flexible and that they continually im 
prove performance. At the corporate level of highly unionized manufac 
turing, three grand labor relations strategies are currently being pur 
sued: Union-Avoidance, Cooperation, and a Mixed strategy 
encompassing elements of both union-avoidance and cooperation. In the 
short run, Cooperators appear to have gained the edge with respect to 
improving corporate performance. The longer-run outcome regarding 
which strategy may prevail, however, is still in the making.
Primarily influenced by the strategic choices of their parent head 
quarters, roughly half of the unionized manufacturing plants in the U.S. 
have embarked on formalized cooperative activities. These activities 
include joint team-based and committee-based programs. Only the 
more intensive joint programs in these plants appear to be having 
positive effects on plant performance and on labor-management rela 
tionships. Where there are secure unions and high degrees of union 
leader participation, gains are all the more sizable. Where employment 
continues to decline and employers engage in subcontracting out bar 
gaining unit work, gains from cooperation are difficult to achieve. The 
evidence also indicates that the positive returns to joint efforts typically 
wane after a few years.
Several general types of problems are typically encountered in coop 
erative settings, problems that can seriously undermine the cooperative 
spirit. These problems include violations of or insufficient trust and 
commitment, demoralization from employment insecurity and antici 
pated gains not achieved, and the inherent difficulties of juxtaposing or 
interweaving traditional collective bargaining and cooperation.
Based on empirical analyses reported herein, several general implica 
tions for unions can be derived. First, in the great majority of cases, 
unions have little choice but to cooperate, because even traditional 
adversarial relations of the past are no longer available to them. Second, 
however, unions have many choices to make about what cooperation 
entails. Third, union leaders, as advocates for the general welfare and 
benefit of employees, must become tomorrow's human resource man 
agement experts and must understand far better the running of a profit-
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able business. As advocates and experts, union leaders have the oppor 
tunity to improve the lives of their members and simultaneously show 
management the full potential for deriving necessary added value via the 
improved management and utilization of its human resources.
American history shows that cooperation has been a short-lived 
experience for nearly all unionized organizations. The widespread "ex 
perimentation" of the present era, however, is unusual and signals that 
conditions have greatly changed, giving some indication that coopera 
tion in U.S. industry may ultimately become a workable alternative. 
Nevertheless, the parties must find ways to avoid the pitfalls that have 
destroyed earlier cooperative efforts. It is in this spirit that several 
prescriptions for long-term success are proposed: namely, establish 
triggers and procedures to resolve serious problems and crises, negoti 
ate trust and commitment, and establish and clarify labor's stake in 
business decisionmaking and labor's claim to sharing performance 
gains.
Competitive threats to unionized enterprises have spurred coopera 
tion, but those competitive threats can also destroy cooperative efforts 
by pitting proponents and opponents of cooperation (within both man 
agement and union ranks) against one another, as organizations faced by 
shrinking markets struggle to find a way out. In that struggle, many 
parties may lose by simply going in circles, with the potential fruits of 
cooperation only an illusion. Those who can form workable part 
nerships, on the other hand, with their eyes focused on continuous 








Management-union cooperative programs as defined for present pur 
poses refer to activities devised and/or undertaken jointly with unions. 
The focus of such programs may be on company performance (for 
example, productivity committees or quality control circles), and/or 
worker satisfaction and well being (for example, quality of work life, 
employee involvement, and safety and health). Activities may also 
entail some form of incentive arrangement to increase company prof 
itability and employee compensation (for example, Scanlon or Rucker 
gainsharing plans and profit sharing or ESOPs that include activities 
designed to increase employee involvement).
If you have never established any such joint programs, please com 
plete sections I, II, III and VII. If you have established any such 
program, even if it has not been fully implemented or has been termi 
nated, please complete all sections of this questionnaire.
Section I. Program Identification
Below is a table that identifies several kinds of programs. Under the 
various stages of the process identified at the top of the table, please 
provide the approximate month and year for each of the applicable 
stages.
Even if you have not established any kind of joint program, please 
indicate under column 1 if the establishment of any kind of joint 
programs was given serious initial consideration, and if so, when.
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Program/ Activity
L Quality of Work Life 
2. Productivity Committee 
3. Quality Control Circles 
















Activity NOT a 
Became Program Joint 
Widespread Terminated Program











9. Other Gainsharing Plan
10. Health and Safety Comm.
11. Substance Abuse Comm.
12. ESOP (with employee 
involvement activities)




Even if you have established or terminated any of the programs 
identified below and they are not jointly coordinated efforts with the 
union, please check this in the last column.
Section II. General Information About Plant
1. What proportion of production workers are under the union con 
tract identified in the cover letter? ____%
2. How many unions represent employees in your plant? ____
3. What proportion of non-exempt office employees are under a 
union contract? ____%
4. What is the average length of employment within the bargaining 
unit? ____ years
5. What proportion of the bargaining unit employees are 
female? ____%
6. Since 1975, what has been the extent of capital expenditures on 
new technologies or automation within the plant?
Substantial ____ Modest ____ None ____ $____
7. Since 1975, what proportion of the bargaining unit employees 
have lost their jobs in the plant because of the introduction of new 
technologies or automation? ____ %
8. Since 1975, what proportion of bargaining unit jobs have been 
subcontracted out on a permanent basis?
Substantial ____ Modest ____ None ____ ____%
9. Since 1975, would you characterize any round of negotiations as 
"concession" bargaining (i.e., wage or benefit freezes or cut 
backs, elimination of restrictive work rules, etc)?
No ____ Yes ____
If yes, in what year or years were such concessions negoti 
ated? ____ ____ ____
10. Is there an Area-Wide Joint Labor-Management Committee in the
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locality of your plant?
Yes ____ No ____ Don't know
11. Is there an Industry-Wide Joint Labor Management Committee in 
your industry?
Yes ____ No ____ Don't know ____
Section III. Comparison of 1976-1980 Period to 1981-1985 Period
Comparing the 1976-1980 period to the 1981-1985 period, please 
indicate the extent to which the variables identified below have changed 
since the 1976-1980 period.
Extent of Change
Much Modestly About Modestly Much 
Variable Higher Higher the Same Lower Lower
1. Total level of production ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
2. Plant capacity utilization ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
3. Productivity per unit of labor ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
4. Product quality ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
5. Rate of scrappage or waste ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
6. Restrictiveness of work rules ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
7. Rate of grievances ____ ____ _____ ____ ____
8. Rate of absenteeism/tardiness ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
9. Adversarial relationship with 
union
10. Adversarial relationship be 
tween supervisors and work 
force
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Section IV. Structure and Focus of Program Activities
A. Including any j oint program that may have been terminated, please 
briefly describe the focus and structure of the joint effort that you 
consider to be the most important to management objectives, 
excluding health and safety activities. (If you have some documen 
tation describing the focus and structure of this program, feel free 
to submit that in place of your description under 2 below.)
1. Key problem(s) that led to and is addressed by program: (e. g., 
productivity, quality, absenteeism)
2. Structure of kind of activities: (e. g., work team arrangements, 
ad hoc tasks groups, regular meetings for employee input, 
etc.)
B. In reference to the program identified above, please indicate:
1. the proportion of bargaining unit employees covered by the 
program: ____ %
2. the frequency of scheduled meetings for
(a) the highest level steering committee: every ____ 
weeks
(b) the lowest level work groups or teams, (if applicable): 
every ____ weeks
3. the number and proportion of union representatives on the 
highest level steering committee: # ____ % ____
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4. who initially promoted the development of the program: 
parent company ____ plant management __ 
division headquarters____ union __
C. If the program identified above has been terminated, please iden 
tify what you believe to be the key factors leading to its termination.
D. To what extent has your plant worked with the following organiza 
tions in designing and/or implementing cooperative programs?
Organization Not at all Some Very Much
Area-Wide Joint Labor-Management
Committee ___ ___ ___
Industry-Wide Joint Labor- 
Management Committee
Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service (FMCS)
U.S. Department of Labor
Section V: Comparison of Conditions Before and After Joint 
Program Implementation
Comparing the five year period prior to implementation of the most 
important joint program identified above, please indicate the degree to 
which the variables identified below have changed.
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Extent of Change
Much Modestly About Modestly Much 
Variable Higher Higher the Same Lower Lower
1. Total level of production ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
2. Plant capacity utilization ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
3. Productivity per unit of labor ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
4. Product quality ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
5. Rate of scrappage or waste ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
6. Restrict!veness of work rules ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
7. Rate of grievances ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
8. Rate of absenteeism/tardiness ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
9. Adversarial relationship with 
union
10. Adversarial relationship be 
tween supervisors and work 
force
11. Cooperative spirit in contract 
negotiations
12. Other conditions that have 
changed (describe)
Section VI. Difficulties in Implementing and Maintaining Joint 
Program Activities
Problems obviously arise as joint program activities are imple 
mented. To what extent have the following problems affected the suc 






Potential Not a Somewhat Very much Termination 
Problems Problem a Problem a Problem of Program
1. Lack of experience or expertise in 
devising and implementing joint 
programs. _____ _____ _____ _____
2. Lack of sufficient trust between
parties. _____ _____ _____ _____
3. Lack of adequate preparation of plant
management for change. _____ _____ _____ _____
4. Lack of adequate orientation and 
training for bargaining unit employ-
5. Perceived lack of commitment by up 
per management.
6. Lack of broad commitment among 
plant managers.
7. Lack of broad commitment by union 
leaders.
8. Difficulty juxtaposing cooperation 
and contract negotiations.
9. Difficulty juxtaposing cooperation 
and contract administration.
Other that the potential problems identified above, please briefly 
describe other problems that you have encountered and/or elaborate, if 
you wish, on any of potential problems identified above.
Section VII.
Please identify the top labor relations executive at the parent company 
or division headquarters who would be most familiar with labor rela-
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tions at all the company's plants. If your company is a single plant 
company, simply check here:
single plant company ____






Finally: please enclose a copy of your current labor agreement. 
Name of Respondent: __________________ 
Company of Respondent: ________________
Thank you again for responding to this questionnaire. As 
soon as the results have been compiled and analyzed, I will 




Survey of Local Unions:
Joint Labor-Management Relations
Project
Union-management cooperative programs as defined for present pur 
poses refer to activities undertaken jointly between companies and 
unions. The focus of such programs may be on company performance 
(for example, productivity committees or quality control circles), and/ 
or worker satisfaction and well being (for example, quality of work life, 
employee involvement, and safety and health). Activities may also 
entail some form of incentive arrangement to increase company prof 
itability and employee compensation (for example, Scanlon or Rucker 
gainsharing plans and profit sharing that include activities designed to 
increase employee involvement).
If you have never established any such joint programs, please com 
plete sections I, II, and VI. If you have established any such program, 
even if it has not been fully implemented or has been terminated, please 
complete all sections of this questionnaire.
Lastly, questions that refer to this company or this plant pertain to 
the bargaining unit employees represented by your local union at the 
plant of the company identified in the cover letter.
SECTION I. Program Identification
Below is a table that identifies several kinds of programs. Under the 
various stages of the process identified at the top of the table, please 





















Month Year Month Year Month Year Month Year Month Year
1. Quality of Work Life
2. Productivity Committee
3. Quality Control Circles
4. Work Teams
5. Training Committee




9. Other Gainsharing Plan
10. Health and Safety Comm.
11. Substance Abuse Comm.
12. ESOP (with employee involvement activities)
13. Profit Sharing (with
	employee involvement activities)
14. Other?
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SECTION II. General Information about Union and Plant
1. What proportion of production workers are represented by your 
union in this plant? ____ %
2. Which of the following best describes the bargaining structure 
between your union and this company?
a. Master agreement with more than one plant of this com 
pany, plus supplemental local agreements at each 
plant. ____
b. Single-plant agreement between your local and this 
plant. ____
c. Multi-employer agreement between your union and more 
than one company ____
d. Multi-union agreement between one or more additional 
unions and this company. _____
3. Do you have a union-shop security clause in your agreement 
with this company?
____ Yes ____ No
4. Do representatives from the national or regional union offices 
actively participate in your contract negotiations?
____ Yes ____ No
5. Does the national union require national union approval of 
contracts negotiated by your local?
____ Yes ____ No
6. Does your local union represent employees at other companies 
in your area?
____ Yes ____ No
If yes, how many other companies? ____
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7. In what year did your union negotiate its first agreement with 
this company at your plant? ____
8. Is the top local officer elected by the local membership or is he 
or she an appointed business agent?
____ elected by local membership ____ appointedJ f IT IT
business agent
9. How long has the current top local officer been in his/her 
position?
____ Years
10. What is the average length of employment within the bargaining 
unit?
____ Years
11. What proportion of the bargaining unit employees are 
female? ____ %
12. Since 1975, would you characterize any round of negotiations 
with this company as "concession" bargaining (where, for ex 
ample, wages or benefits were frozen or cut or protective work 
rules were modified)?
____ Yes ____ No
If yes, in what year or years were such concessions negotiated?
13. To what extent does the local union leadership trust manage 
ment's capabilities to manage this company?
____ Very little ____ Much 
____ Little ____ Very much
14. To what extent does this company treat the union as having a 
legitimate right to represent workers?
____ Very little right ____ Little right 
____ Full right
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15 . Which of the following best describes the overall relationship 
between the bargaining unit and local management?
____ Very good ____ Poor 
____ Satisfactory ____ Very poor
16. Is there an Area- Wide Joint Labor-Management Committee in 
your locality?
____ Yes ____ No ____ Don't know
17. Is there an Industry- Wide Joint Labor-Management Committee 
in your industry?
____ No ____ Don't know
18. To what extend do the following parties support the establish 
ment of joint labor-management programs?
Generally Generally 
Party Opposed Neutral in Favor
Local Union Leaders ____ ____ _____
National Union Leaders ____ ____ ____
Local Union Members ____ ____ _____
Plant Management ____ _____ ____
Company Executives ____ ____ ____
SECTION HI. Structure and Focus of Program Activities
A. Including any joint program that may have been terminated, 
please briefly describe the focus and structure of the joint effort 
that you consider to be the most important to union objectives 
(excluding health and safety activities).
1. Key problem(s) that led to and is addressed by program 
(for example, quality of work life, job security, low produc 
tivity, etc.):
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2. Kind of joint activities (for example, work team arrange 
ments, ad hoc tasks groups, regular meetings for employee 
input, etc.):
B. In reference to the program identified above, please answer the 
following questions.
1 . What proportion of bargaining unit employees are covered 
by the program?
2. How frequent are meetings held by:
(a) the highest level steering committee? 
every ____ weeks
(b) the shop floor work groups or teams (if applicable)? 
every ____ weeks
3. Are these meetings well attended by committee or team 
members? (please check)
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(b) Shop Floor 
Committee 
Meetings
4. How many union and company representatives sit on the 
highest level steering committee?
____ # union rep. ____ # company rep.
5. Who first promoted the development of the joint program?
____ union ____ company ____ both union 
and company
C. Have any union representatives been assigned or elected by the 
union to act as joint program coordinators or facilitators?
____ Yes ____ No
If yes, how many union representatives are full-time or part-time 
coordinators or facilitators?
____ # full-time ____ # part-time
D. To what extent are joint labor-management activities allowed to 
modify either work rules or wages and benefits negotiated in the 
labor agreement? (please check)
Not at all Very little Little Much
Work rules ___ ___ ___ ___
Wages and
benefits ___ ___ ___ ___
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If work rules and/or wages and benefits can be modified through 
joint activities, what procedure or rules are followed in making 
modifications? (please briefly describe)
E. To what extent do union representatives who serve on the con 
tract negotiation team or who are regular grievance commit- 
teemen also serve in key positions in joint labor-management 
committees?
____ Not at all ____ Much overlap 
____ Very little overlap ____ Very much overlap
E Has the national or regional union office provided expertise or 
resources to your local for joint labor-management activities?
____ Yes ____ No
G. Has any neutral outside consultant(s) been used to help facilitate 
your joint efforts?
____ Yes ____ No
H. To what extent have tradeoffs been made between promotion of 
the union's social concerns or objectives (for example, concerns 
for older workers, minorities, females, safety and health, etc.) 
and joint labor-management program objectives?
Considerable tradeoff ____ Some tradeoff ____
Little or no tradeoff ____
I. To what extent has your plant worked with the following organi 
zations in designing and/or implementing cooperative programs?
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Organization Not at all Some Very Much





Federal Mediation & 
Conciliation Service 
(FMCS)
U.S. Department of 
Labor
SECTION IV. Comparison of Conditions Before and After Joint 
Program Implementation
Comparing the five year period prior to implementation of the most 
important joint program identified above, please indicate the degree to 
which the variables identified below have changed.
Extent of Change
Variable
Much Modestly About Modestly Much 
Higher Higher the Same Lower Lower
1. Union member satisfaction 
with job tasks.
Level of job security.
3. Work conditions and quality 
of work life.
Sharing of information by 
management.
Management understanding 
of worker interests and 
problems.
Management understanding 







7. Union leaders' understanding 
of management's business in 
terests and problems.
8. Union members' understand 
ing of management's business 
interests and problems.
9. Joint problem solving rela 
tionship between union lead 
ers and managers.
10. Union input into business 
decisions.
11. Cooperative spirit in contract 
negotiations.
12. Problem solving relationship 
between supervisors and 
union members.
13. Union's ability to resolve 
member grievances or prob 
lems satisfactorily.
14. Union member commitment 
to union
15. Union member commitment 
to company.
16. Public image of union.
17. Worker productivity.
18. Product quality.
19. Level of scrappage or waste.
20. Rate of grievances.
21. Rate of absenteeism/tardi 
ness.
22. Flexibility of work rules.
23. Other variables?
SECTION V. Problems in Implementing and Maintaining Joint 
Program Activities
Problems obviously arise as joint program activities are imple 
mented. To what extent have the following problems affected the sue-
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Potential Not a Somewhat Very much Termination 
Problems Problem a Problem a Problem of Program
1. Lack of experience or expertise in 
devising and implementing joint 
programs. _____ _____ _____ _____
2. Lack of sufficient trust between
parties. _____ _____ _____ _____
3. Violation of trust by either party. _____ _____ _____ _____
4. Lack of adequate preparation of
plant management for change. _____ _____ _____ _____
5. Lack of adequate orientation and 
training for bargaining unit em 
ployees for change. _____ _____ _____ _____
6. Lack of commitment by upper
management. _____ _____ _____ _____
7. Lack of broad commitment among
plant managers. _____ _____ _____ _____
8. TUrnover of key managers. _____ _____ _____ _____
9. Lack of broad commitment by 
union leaders.
10. TUrnover of key union leaders.
11. Skepticism or lack of interest by 
workers.
12. Balancing joint activities and con 
tract negotiations
13. Balancing joint activities and con 
tract administration (e.g. griev 
ance handling).
14. Perceived manipulation of pro 
gram (or bonus formula) by 
management.
15. Perception by workers that union 
leadership has been coopted by 
management.
16. Insufficient job security.
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17. Continued reduction in work 
force.
18. Expected gains from program not 
gotten.
Other than the potential problems identified above, please briefly 
describe other problems that you have encountered and/or elaborate, if 
you wish on any of potential problems identified above.
SECTION VI. Thank you again for responding to this questionnaire. 
As soon as the results have been compiled and analyzed, I will send you 
a summary of the key findings.
Name of Respondent: 
Name of Union: 
Phone number:
Lastly, as part of the analysis, it would be very helpful to have a copy 
of your current labor agreement. Therefore, we ask that you please 







1. At what operating level are key strategic decisions made 
regarding manufacturing operations (i.e., major capital 
investments, acquisitions, plant closure, etc.)?
____ parent ____ subsidiary
headquarters headquarters
____ operating ____ divisionf &
headquarters headquarters
2. At what operating level are key strategic policies made regard 
ing labor-management relations (i.e., key negotiation issues, 
union avoidance, joint management-union activities, etc.)?
____ parent ____ subsidiary
headquarters headquarters
____ operating ____ division
headquarters headquarters
3. If you represent a subsidiary, operating company, or division 
of a parent company, please complete a, b, c, and d below.
(a) Name of Parent Co.: __________________ 
Address: __________________





(c) Name of subsidiary, operating company, or division 
headquarters that you represent:
Name of Organization: _______________
____ subsidiary ____operating co. 
____ division
(d) By drawing arrows between the organizational units 
below, indicate the linkages between your subsidary, 





Please answer the questions below as they apply to your level 
within the organization structure (parent company, subsidiary, 
etc.).
These data are for statistical purposes only. All answers will 
remain confidential.
B. Manufacturing Facilities
1. How many domestic manufacturing plants are there within 
the company?
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____ # of unionized facilities ____ # of non-union
facilities
2. Since 1975, how many domestic manufacturing plants have 
been opened or acquired and are still in operation?
____ # of unionized plants ____ # of non-union
plants
3. Since 1975, how many domestic manufacturing plants have 
been permanently shut down?
____ # of unionized plants ____ # of non-union
plants
4. How many unionized domestic manufacturing plants have 
some formalized joint management-union activities de 
signed to improve company performance and/or quality of 
work life? ____
5. How many manufacturing plants are located outside of 
North America? ____
6. Approximately what proportion of total manufacturing pro 
duction is produced outside North America? ____ % 
total production.
7. Approximately what proportion of total manufacturing 
products (components and finished goods) are sold outside 
North America? ____ % total worldwide sales.
8. Since 1975, have there been any major changes in company 
structure due to merger with other companies, major ac 
quisitions, or joint ventures? Yes ____ No ____
If yes, please briefly identify these mergers, acquisitions, or 
joint ventures.
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C. Company Policy In Unionized Facilities
1. In general, company executives are
____ not in favor of ____ in favor of 
____ indifferent to joint management-union programs 
or activities.
2. Specifically, the company has: (check one)
____ a. instructed plant management to actively pur 
sue joint management-union activities.
____ b. instructed management NOT to engage in 
joint management-union activities.
____ c. left the decision to engage in joint manage 
ment-union activities to plant level managers.
3. To what extent are top union officers involved in strategic 
management decisions affecting your manufacturing 
operations?
___ very much involved ___ somewhat involved 
___ much involved ___ not involved 
Please briefly describe any such involvement. ______
In general, it is company policy to:
____ strongly oppose ____ oppose 
____ remain neutral to union representation of non 
union manufacturing plants.
How many union organizing drives have occurred in the last 
5 years at your manufacturing plants?
____ # of successful union organizing drives 
____ # of unsuccessful union organizing drives
Have there been any union decertification efforts in the last 
5 years at your manufacturing plant?
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Yes ____ No ____ 
If yes, how many?
____ # of decertification drives unions have lost 
_____ # of decertification drives unions have won
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